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1Introduction
Kees van Kersbergen, Robert H. Lieshout and Grahame Lock
1 Sovereignty and the Retreat of the State?
We live, as is often remarked, in a fast-changing world. Some of the changes
to which we are witness - and which are of practical concern to us all - lie
in the political sphere. For instance, advanced societies are marked, among
other things, by complex shifts in the power and competence of the nation
state. It is said that state and society are becoming increasingly interwoven,
leading to a 'politicization of society' and a 'socialization of the state'. This
implies that the tasks and responsibilities of the nation state are in continu-
ous expansion. Yet a process of 'individualization' and 'fragmentation' of
political and social life also seems to be taking place; to this must be added
a redistribution of some of the capacities of the nation state to regional or
local levels as well as to 'intermediate bodies'. In the opposite direction,
however, other developments, like internationalization, including the emer-
gence of new regulatory systems at international level, are generating what
are called 'transnational' networks. These appear to be gaining control of
ever more aspects of social and political existence.
As a result of these developments, political decision-making is becom-
ing opaque, and the mechanisms of democratic control - which have tradi-
tionally operated in the framework of the nation state - seem to be in a
process of erosion. At the same time the scope and the character of politi-
cal participation are being modified: new networks are emerging as links
between the various decision-making levels, while support for 'national
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society' is falling, and the efficacy of national governance structures is
declining. Thus expansion, individualization, localization, internationaliza-
tion and fragmentation have all become keywords summarizing the phe-
nomenon of political change as it now affects advanced societies.
The central theme of this book is political change.] Whether we look at
political change from the perspective of political philosophy, international
relations or comparative politics (the three disciplines represented in this
volume), its key aspects are increasingly analyzed in terms of the transfor-
mation of the nation state. The nation state is seen more and more as just
one 'form of governance' (cf. Caporaso 1996) where many others are also
conceivable.
We agree that political authority can take many forms and be based on
all kinds of principles. The nation state's distinctive characteristic as a form
of governance is that political authority is based on the principle of territor-
iality. The nation state is a historically specific form of political authority,
which is enduring yet variable. It has existed since the end of the Thirty Years
War. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) meant the victory of a new interna-
tional order based on territorially defined units of political authority that
accepted one another as equals. As sovereign states 'they no longer claimed
the right to exercise authority on the territory of another state, and denied
that any authority could be placed above them' (Lieshout 1999: 13). Sover-
eignty refers both to the fact that states actually enjoy supreme power over
their territory and the people living on it, and to the fact that they claim this
power as a right of international law (cf. lackson 1999a).
In the contemporary debate on political change and the nation state
sovereignty plays a central role in many ways. It is therefore imperative to
avoid conceptual confusion. In our view, sovereignty has two aspects. The
first is that, with respect to its territory and the population living on it, a
state recognizes no authority other than its own. This is called 'territorial
integrity' or 'internal' sovereignty. The second aspect is that a state recog-
nizes no authority above it in its relations with other states. This is called
'independence' or 'external' sovereignty (cf. Lieshout 1999: 14). States can
delegate part of their internal as well as their external sovereignty to interna-
tional organizations. This does not mean, however, that states 'surrender'
their sovereignty. It is crucial to bear this in mind when studying political
change in terms of the transformation of the nation state. It implies that, in
principle, we tend to be sceptical of those analyses that, too readily and too
strongly, claim the end of the Westphalian system and the nation state, the
accompanying crisis of democracy, and even 'the end of history'.
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Scholte quotes interesting UNCfAD figures to the effect that the number
of enterprises operating in more than one state jurisdiction increased from
3,500 in 1960 to 40,000 in 1995 (UNCfAD 1996: ICla22). Just as interest-
ingly, 'intrafirm trade between subsidiaries of the same transborder corpora-
tion accounts for at least a quarter and perhaps as much as over 40 per cent
of the world's cross-border commerce' (Scholte 1997: 437). Nevertheless,
the nation state survives as a central political entity. Indeed, Scholte correct-
ly notes that 'states have played an indispensable enabling role in the glob-
alization of capital' (ibidem: 441). The reason is obvious: this globalization
of capital can only function within a regulatory framework, and this frame-
work is largely the work of the nation states, especially in the form of the re-
alization of international treaties and agreements. It is true, though, that
there are now fields of economic activity in respect of which it is difficult to
determine what national jurisdiction is responsible for their regulation.
It is therefore not obvious that we should, as Scholte proposes, draw the
conclusion that nation states have, for reasons like the above, lost their 'for-
mer core attribute of sovereignty' (ibidem: 442). His claim that global capital
readily overrides state sovereignty seems to confuse a legal with an econom-
ic issue. It may be true that multinational and transnational corporations
'regularly frustrate tax collectors through transfer pricing and offshore cor-
porate registration' (ibidem: 443), as well as by other measures, such as the
relocation of production and marketing facilities. This, however, means not
that these corporations are challenging state sovereignty, but that they are
attempting to avoid some of the consequences of their subjection to that
sovereignty, that is to say in casu to the fiscal laws of certain high-taxation
states. Again, the pressures exerted by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank (IBRD) and similar agencies, however constraining
these pressures may de facto be, do not in principle imply any demand on
the part of these agencies for the relinquishment of state sovereignty. Nor
can we say that the growth of what are called 'multilateral governance
arrangements', though these are of great interest in respect to their princi-
ples of organization and function (do they 'facilitate' or 'curb' the activities
of transnational or supraterritorial capitalism?) formally puts into question
the authority or sovereignty of the nation states, which indeed are, directly
or indirectly, collectively responsible for these arrangements.
Accordingly, we reject the unsophisticated globalization argument that,
as territorial borders are progressively becoming economically irrelevant,
processes such as world market integration are 'limiting' or even 'undermin-
Introduction 13
ing' the sovereignty of nation states. It may be the case that the nation state
has lost a significant part of its power, since this 'has leaked away, upwards,
sideways, and downwards'. It may be that 'in some matters, it seems even to
have gone nowhere, just evaporated', or even that 'the realm of anarchy in
society and economy has become more extensive as that of all kinds of
authority has diminished' (Strange 1995: 56); and it may be equally true
that globalization represents 'a shift in locus of decision-making not only
from the nation-state to transnational actors but also from national govern-
ments to the private sector' (Cable 1995: 37). Neither of these develop-
ments, however, necessarily implies that the core property of sovereignty -
the claim to supreme authority over a certain territOlY and its inhabitants
within clearly defined borders - is disintegrating just because penetrating
these borders is becoming less and less difficult (cf. Anderson 1996).
It goes without saying that the political science literature on the process
of European integration also increasingly focuses on the effects of the
emerging polity of the European Union (EU) on relations of authority
between and within its member states. Can the states that are part of this
'supranational polity' (cf. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998) still be regard-
ed as sovereign? Multi-level theorists argue that the European Union is a
polity in the making (cf. Marks and Hooghe 1999). They also claim that this
polity has no historical precedent. The European Union is neither a new
federal state nor a mere intergovernmental pact. It is supposed to have
become a system of multi level governance. Subnational, national and
supranational levels are said to share in authority and decision-making, but
particularly in this type of argument, it is imperative that crucial concepts
such as authority and sovereignty, as well as power and control, are used in
a clear and unambiguous manner. Marks et al. (1996: 342~3) fail to do this,
when they argue that 'while national governments are formidable partici-
pants in EU policy-making, control has slipped away from them to supra-
national institutions. States have lost some of their former authoritative
control over individuals in their respective territories. In short, the locus of
political control has changed. Individual state sovereignty is diluted in the
EU by collective decision-making among national governments and by the
autonomous role of the European Parliament, the European Commission,
and the European Court of Justice'.
In our view, the European Union is still primarily an intergovernmental
bargain between states. This bargain has not affected the sovereignty of the
member states, but obviously has had an impact on, although not necessar-
14 Kees van Kersbergen, Robert 11. UesllOUI and Crahmne Loch
ily diminished, let alone annulled, their policy autonomy. Moreover, no
one will dispute that, whenever it concerns 'history-making decisions' (cf.
Peterson 1995), i.e. decisions that will change the Ell's institutions and its
rules of the game, states are still the prime movers.
Historically, the delegation of competences to the European suprana-
tional institutions has first of all served well-defined national goals, and
strengthened rather than weakened the nation state. This view has been
argued forcefully, although on the basis of very different rationales, by Mil-
ward (1992) and, more recently, Moravcsik (1998). Milward takes excep-
tion to much political science 'theorizing about interdependence and inte-
gration' as 'a piquant but watery soup through which the historian hunts in
vain for solid scraps of nutriment' (Milward 1992: 20). Contrary to what
most political science theories would lead us to expect, historical evidence
bears out that there exists no antithesis between integration and the nation
state. It was only through the construction of supranational European insti-
tutions that the participating states were able to rescue themselves from col-
lapse. In so doing the European nation state created 'a new political consen-
sus as the basis of its legitimacy, and through changes in its response to its
citizens which meant a sweeping extension of its functions and ambitions
reasserted itself as the fundamental unit of political organization. The Euro-
pean Community only evolved as an aspect of that national reassertion and
without it the reassertion might well have proved impossible. To supersede
the nation-state would be to destroy the Community. To put a finite limit to
the process of integration would be to weaken the nation-state, to limit its
scope and to curb its power' (ibidem: 3).
Moravcsik is as critical as Milward of the existing political science litera-
ture on Europe, but where the latter sees European integration primarily as
an effort to strengthen the European welfare state, the former regards it as 'a
distinctly modern form of power politics, peacefully pursued by democratic
states for largely economic reasons' (Moravcsik 1998: 5). The pooling and
delegation of authority are "'two-level" strategies designed to precommit
governments to a stream of future decisions by removing them from the
unilateral control of individual governments' (ibidem: 73). It should be
borne in mind, moreover, that the Ell is a supranational organization, and
that this type of organization has much less power vis-a-vis the member
states than any nation state has vis-a-vis its citizens. Haas's observation, in
his classic study on the first years of the European integration process, that
the newly created European institutions, such as the High Authority of the
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Coal and Steel Community, 'depend on the good faith of the old power cen-
tres for the realisation of their aims, both because of the real powers re-
tained by national governments and because the High Authority lacks any
substantial means for compelling compliance from a recalcitrant member
state' (Haas 1968a 119581: 58), still holds true today for the present institu-
tions, however much their power and scope may have increased since the
1950s.
Thus supranationality is compatible with the nation state. Some authors
would argue that the same applies to globalization and the nation state. On
the basis of empirical evidence they challenge the claim that economic inte-
gration has adverse effects on the domestic and international policy autono-
my of the nation state. In a recent study, Garrett argues that 'globalisation
and national autonomy are not mutually exclusive options. The benefits of
globalisation can be reaped without undermining the economic sovereignty
of nations, and without reducing the ability of citizens to choose how to dis-
tribute the benefits - and the costs - of the market' (Garrett 1998: 6). Be-
sides, as Weiss points out, it should not be forgotten that 'even if economic
integration were far more advanced than at present, the predicted emascula-
tion of state powers would not come about. This is for two interrelated rea-
sons. First, the effects of integration on governing capacities would not be
uniform... this is partly because nation-states themselves exhibit consider-
able adaptability and variety - both in their responses to change and in their
capacity to mediate and manage international and domestic linkages, in-
cluding in particular the government-business relationship. Second, contin-
ued divergence can be expected also because... in some key instances global-
isation is being advanced through the nation-state, and hence depends on
the latter for its meaning and existence' (Weiss 1998: 189).
2 Outline of the Book
The book's central theme is elaborated from different but complementary
theoretical and empirical perspectives. In Chapter 2, Grahame Lock analyzes
some aspects of the idea of political change, and recent mutations of it,
against the background of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the last of the
great 'modern' projects, and the newly revived claim of an 'end of history',
this time of the neo-liberal variety. Lock looks at the ideology of change and
some of its cognates: progress, development and revolution. How is politi-
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cal change perceived by those subject to its effects; and what is its relation to
so-called 'cultural change'? He analyzes the very powerful ideological pack-
age that, to all intents and purposes, appears to dominate the new, 'post-
modern' world, which is characterized by a new 'dogma of anti-dogmatism':
a neo-liberal-inspired attempt to eliminate politics, a conception of the
globe as one enormous civil society devoid of the state. He also explores the
relationship between this package and the ongoing processes of Euro-
peanization, internationalization and globalization. What are the chances
of the state surviving in these 'ahistoric' times?
In Chapter 3, Wil Hout and Robert H. Lieshout continue the analysis by
probing how a systems approach to international relations can help us get a
grip on the changes that are, and have been taking place in the international
system. They focus on two crucial changes characterizing the contemporary
global order, which can have far-reaching consequences for the Westphalian
states system: (1) the end of the bipolar structure of the international politi-
cal system as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and (2) the
increase in the level of interdependence among national economies. On the
basis of a brief review of some recent perceptions on the relationship be-
tween agent and structure, they first discuss the theoretical notions that help
to make sense of these changes. Subsequently, Hout and Lieshout try to es-
tablish to what extent the presumed end of bipolarity and increase in inter-
dependence can be substantiated empirically. Finally, they discuss the ques-
tion of what, on the basis of our theoretical understanding and empirical
results, can be said about the future of the international system. Will the end
of bipolarity and the rise in interdependence lead to the destruction of the
existing international system in which sovereign states are dominant?
In Chapter 4, Kees van Kersbergen takes a comparative perspective and
examines the challenges that economic internationalization and European
integration pose to national political systems. His argument is that both
processes affect the policy autonomy and political capacity of nation states,
but that these developments should not be confused, let alone equated with
a loss of sovereignty. Undoubtedly, the significance of national borders for
economic transactions has declined, but this does not imply the acute and
definitive demise of national sovereignty and politics. The adaptive capacity
of nation states is highly variable. This means that the effects of internation-
alization and Europeanization diverge and to a large extent depend on the
national political community's ability to mobilize power and form coali-
tions, both within the state and between them. The powerless state is a
Introduction 17
myth. In fact, the roles of the state and international cooperation are both
increasing, and in the course of this process the ways in which the state exer-
cises power are being transformed.
The theoretical consequences of the possibly changing forms in which
political power will be exercised in the future, are the topic of Chapter 5 by
MaTcel WissenbuTg. He imagines a world in which the state, once thought of
as the central unit of politics, the ultimate source of rights and sole wielder
of legitimate force, has 'fragmented' and 'leaks power' in several directions.
Wissenburg's exercise makes clear that mainstream, liberal, political theory
is to a large degree predicated on the existence of a sovereign state as a nec-
essary condition for the existence and protection of a society with liberal
democratic values. He explores the problems that this hypothetical 'disap-
pearance' of the state, for instance in the form of a far-reaching delegation
of power to supranational organizations, can pose for liberal democracy
and mainstream political theory. Even if sovereignty continues to be a fea-
ture of the nation state, at least two effects of these 'power leaks' pose fun-
damental challenges to liberal democracy: the creation of incompatible sys-
tems of rights and duties by distinct authorities supposed to bind the same
individual or groups of individuals, and the dissolution of the relation
between classic reference groups (people, nation, polis) and their political
institutions. In meeting these challenges, transnational and international
organizations will be forced to assume many of the responsibilities that
presently exclusively belong to the state.
In Chapter 6, Bob Reinalda discusses whether, how and to what extent
international organizations can be relevant actors as far as political change
and the transformation of the nation state are concerned. He does this by
discussing three theoretical approaches to the role of international organi-
zations, which have successively dominated the study of international orga-
nizations: the evolutionary, the functional and the governance approach.
It appears that at times international organizations, and the persons leading
them, can act as agents of change. It should not be forgotten, however,
that international organizations, once established, can also generate power-
ful pressures to resist change. It more or less depends on the nation states
participating in the international organizations which role they will play.
Whenever they are agents of change, international organizations act more
or less as trailblazers helping states find a way to a successful adaption to
economic and social upheavals taking place in the international system.
Although international organizations and other structures of international
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governance have unmistakenly led to a loss in the nation state's policy
autonomy, nation states can accept this because international organizations
and international governance arrangements are assisting them in adapting
to external pressures and long-term change. It turns out that the relation-
ship between states and international organizations is also one of mutual
reinforcement.
The European Union is by far the most advanced form of international
organization and cooperation. It is also one of the most powerful sources of
domestic political change. In Chapter 7, Markus Haverland argues that
among all manifestations of internationalization, the economic, legal and
political integration taking place inside the European Union presents the
most visible and direct challenge to national policy autonomy by far. With
respect to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, external
economic relations, agriculture and, most recently, monetary policy - all of
which were once the exclusive domain of the nation state - the member
states have delegated authority to the European level, and thus dramatically
limited their scope for independent policy-making in these areas. This does
not mean, however, that the Ell's member states have become the passive
targets of transnational coalitions forged by ambitious Eurocrats. On the
contrary, they still play a dominant role in the whole process of European
rule making and try to guard their national interests and ways of doing
things the best they can. As a result the impact of European regulations is
often complex and ambiguous. Haverland illustrates these points by pre-
senting a case study in which he sketches German, Dutch and British policy
preferences, as well as their origins in national practice, with respect to the
Packaging Waste Directive that the Commission was preparing, the majori-
ty decision that was eventually taken in the Council of Ministers, and the
Directive's effects on their respective national practices.
In some cases, the loss of state authority is evident and substantial. In
Chapter 8, AnIOn Weenink and Aad Correlje analyze the processes that led to
what is arguably one of the most salient events in the history of the nation
state: the almost complete evaporation of the Russian state. This is, how-
ever, not a consequence of Russia's integration into the world economy, but
of a vicious cycle set in motion with the execution of the Law on State
Enterprises in 1987 - aggravated by the so-called 'mineral curse'. This Law
destroyed the command lines that had kept the Soviet economy going, and
the central government lost control over the energy sector, on which Soviet
prosperity, such as it was, had been fully dependent. After the collapse of
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communist rule and the assumption of power by Yeltsin, it soon became
clear that the oligarchs of the energy sector had become Russia's new power
brokers and most important rent-seekers. They could make or break politi-
cians, whether reformist or not. In Russia, a complicated game is being
played between the federal government and the energy sector, in which the
former, in search of desperately needed financial means, imposes more and
more taxes on the latter, but, at the same time, in search of the latter's vital
political support, grants it ever more exemptions. The state's weakness acts
as a break on foreign and domestic investment, and, accordingly, Russia's
integration in the world economy will remain limited. Weenink and Cor-
relje even go a step further: the Russian state's weakness makes it more or
less immune to the effects of globalization.
The democratic state has always functioned in the context of organized
social and economic interests, pressure groups and social movements. To a
greater or lesser extent the effectiveness of democratic governments has
been dependent on its relations with labour and capital. A leading hypoth-
esis in the globalization literature is that increasing economic interdepen-
dencies, as well as the demand for more labour flexibility, are diminishing
the government's role in the field of labour relations. In Chapter 9, Hans
Slomp shows, however, that as far as Europe is concerned this is not the case.
Globalization and the demand for labour flexibility have motivated Euro-
pean governments to display more rather than less initiative in calling for
tripartite agreements. Moreover, tripartism has persisted in countries in
which it already existed and expanded to countries without a tradition of
national-level concertation. However, this spread of tripartism has not led
to a convergence of the different European systems of industrial relations.
Slomp's analysis of the development of these systems shows that - in spite
of the pressures to converge - the variation in national policy styles and
national institutional arrangements persists.
There exist striking similarities between the women's movement in
Spain and the Netherlands as far as their definitions of the problems and
basic strategies are concerned. Considering the fact that these countries have
experienced such radically different political histories, these similarities
would seem to provide prima facie evidence of the powers of globalization,
this time in the form of 'global sisterhood'. In Chapter 10, Conny Roggeband
and Mieke Verloo make clear that, also in this case, first appearances are mis-
leading. The Spanish and Dutch women's movements against domestic vio-
lence and sexual harassment were both inspired by the same American and
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British examples, it is true, but they soon found out that they could only
achieve their aims by winning the active support of, respectively, the Span-
ish and Dutch national state. This accommodation process took somewhat
longer in the Netherlands than in Spain. First, because the generosity of
Dutch welfare state provisions initially created the impression that the
Dutch women's movement had no need to engage itself in politics. Second,
because, from 1982 to 1996, the Spanish socialist party held a virtual
monopoly on political power while Spanish society, lacking a civil society
tradition, was highly politicized - the Spanish women's movement simply
had nowhere else to turn. Global sisterhood certainly posed a challenge, but
the Spanish and Dutch states had no problem meeting it. The success of
both movements in making sexual violence against women a political prob-
lem actually strengthened the state by enlarging its responsibilities with the
protection of its citizens even in the sphere of their private relationships.
In the concluding Chapter 11 the editors first present the reader with an
overview of the unresolved issues, the ongoing debates and the possible
paths for future research that seem to be implied by the contributions to
this volume. They note that the clearest and perhaps most surprising finding
of the book is that the nation state endures, both nationally and interna-
tionally. Accordingly, the reader should not be worried too much by the dire
consequences that many an author predicts will follow from globalization.
The editors believe that the often emotionally and ideologically charged
debate on internationalization, globalization and the role of the nation
state, would profit from a healthy dose of scepticism, as in the form of this
book. They are confident that others will disagree with them, not only with
respect to the presumed positive effects of scepticism, but also to the theo-
retical and empirical validity of the results presented in this volume. The
debate will certainly continue.
[n this book we present an overview of some of the major results of the research activi-
ties undertaken by researchers of the Political Science Department of the University of
Nijmcgen in the context of the Department's research programme 'Political Change',
which started in 19')4.
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2Ringing the Changes:
Mutations in the Idea of Political Change
Grahame LocI<
1 Introduction
The Russian Narodnik Zhelyabov, assassin in 1881 of Tsar Alexander II, is
said to have acted on the maxim that 'history moves too slowly - it needs a
push' (Brown 1995: 96). Zhelyabov gave it one. So too, more notoriously,
did Gavrilo Princip and Marinus van der Lubbe, among many others impa-
tient for change.
Not long after Zhelyabov's deed (and some time before those of Princip
and ofvan der Lubbe) the Russian Marxist - and anti-Narodnik - Plekhanov
published an essay on The Role of the Individual in History. He argued that
no individual can buck the 'logic' of history. What he can do, within that log-
icallimit, is according to Plekhanov to influence social mentality and to that
extent he can even 'make history'. So, he concludes, it is possible to change
political reality. But this means, on his account: giving it a push in the direc-
tion in which it is in any case bound to go (Plekhanov 1946 and 1947).
What determines the direction in which it must go? A deeper principle than
that of individual action or any aggregate of such actions: on Plekhanov's
Marxist view, it is the principle of economic determinism.
But the concept of change need not be interpreted in any such determin-
istic sense. It is indeed clear that the notion of political change is potentially
multivalent. What, where political change is concerned, do we suppose to be
in process of change? Are we concerned with essential change - say, from
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one type of society to another quite different type - or also with changes
within a society? With punctual and occasional changes or with long-term
trends? Are we to regard political change as an endogenous or an exogenous
matter, relative to the political system itself? Is the principle of any change al-
ready intrinsic to the situation which precedes it? Is there a lelos in the
process of change or is the latter mere contingency, even meaningless, con-
sidered in the broad historical context?
Further: what theory do we apply in attempting to explain political
change? Should we adopt a 'push' account of change (such as evolutionary
theory, where something like a conflict of interests or of ideologies is the
motor) or a 'pull' account, where for example the need to maintain political
equilibrium accounts for change as its functional condition? Can anything
be done to steer the course of history - as governance theory, for instance,
supposes - or are we the slaves of immanent historical laws? (cf. Reinalda's
contribution to this volume.) Do things keep changing or does there ever
come an end to change - an end of history? And so on.
Whenever change takes place, we can ask about the substrate of the
change. Something, as we noted, can change - that is, undergo modification
in one or more of its characteristics - or it can change into something else. A
political regime can, say, become milder or stricter, better organized or more
chaotic; but it can also change into another, quite different kind of regime.
Thus when we speculate for instance about the future of the nation state we
might be concerned either with the question of whether the nation state is
changing in respect of some of its (important) characteristics or of whether
it is changing into - or being absorbed into - something else (cf. Hout and
Lieshout's contribution to this volume). The two senses should, of course,
not be confused.
A study of political change in Russia at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry might well make mention of Zhelyabov's act (which as a matter of fact
resulted in a strengthening of autocratic rule). But it might, looking at the
matter from a different and more academic standpoint, put the emphasis
on underlying economic and political trends. l Similarly, Princip's act could
be cited as the proximate cause of the outbreak of the Great War. But the
profounder causes of the situational changes leading to war would more
likely be sought in, say, the intensifYing economic and military competition
between Great Britain, Germany and other European states. Van der Lubbe's
attempt to burn down the Reichstag provided the Nazis with an excuse for
the application of State terror against their political opponents, thus allow-
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ing them to consolidate their rule. But the rise of Nazism and the regime
change of 1933 would itself probably be explained in more general terms,
say, in terms of the chronic malfunctioning of the German economy and
the immaturity of German politics (cf. Grunberger 1971: 33).
What interests us here are explanations of the second kind: attempts to
explain long-term trends in social and political change in terms of their
deeper causes; and more particularly, the widespread tendency in present-
day thinking to suppose that the most fundamental long-term cause of
political change in western societies is to be found in the unfolding of the
liberal-democratic idea. Specifically, I shall look both at this idea itself and at
some of its roots and implications. The topics addressed are among those
treated in the Nijmegen research programme on political change. It should
be noted at the outset that I am by no means always in agreement with all
the authors and theories discussed here, but I take them to have raised sig-
nificant and relevant issues.
2 A Liberal End of History?
Before turning to the above-mentioned theme, I should make some very
brief comments on the history of the idea of political change. We know that
some thinkers of classical antiquity - Parmenides is the exemplary case -
regarded all change as illusory. Certain conservative thinkers inclined
towards the same direction, the reason of course being that, on such a con-
servative view, the basic values of politics are immutable; apparent change is
thus unreal. Plato argued that the Idea or Form of the Good is, like other
conceptual essences, invariable. So the true science of politics is the science
of such invariable Forms. Heraclitus, in contrast, held that all is in motion -
though at the same time, as he liked to put the point, it is not. So, he con-
cludes, change is contradictory, as indeed is the essence of reality. The world
is not so much being as becoming. Greek democrats tended to take a Hera-
clitean point of view. Ancient oligarchs on the other hand interpreted this
commitment to change as a confession by the democrats of their hostility to
perfection and their propensity to corruption; for change is corruption.
In certain respects, similar divisions of opinion still operate in the field
of political ideas. Democratic thought is still attached to change, which
since the nineteenth century has typically been glossed in terms of the cate-
gory of progress. Conservatives, in contrast, who often argue for the de facto
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harmful consequences of social change, at the same time frequently claim
that democracy encourages a false relativism of values.
Yet it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that we are all rela-
tivists now. The distance between the political margins has narrowed, at
least in the western world. The political divide now tends to set those who
believe that change should proceed rapidly against those who demand only
a more gentle pace. Thus few today deny the necessity of social and political
change, nor the mutability of social and political norms. Repeatedly to 'ring
the changes' is now normality.
I already made a reference to Plekhanov's historical theory. The debates
among Marxists on historical change offer some of the richest material
available to those wishing to reflect on the topic. But few political scientists
are now Marxists; they seek their inspiration elsewhere. In this they mirror
the general ideological trends of the age.
Our epoch, at least in the western world, seeks its normative foundation
in neo-liberalism, associated with a certain interpretation of the democratic
principle. 2 The present relevance of the reference to neo-liberalism is that
the agenda for political change in our time sometimes appears to be marked
by a kind of inevitability. It is the inevitability of the progressive realization
of neo-liberal and neo-democratic 'values'.' That is to say, the political
changes taking place in the world often look very much like results of what I
called a (step-by-step) unfolding of the neo-liberal idea. They are certainly
widely interpreted in this sense.
Perhaps the best-known recent example of this line of interpretation is
the work of Francis Fukuyama. One of Fukuyama's suggestions - published
in 1989, just at the time when the communist bloc was collapsing - is that
there is after all, in spite of our twentieth-century scepticism and pessimism,
something like a 'universal idea of history', understood in a more or less
Hegelian sense; and that the direction which this idea is taking is that of the
ultimate triumph of liberal democracy. 'What is emerging victorious',
Fukuyama adds, 'is not so much liberal practice, as the liberal idea'. Hegel,
he suggests, was right to talk about an 'end of human history', but wrong in
his characterization of its nature. The end of history, I'ukuyama adds, is in
fact a capitalist and liberal-democratic one (Fukuyama 1992: 45, 136-39,
289); and it is already upon us·
I want to distinguish two ideas: on the one hand, the notion that politi-
cal change, in the deeper sense, is and must be in the direction of an
inevitable and global victory of the neo-liberal idea (a story of which
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rukuyama's account is only one variant); on the other hand, an insistence
on the real and still-expanding power of a multinational, or better transna-
tional capitalism, whose functioning is patterned and legitimated by a glob-
al network of neo-liberal political and legal structures.
The first idea, it seems to me, is a chimera, though it is not possible
within the limits of this chapter to demonstrate this point. The second, if
carefully formulated, may contain much truth. If so, it points to a deep-seat-
ed source of political change in our time. Some of the aspects of such
change have moreover received insufficient attention from researchers - for
instance those concerning the links between the various contributing ele-
ments of liberal-democratic ideology, especially its individualism, its rational-
ism and its anti-dogmatism.
It is a matter, however, not of the 'unfolding' of an idea, but of the func-
tioning and mutation of institutions which - even if we call them by the
apparently simple, perspicuous and innocuous name of 'liberal-democracy'
- are in reality a product of complex historical processes and struggles
between very different, often bitterly opposed political currents and move-
ments. The results of these struggles have, under specific historical circum-
stances, included great political gains, some of which are now enjoyed by
the peoples of the western nations. But that is another story, and not the
whole story.'
In a Left-handed sense Fukuyama was not wrong to raise the issue of a
liberal-democratic end of history. For there is a widespread and effective ide-
ological belief in just such an end-point. It is indeed as if there were an
essence or logic of liberal democracy in the process of 'working itself out' in
history and now indeed moving toward its apotheosis. 6
This notion is in fact one of the component ideologies of late moderni-
ty. Only one component, it is true: for modernity is a portmanteau idea
made up of various parts, whose sundry combinations permit different
interpretations. The presently dominant version of the liberal-democratic
idea is, roughly, one which seeks and finds the legitimation for political and
social policy in an appeal to administrative and scientific rationality, to indi-
vidual (and sometimes group) rights, and - in the appropriate cases - to
democratic decision-making procedures.
Liberal ideology - in this respect an heir to the Enlightenment tradition,
and true to its attachment to the ideals of human freedom and reason - rec-
ognizes no dogma. This is its strength. But it is also its weakness. For, in prac-
tice, this attachment can function as an obstacle to self-understanding - as
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an obstacle to a grasp of the principles of liberal democracy's own mode of
operation as an ideological system.
3 Liberalism, Contractualism and Narcissism
A standard contrast in liberal ideology is that between dogmatic inflexibili-
ty on the one hand (something which it, of course, opposes) and openness
to 'rationalization' on the other, this latter being understood as a principle
applicable to all the organizational structures of society (a principle which
it supports and promotes). The goal is to change society for the better. This
kind of change is taken to imply both the elimination of anomalies and
increases in social efficiency. Rationalization, in a sense expanded even
beyond Max Weber's conception, has become a central ingredient in the
quasi-official ideology of nearly every western government. It implies the
necessity of change, and always in principle in a positive direction.
But what is it that rationalization rejects with such determination? What
is dogma? We need to make a detour in our story in order to address this
question, before integrating the answer into our remarks on political
change.
Dogma is, in brief, sacrosanct truth.' To reject it is to reject the existence
of any such truth. But this - at least on one view, that of Freud - means to
reject the 'paternal law' (cf. Freud 1955 and 1957)8
Resistance to the paternal law is fed, on Freud's account, by narcissism.
Some commentators indeed claim that our society is becoming ever more
narcissistic. Christopher Lasch for instance has produced an articulate if
controversial and sometimes superficial version of this thesis (cf. Lasch
1978). We are all to some extent narcissists, Freud insists (Freud 1953: 89).
But when 'cultural' - or socio-political - conditions favour it, narcissism
flourishes. The continuous expansion of the power of liberal or neo-liberal institu-
tions is such a favouring condition.
Freud writes about the narcissistic stage in individual human develop-
ment, at which the little child imagines himself - that, after all, is how the
world and especially his parents treat him - to be the centre of the universe,
monarch of all he surveys, owing allegiance to no one and nothing: he is
'the centre and core of creation - His Majesty the Baby, as we once [all] fan-
cied ourselves' (cf. Freud 1957: 91). So narcissism already has a 'political', in
fact a kind of 'monarchist', dimension.
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The Freudian Pierre Legendre suggests that, within the general liberal
framework, it is 'contemporary contractualist ideology' that encourages
regression to narcissism. For is not each adult among us nowadays told,
even officially, that he is the legitimate source and origin of all his 'prefer-
ences', therefore of all his 'choices', of course on the basis - we already came
across this concept - of his own freely adopted 'values'? Thus no more than
pragmatic allegiance can be demanded of the individual to anything out-
side himself. In present-day contractualist society, each of us - so he is
unceasingly assured - is a little sovereign, in a world of his sovereign peers.
Reality, however, looks rather different. In reality each of us is already
'recruited' at an early age by some dogmatic system or systems." We can of
course later repudiate the content of the system which first socialized us,
and replace it by another one. We can change our minds, even radically. But
we cannot step entirely outside the structure of dogma itself - or rather, we
can do so only partially and occasionally, standing, so to speak for a while
on one leg in order to 'freely' move the other. So 'anti-dogmatism', if it
makes sense, is always a relative concept, specific to a given situation, and
never an unequivocal general recipe for political change.
We can, it is true, attempt a comprehensive emancipation from any and
every dogmatic authority. The 'success' of such an endeavour is however
purchased at a high and perhaps surprising price: the risk of psychotic
breakdown. 10 This is Legendre's claim. Moreover, if the function of dogma is
to knit together the biological individual and the social institution, within
the framework of some system of what we called sacrosanct truth (whatever
the degree of success of this operation in an individual case may be), it
would follow that, when the knitting starts to unravel, as contemporary
contractualism causes it to do, the barriers are removed to a reintroduction
of 'social fantasms of absolute power' (Legendre 1997: 116)11 For where lies
the limit - the limit to change - when nothing is sacrosanct?
What contractual ism in its liberal or modern variant in effect denies,
Legendre adds, is the triangular character of social relations. It represents
these relations on the model of a bilateral or multilateral, but in any case
one-dimensional link between the contracting parties, whose relations are
their business alone. Yet this is to ignore the psycho-political necessity of a
reference to a third party, outside of and above the two or more contracting
parties (ibidem: 249, 253), a reference without which the contract would be
empty in itself and arbitrary in its consequences. This third party may be
Cod, or some other source of the above-mentioned sacrosanct truth.
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It is such a triangular relation which concerns Freud in his study of
Group Psychology. The proper model of a social or political relation, he
argues, is a group of persons united not in a contractual but in a libidinal
relation, of each with his fellows and of all to such a third party. This latter
may be a 'charismatic leader', but can equally well be an idea or an abstrac-
tion ([reud ] 955: 100): a religious idea, nationalism, socialism - or free-
dom, democracy and the rule of law. It is again a matter of narcissism, but
now of a collective narcissism: a community is united in self-love, but only
when the bilateral relations between its members are cemented by an iden-
tification with an idea or leader of sacrosanct standing: that is to say, with a
dogma.
Dogmas are - it ought to be added, to avoid all misunderstanding - by
no means always conservative in their content: they may be liberal, radical
or even revolutionary. There is even a dogma of anti-dogmatism, which in
fact plays an important role in liberal and neo-liberal thought.
Bernard Edelman makes a similar point in a different way. Human indi-
viduals in mass society, he suggests, are characterized by their attachment to
'two affective centres'. On the one hand they stand in a relation of subordi-
nation to some authority. On the other hand it is this very relation of sub-
ordination that makes it possible for them to 'identifY', on a basis of equal-
ity, with their fellow men. That is to say, sociability is a function of submis-
sion. The masses, Edelman adds, are the slaves of their master's liberty, and
indeed of the latter's own narcissism (Edelman ]981: 69, 76). This account
may remind us of the story of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky's The
Brothers Karamazov. Ordinary people, says the Inquisitor, need someone or
something to worship. 'When gods disappear from the earth', he adds, 'they
will fall down before idols just the same' - even if before secular idols.
Let us finally note that the juridically defined individual, beloved of lib-
eral ideology, possessed of a juridically defined rationality, is in a sense the
antithesis of the narcissistic and irrational 'mass' individual which fascinat-
ed Freud. Yet have we not already for a long time lived in an epoch of the
masses - and of their (irrational) revolt? The task of neo-liberal ideology, it
seems, is in part to keep these two pictures at arm's length: to treat the 'affec-
tive', 'dogmatic', and 'irrational' features of human life, and especially of
mass society, as if they were no more than accidental deviations from the
rational norm. For it is this norm of rationality. and not the 'darker' truths
about man, which it hopes to establish as the effective guiding line in polit-
ical change.
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4 Are There Limits to Political Change?
These remarks may throw a useful light on the general background to recent
processes of political change. It is a matter, in the phrase which we have
already met, of the content and consequences of 'contemporary contractu-
alist ideology'. Contractual ism is of course a very old idea. But much newer
- dating from the end of the Cold War - is the situation in which the con-
tractualist metaphor, posited as a generally valid picture of human society,
hardly meets with any resistance12 [ mean: with hardly any resistance from
large-scale social movements or 'counter-institutions', inspired by an alter-
native vision. There are of course and will continue to be many individuals
and groups for whom the world is viewed in quite different terms. But the
Zeitgeist, so it appears, is against them. 13
However that may be, in such a contractualist picture the contracting
parties are, let us recall, represented as sovereign egos, whose will is source
and origin not just of particular contractual links but of the law itself. So po-
litical change, on this view, is just a function of the repeated exercise of a multi-
plicity offree individual wills. A narcissistic image - a vision of omnipotence. 14
For on this assumption, there is no intrinsic limit to the breadth or
depth of political change. There is after all no authority, beyond the individ-
ually contracting parties, capable of setting any such - 'dogmatic' - limits.
Reason and rationalization hold sway.
The essentially economic concept of rationalization (together with the
notion of its presumed product, efficiency) is next linked with an idea of
democracy. This is glossed as a form of sovereignty of the people, where the
latter is understood as an aggregate of free and equal individual wills. These
seek satisfaction on a market of competing values and programmes. A para-
dox (to return to Freud's point): in the age of advanced mass society the sov-
ereignty of the individual is still, indeed ever more insistently propounded,
in a kind of imaginary or wishful resistance to reality, as the foundation of
society and of the state (cf. Edelman 1981: 21).
In this manner a whole ideological package is tied together. The package
centrally includes - this point is directly relevant to our theme - a concep-
tion of political change as progress. For progress is nothing other than contin-
uous change in the direction of rationality and efficiency, of democracy and
liberty.
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But there is another paradox. For if we look at the matter from another
angle, it appears that there is after all a limit to change. Why? Well, suppose
that a 'liberal end of history' were to be realized; that is to say, suppose that
liberalism were indeed to emerge definitively victorious over its rivals and
principal opponents. Then it would be irrational to attempt to 'transcend' it.
Political change would in this respect have come to an end.
Note, however, that to challenge this limit would be to reintroduce the
ghost of another hind of change: revolution. Jean-Claude Milner comments
that the contemporary political system demands and enforces respect for a
certain stability of political form. This is called a 'constitution'. The constitu-
tion describes the limits of legitimate political action, and thus of political
change. It guarantees for instance the rights to freedom of thought and asso-
ciation. But at the same time it defines procedural structures that make it
possible for these very rights to be abrogated. Thus neo-liberal society,
whether or not stable de facto, contains - as is well known - a fault line. Rev-
olution is possible: in this case, 'legal' revolution against the liberal state.
The reproduction of liberal democracy is not guaranteed by its formal struc-
ture. Its conquests can be reversed; change can take place in a 'backward'
direction.
But, it might be argued, no liberal or neo-liberal ever seriously believed
or claimed otherwise. This however would mean that the liberal state also
needs to ensure, alongside the formal conditions, the material conditions of
its reproduction. IS That is to say, it must make use of the standard instru-
ments of social manipulation (sometimes called propaganda or education)
and, if necessary, of violence.
But why might it, as a matter of fact, need to make use of such means?
Does it have (virtual or actual) enemies? That is an empirical question, to be
posed in any given case. There are however thinkers who claim that in every
social system, at least in all advanced or developed systems, including liber-
al systems, there is oppression and exploitation - and resistance (cf. e.g.
Badiou 1991). That is to say: there is always at least potential for revolution.
Now revolution, in Milner's conception, is rebellion, which means, in
his formulation: a practical attempt to apply the idea that there really are no
bounds to possible change (Milner 1992: 28). Revolution is possible: and not
only in the legal form. This is a more interesting idea than that concerning the
lack of a formal guarantee. It raises a question that neo-liberalism, in its
common variants, generally allows to slumber, perhaps in the hope that it
will never raise itself from sleep.
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5 A Transformation in the Idea of Change
As we have already noted, most of the elements of this contemporary ideo-
logical configuration have been in existence for a long time. But they are
now combined in a package which appears, as we claimed, to meet - for the
first time in history - little structural or institutional opposition. With the
end of the Cold War it is as if there were an end of history, characterized by
the triumph of liberal or nea-liberal structures and 'values'. There are of
course optimistic and pessimistic versions of this view: the new situation
may be welcomed or deplored. But we are concerned with its significance
from the point of view of political change.
It seems to me that in this connection the collapse of communism real-
ly has played a key role.]6 For it means that we now have to think about
political change in a different way. Etienne Balibar remarks that the defeat
of communism marked not only the end of the period of political 'moder-
nity' opened by the French Revolution, but also the end of the appropriate-
ness of the political vocabulary which that Revolution introduced or popu-
larized - and in the first place of the notion of 'revolution' itself. And yet the
events of 1989-91 were themselves widely described and interpreted in just
these 'old-fashioned' terms: as revolutions - or at a pinch as counter-revolu-
tions, which in the present context comes to the same thing. That is to say:
they were transformations of the 'old sort', whose consequence was howev-
er, it seems, to make further transformations of the same old sort not just
impossible but practically unthinkable (cf. Balibar 1991: 5). So a mutation
has taken place in the notion of political change.
An important and connected aspect of recent change is the partial dis-
appearance of the labour movement in its classic form, as well as of the
stock of concepts - like that of class struggle - which inspired it or which it
inspired. The new general line of western Social Democracy is neo-liberal; it
wants to sweep away the irrational ideological and political relics of past
history - like socialism itself, but like conservatism and other outdated dog-
mas too. This is by definition an anti-dogmatic position: it rejects, at least
in principle, all 'value-authoritarianism'. In that respect it is already 'post-
modern', but only because and in so far as it has realized the essence of
modernity.
Are we, in this sense, all liberals now? Fukuyama has proposed an inter-
pretation of the present state of affairs. He claims that, following on what he
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calls the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning, all
rival candidates to liberal democracy as an ideology of potentially universal
validity have been knocked out of the running. How does Fukuyama sup-
port this claim? He declares in this respect his debt to Hegel's philosophy of
history (cf. Fukuyama 1992: 42, 199). It is odd that he invokes Hegel, since
the latter's philosophy is rooted in a quite different philosophical tradition
from that of liberal democracy. In particular, it makes use of a very different
conception of reason. Hegel's account is a historicizing idealism, in which
for instance 'age-old tradition' and religious faith play a role quite distinct
from that of mere obstacles to rational thought, rational action and rational
social organization. Indeed, reason, in his view, reveals itself in states of
affairs and in social structures, which others - like many contemporary lib-
erals and social-democrats - assault as examples of patent irrationality. So
Fukuyama is in this regard, like most of his contemporaries, really an anti-
Hegelian. 17
6 Kinds of Political Change
I have already made some scattered comments about cause and effect in the
field of social and political change. In Marxist theory, as is well known, there
is said to be an economic basis or infrastructure which functions as a kind
of ultimate cause of social change, and an ideological, legal and political
superstructure which, though ultimately an effect of the economic infra-
structure, may itself come to function as a secondary cause of such change
(cf. for example Cohen 1978; Lock 1981).
We can usefully distinguish in this connection between various kinds of
change. CA Cohen offers the following set of distinctions. There are, to
begin with, structure-preserving changes. At the economic level, for instance,
inefficient firms go bankrupt, their places being taken by other, better func-
tioning organizations. But these are changes which help preserve the eco-
nomic structure, a structure that might otherwise be under threat. Secondly,
there are type-preserving changes: for instance, the early capitalist state form
was replaced by a welfare state, a change which, however, was not just com-
patible with but may even have been a necessary condition of the mainte-
nance of capitalism. Thirdly, there are changes which do not preserve a type
of society but rather destroy it, creating something new: 'this is the revolu-
tionary case' (Cohen 1978: 85-86).18 Revolution occurs, producing epochal
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change: one social system (the ancient world, feudalism, capitalism) is suc-
ceeded by another.
Compare Hegel's account. For Hegel, it is true, the stages of history are
categorized in rather different terms: in terms of the unfolding of the ratio-
nality ofAbsolute Spirit. The whole process is realized in historical stages, in
a succession of what we may call civilizations. This succession of civiliza-
tions - together with the political changes associated with it - has a 'logical'
character. For it has a final cause: 'the consciousness of its own freedom on
the part of Spirit' (Hegel 1991: 18-19). But the theme - the 'becoming'-
with which Hegel is concerned may, like that of Marx, be called one of
'epochal' change. Thus both Hegel and Marx, each in his own way, claim to
know why the world is changing, and in what direction. 19
The same is not always true of contemporary political scientists. But it is
true that, in their studies of political change, something of the interest in
epochal change remains. This interest is largely directed at what is called
'political development' in the second (ex-communist bloc) and third
worlds (see for instance Apter 1968; Huntington 1968; Nisbet 1969; Higgot
1983). The idea seems to be that both these worlds are in an inevitable if
sometimes slow and uneven transition to liberal democracy; and indeed
that this latter is the telos of all human communities which can hope to sur-
vive. Political change thus, in this usage, again seems somehow to imply
social progress or modernization.
We have discussed, above, a number of distinctions between various
kinds of social and political change. One of these was structure-preserving
change. Harry Eckstein introduces a similar idea, that of 'pattern-maintain-
ing' change, as it operates in the cultural field. There is, he comments, a type
of cultural change whose function is to 'keep cultural patterns in existence
and consonant': plus ~a change, plus c'est la meme chose. But with modern
society becoming ever more complex, another form of change may, he says,
be expected to occur. The point is that this complexity demands a flexibility
on the part of the members of society. Thus a movement away from cultural
rigidity is indicated. Indeed, Eckstein remarks that as societies become more
changeable, the elements of culture increasingly become 'forms' that can
subsume a variety of 'contents'. Post-modernism again, we might think.
There is a relation between the notion of culture on the one hand and
that of dogma on the other. If dogma consists in the sacrosanct truths of a
given society, then it may be regarded as a kind of core of that society's insti-
tutional culture. for all dogma must be institutionally reproduced. Yet in
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the modern ideology of rationalism, the notion of dogma itself has been
thoroughly discredited. Thus, in late modern society, cultural features which
fail to meet the dominant rationalist criteria can be condemned as, precise-
ly, dogmatically inspired obstacles to (necessary) change. But what institu-
tion does not, at least potentially, fall into the danger zone?
In respect of radical and discontinuous change, Eckstein argues that, in
periods in whicb such change is recurrent, it tends to foster cultural traits
'conducive to reorientation'. That is to say, cultural values come 10 'antici-
pate' their own obsolescence and need for replacement. It is a matter of the
essential changeability of culture, of its lack of an ultimate foundation 20
This state of affairs might - to return to an earlier theme - be regarded
as a dangerous one. ror it would mean, if Legendre is right, that one impor-
tant barrier to the 'natural tendency to psychosis' - the barrier of socializa-
tion in a system of sacrosanct truth - is at least partially removed (cf.
Legendre 1983: 28). Political scientists generally pay little attention to sce-
narios of this kind. Moreover, the argument may seem difficult to support
empirically, and might in any case look exaggerated. But Eckstein himself,
in a glimpse of its possible importance, talks of a 'malaise about authority'
in highly advanced societies, which paradoxically 'seems to exist concur-
rently with the progressive growth of what people supposedly (and no
doubt actually) want authority 10 be: decent, down to earth, participant,
lenient, concordant, open to achievement'. In a perspicuous comment, he
adds that the explanation of this malaise might lie in the 'disenchantment'
of politics, in its substitution by 'rationally effective but too-drab systems'.
For though society and polity remain 'intangible mysteries', 'dignity has
waned in relation to efficiency' (Eckstein 1992: 259). To the extent that
there has been such a movement from dignity to efficiency, 'our representa-
tive figures Ihave become] capable but plain', managers rather than princes.
This, he adds, is what people seem to demand; but, he asks, can they live
with its consequences? So it is important to ask what these consequences
might be. These are questions of some importance. But their place in the
study of political change generally goes unnoticed, or remains obscure.
It is typical of development theory, Eckstein continues, to think of social
and political change in terms of successive stages rather than of continuous
growth. Our society, it is usually assumed, has reached an advanced stage in
the developmental process. But what characterizes such an advanced soci-
ety? Eckstein suggests: the degree of penetration of society by the political
domain. Indeed, political development, he writes, is a matter of growth in
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the political density of society. So advanced society - that is to say, modern
society - is typically 'political society'. But has there really, as Eckstein
argues, been an expansion of the political sphere, a kind of colonization of
the social by the political domain? Or is it rather a matter of what Carl
Schmitt calls the typically liberal 'negation' or denial of politics: of a reduc-
tion of politics to economics (with a supplement of morality) or adminis-
tration? An old dream, but one constantly - and recently - recycled in new
variants. 21
7 National Boundaries and Globalization
Whether or not we can live with the state of affairs described by Eckstein, we
seem to be obliged to come to terms with a measure of political internation-
alization and globalization - my last theme. There is much to be said about
these processes, and little room to say it here. We must therefore restrict our-
selves to a few remarks on the manner in which these tendencies can be and
often are interpreted as yet further examples of a progressive realization of
the neo-liberal idea. What after all are national boundaries - it is now often
argued - but institutional remnants of an irrational or dogmatic attachment
to an out-of-date ideology (the much-denounced 'stupidity of national-
ism')? If society and the state are to be understood on a contractarian model,
why should a given aggregate of its contracting parties be obliged to unite in
the limiting figure of a nation? Any voluntarily agreed form of association
would be as good as any other. The nation state can on this view make no se-
rious appeal to a naturally pre-eminent status. The attempt to defend it as
anything but a contingent preference would render it liable to anti-dogmat-
ic criticism. State sovereignty would be the reflection of such a contingent
form of international organization, always subject to 'renegotiation' by any
parties with an interest in the matter - whether individuals, associations,
other states or supra-state entities, multinational and transnational corpora-
tions or whatever. 22
There are commentators who interpret this situation optimistically. To
some, indeed, it looks as if nothing less than a global society, based on a
global economy and organized in a global political order, can satisfy the
demands of the logic of neo-liberal democracy - that is to say, globalization
is also an end to which history tends.
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Philosophically, such a picture is as idealistic if not as subtle, as Ilege!'s
great metaphysic of history. There is a temptation, basing oneself on this
image, to interpret all political change as either change in the direction of
the fulfilment of such a logic - in which case it can be qualified as essential
change - or, where it appears to point in the 'wrong' direction, to disqualiIY
it as a contingent regression. It is tempting, for example, to interpret all evi-
dence of the supersession of national sovereignty as the expression of such
an essential transformation, while evidence of its continued significance or
even increasing importance is viewed as merely accidental, or subordinate
to the subjacent movement (cf.the Introduction to this volume).
There are some thinkers who hesitate to accept the optimistic picture.
Alexander Zinoviev for example has remarked that globalization - whatever
it might be - does not, nor is it intended by its principal protagonists to
serve the interests of humanity. On the contrary: it is a struggle of one sec-
tion of humaniry against all others for world domination. 'It is a cruel and
merciless struggle', he adds, whatever fine phrases may be used to disguise
the fact, a fight for domination and for survival. The vanquished who sur-
vive will be allowed to live, he predicts, only in a form and measure which
the victors find appropriate. The defeat of Soviet Communism turned the
earth into a 'one-party planet'; and this development was probably fatal for
the future chances of successful resistance by the exploited and oppressed.
In other words, there is not much room for radical political opposition to
the new or emerging global structure, since there are no obvious alternatives
to it (cf. Zinoviev 1998)21
This is not an apocalyptic message. For it is not a matter of predicting
another kind of end of history - a catastrophic one - but of informed spec-
ulation on the direction in which the processes of political and social
change may be taking us. For the rest, Zinoviev's view is compatible with the
hypothesis of a continuation, in modified form, of the figure and function
of the nation state. Such states generally, after all, still exercise and will pre-
sumably continue to exercise, to use a classic phrase, a 'more or less success-
ful monopoly of control of the means of violence within their own territo-
ries' (Barrett 1996). Moreover, their frontiers continue to play an important
role: for example, they are still firmly closed, and are intended to remain
closed, not to each other's citizens, but to mass immigration by 'undesir-
able' populations from the underdeveloped world. In this sense sovereignty
remains not just intact, but a necessary instrument of exclusion.
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'Globalization' is in fact arguably no more than a tendentious descrip-
tion of the dynamic situation of a world entirely carved up into a pattern of
competing but at the same time cooperating nation states, grouped into
temporary or more or less permanent alliances, a world whose 'civil soci-
eties' function, as they always have done, internationally, perhaps indeed
ever more internationally. But this in fact happens not just with the permis-
sion, but in one way or another with the active encouragement and support
of the various nation states. The globalization thesis suggests, in contrast,
that this latter fact is a mere contingency and an obsolescent one at that. In
other words, globalization can be understood as a (neo-Iiberal) myth,
though of course a myth with its own material political consequences: what
Machiavelli called a verita effetuale.
8 Conclusion
To conclude: political change in the direction of internationalization, or of
the global society has been widely understood - explicitly or implicitly - as
determined by a process of the unfolding of the liberal-democratic idea.
This conception, I have suggested, is erroneous in various senses. It is true
on the other hand that we can expect further changes in the direction of the
consolidation and expansion of what is called 'global society', a society
structured by neo-liberal and neo-democratic - perhaps they should be
called post-liberal and post-democratic - institutions. But this is not the
same thing as what is nowadays called globalization, since it leaves the
nation state intact. Nor in any case is there anything predetermined about
such developments. There is no end of history to which they point. To
believe such a thing would be to succumb to what Plekhanov, in a typical
turn of phrase, called the attitude of the fatalism of inevitability. Whoever we
are, and whatever our specific interests and ideals, we strive, he added, to
discover the 'iron laws of political change'. But usually in order, following
the example of the circus strong-man, to bend them.
See for instance Lenin's well-known 1899 study of contemporary Russian economic his~
'ory (Lenin 1974).
2 From the philosophical point of view, the characterization of liberal democracy and of
nea-Iiberalism (which are not systematically distinguished here) made use of in this
paper is an unrefined one. But it will do for present purposes. See also Marcel Wis-
senburg's essay in this book.
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3 On Charles Taylor's account too, our epoch is ideologically dominated by what he calls
the liberal-individualist axiom. According to this axiom, the goals of individuals (and
derivatively of groups) are understood as being 'freely adopted' by them, rather than
being 'determined by the nature of things'. Hence, he comments, the modern system
calls them values (Taylor 1980: 78).
4 There are other versions of this idea; for instance that proposed by the nineteenth-cen-
tury mathematician Antoine-Augustin Cournot. 'He envisaged "history" (roughly the
conflict-ridden epoch of wars of religion and politics, of great heroes and mighty deeds)
gradually coming to an end with the institutionalization of scientific discovery, techno-
logical application and market economic enterprise' (Martins 1996: 221). See also the
special number of the journal Wijsgerig Perspecliej (Meppel) on 'Het einde van de
geschiedenis', no. 2,1994-95.
5 See on this theme Zinoviev (1999b). He argues that, during the latter period of the Cold
War, 'the west was characterized by a flourishing of democracy, of liberalism, of freedom
of thought and of creative pluralism .... These seemed to be organically linked to the
very nature of western civilization'. Rut this turned out not to be the case. With the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, there occurred not a further flour-
ishing but on the contrary the beginnings of a 'destmction of the very foundations of
[European I civilization' and the 'collapse of its true values'.
6 I leave aside here the question of whether a new 'enemy' of the western world has been
identified - had to be identified - in 'Islam' or its fundamentalist variant. But whatever
might be thought about this matter, the so-called fundamentalist threat is self-evidently
of an entirely different order from the old communist menace. There is no visible
prospect of a Moslem 'takeover' of western European societies or of the imposition of
the Moslem religion and Moslem laws on their populations.
7 For an extended account of the history of the various concepts of dogma and their appli-
cation, see Herberger 1981. Compare Lock 1999: 72-79.
8 See Freud 1953: 143.
9 Althusser calls this process of ideological recruitment by the name of 'interpellation'
(Althusser ]976: 113-14): 'All ideology interpellates concrete individuals as concrete
subjects.... It "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms all of them) by
that very specific operation which we call interpellation ... ' (emphasis in the original).
10 See Legendre 198{), a study of murder and attempted murder by a French Canadian,
Denis Lortie, and of his 'psychotic endeavour to erase the social phantasm of paternity'.
Lortie, whose avowed aim was to massacre the members of the government of Quebec,
told police after his arrest that the 'government had my father's face'. In a perfectly nar-
cissistic manner - a feeling of omnipotence being one of the principal phenomenologi-
cal features of narcissism - he added that 'I felt capable of destroying this aUlhority, my
strength was boundless' (cr the editor's Introduction in Legendre 1997: 3-8).
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11 Compare Zinoviev's recent condemnation of 'western totalitarianism': he claims that,
with the NATO war against Serbia, 'the west has revealed a ... very powerful tendency to
a generalized totalitarianism', 'in total contempt of the international institutions which
it itself created' (Zinoviev 1999a).
12 It is contested outside of the western world, notably by militant Islam (but see the
remark above on the relation of Islam to the west).
13 One of the tragic features of contemporary life, in a technical sense of 'tragedy', can be
found in the inevitable struggles inside non-modern social institutions - like the
Catholic Church - between them and those of their own members suffering from a
severe strain of the 'modernizing' virus, struggles usually (predictably) ending in a
degree of institutional disintegration. Sometimes leaderships, in an anticipatory mode,
themselves initiate such a modernization drive, which then often slips out of their
control.
14 It is this modern notion, applied in all its apparent consistency, that underlies post-
modernism, according to which there are no legitimate 'grand' - supra-individual and
binding - narratives. In a sense, post-modernism just is consequent, narcissistic mod-
ernism - putting an end not to history, but to modernism itself.
15 One question is what to do when the constitution is under serious threat. Carl Schmitt,
the German jurist, made a plea in the early 1930s for the assumption of dictatorial pow-
ers by the President - thus violating the existing (Weimar) Constitution in respect of
certain of its articles, but in order to save the essence. Having lost that battle, Schmitt
'capitulated to reality', joining the victorious Nazi Party (cf. Schmitt 1973).
16 Cf. Zinoviev (1999b): 'Our epoch is not just post-communist, it is post-democratic.'
17 Ten years after the publication of his original article, Fukuyama has confessed that his
end-of-history thesis is fundamentally false, his reason being that it failed to take into
account the dynamic character of the natural sciences. But he now predicts an end to
human history within a couple of generations, when biotechnology will have developed
the tools necessary to carry out what social engineering (political action) failed to
accomplish. At that moment, he says, a post-human age will begin (Fukuyama 1999).
18 Cohen adds: '[t is sometimes appropriate to explain phenomena by reference to the eco-
nomic structure itself, in abstraction from the processes enveloping it. Perhaps the emer-
gence and strength of the ideology of liberalism are in part due not to the dynamic of
capitalism but to its persistent structural requirements: this was certainly Marx's view'
(Cohen 1978: 87).
19 There is of course much more to be said in respect of any comparison between Hegel
and Marx: see in this connection especially the commentaries of Louis Althusser on the
topic.
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20 This means, by the way, that a change has also taken place in the sense of the term 'cul-
ture'. Its original meaning, defined by the canon lawyer Gratian in his twelfth-century
Decretum, was rather that now reserved for the term 'dogma': false and intolerant belief,
in particular that of the adversary, that is, of the non-Christian (Cratian, Decretum,
26.2.9; quoted in Legendre 1974: 263).
21 Cr. Schmitt 1996: 61, 69ff. Schmitt writes that 'the pure and consequential concept of
individualistic liberalism' can produce no positive theory of politics. For liberalism
understands politics not in political terms, but in economic terms, as a 'rationally con-
structed social ideal or program, a tendency or a rational calculation'. He notes, at the
same time, that Marxism 'follows its liberal bourgeois enemy into its own domain, the
economic', For Marxism is - or is widely understood to be - an economic determinism.
Marxism also, like some other variants of socialism, hoped to replace politics (political
struggle) by administration.
22 It can be argued that we should talk not so much about a renegotiation of sovereignty as
about an imposition of new international juridico-political forms. But this of course
would be an illiberal way for any state or coalition of states to behave.,.
23 The NATO war against Yugoslavia can be regarded as an important step in the imposi-
tion of such 'one-party' hegemony. The accusations of humanitarian excesses commit-
ted by the Serbs against the Albanian Kosovans are on this view - whatever their truth -
the necessary, indeed classical pretext (there has to be some pretext, and one which rests
on real excesses presents significant advantages) for the demonstration of the one-party
capacity to rewrite international law and to redefine the global order, especially where
these bear on national sovereignty. But note that the 'one party' is in fact an alliance of
nation states, in this case the NATO member states, even if an alliance led and dominat-
ed by the United States.
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3The Limits of Theory:
Detecting Contemporary Global Change and
Predicting the Future of the States System
WiZ Haut and Robert H. Lieshout
1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore the extent to which a systems approach to inter-
national relations can help us get a grip on the changes that are, and have
been taking place in the international system. We will do this by focusing
on two crucial changes characterizing the contemporary global order, which
can have far-reaching consequences for the existing Westphalian states sys-
tem: (1) the end of the bipolar structure of the international political sys-
tem, which had been with us since the middle of the 1950s, as a result of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and its disappearance as a superpower, and (2)
the increase in the level of interdependence among national economies.
In Section 2, we discuss the relevant theoretical notions provided by the
systems approach to international relations as introduced by Waltz (cf.
Waltz 1979). Our discussion is primarily based on a brief review of some
pertinent perceptions on the relationship between agent and structure in
the international system published by various lR-researchers in the course
of the last decade. These perceptions resulted from a major re-thinking of
IR-theory, which was set off by the historically unprecedented, and theoret-
ically unexpected, peaceful disintegration of the Soviet empire.
In Section 3, we try to establish to what extent we can substantiate the
presumed changes with empirical data. Pinally, in Section 4, we turn to the
question of what, on the basis of our theoretical understanding and our
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empirical results, we can say about the future of the international system.
Do the end of bipolarity and the rise in interdepence sound the death-knell
of an international system in which sovereign, territorial states are the dom-
inant players?
1 Theory: Understanding Contemporary Global Change
2.1 A SYSTEMS APPROACH
A first step to understanding contemporary change at the global level, is to
assume that it is possible to divide the universe of possibly relevant phe-
nomena into phenomena that are relevant to the explanation of it, and
those that are not. The ones that are relevant are considered to be part of a
system - in this case, of course, an international system. These phenomena,
or elements of the system, are somehow interrelated. This means that 'the
conduct or state of anyone of the elements is influenced by the conduct or
state of the other elements' (Lieshout 1995: 17). Moreover, as far as these
elements are concerned, a distinction should be made between the actors
(or the interacting units) on the one hand, and the structure on the other. In
this we follow Waltz's exposition of the systems approach in Theory of Inter-
national Politics (Waltz 1979). According to Waltz, 'at one level, a system
consists of a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that
makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a
mere collection. At another level, the system consists of interacting units'
(ibidem: 40).
A systems approach implies that the actors in the system under consid-
eration are assigned a certain motive to act. This is the so-called 'explanato-
ry principle'. In the case of the international system we assume that the
actors try to survive in that system. The actors do this by adapting to the sys-
tem's structure to the best of their knowledge. It is up to the actors to find
out what the structure looks like and to decide whether or not they want to
comply with it. The structure does not determine the actors' behaviour. The
manner in which this adaptation process takes place can, in turn, have con-
sequences for the structure of the system. If this possibility were excluded,
then there would be no need for a systems approach (cf. ibidem: 58). A sys-
tems approach also involves a decision as to which of the elements in the
system under consideration will be conceived of as the actors in the system
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and which ones as part of the structure. This choice of the actor is guided
purely by methodological considerations. The only thing that matters is
that our choice of the actor promises to provide us with the best possible
answers to the types of question we wish to answer (cf. Lieshout 1995:
19-20). Since it is our aim to understand contemporary change at the glob-
al level, we think it is best to assign the explanatory principle to the state,
and not to so-called 'non-state actors', such as multinational corporations,
international organizations, or transnational social movements. Thus the
international system is a states system.
2.2 WALTZ'S THREE-PART DEFINITION OF STRUCTURE
We start our 'imaginative construction' of the states system (cf. Collingwood
1957 [1946]), which should enable us to identifY the most significant
changes it went through during the 1990s, with a discussion of the structure
of that system on the basis of Waltz's 'three-part definition of structure'. In
his view, structures are defined: 'first, according to the principle by which a
system is ordered'; 'second, by the specification of functions of differentiat-
ed units'; and 'third, by the distribution of capabilities across units' (Waltz
1979: 100-1).
With respect to the first part of his definition, Waltz defends the posi-
tion that systems are ordered either anarchically or hierarchically. The states
system is ordered anarchically. This does not imply that chaos reigns in the
states system. It merely means that the states system is one of self-help. It
lacks an agency that, if necessary, can force states, even the mightiest among
them, to abide by the rules and keep their promises. In Waltz's view anarchy
is the most fundamental property of the states system. It constitutes the lat-
ter's 'deep structure', to use the expression introduced by Ruggie (Ruggie
1986: 135). It should, however, not be forgotten that 'anarchy, taken by
itself, can never explain why states sometimes do cooperate with one anoth-
er, and sometimes do not, why certain states regularly wage war upon one
another, and others coexist peacefully for centuries' (Lieshout 1999: 18). As
far as the ordering principle of the international system is concerned, we
think there is general agreement that it has not changed during the 1990s.
The states system is still an anarchy. As Waltz observed in an interview
recently published in the Review of International Studies: 'It's a self-help sys-
tem. The system has not been transformed' (Halliday and Rosenberg 1998:
378).
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Concerning the second part of the definition, 'the specification of func-
tions of differentiated units', Waltz is of the opinion that this part 'is not
needed in defining international-political structure, because so long as
anarchy endures, states remain like units' (Waltz 1979: 93). In his view 'the
functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise principal-
ly from their varied capabilities' (ibidem: 97). This leads Buzan, lones and
Little to the conclusion that 'in Waltz's logic, these two tiers are so closely
linked as to be nearly opposite sides of the same coin' (Buzan et al. 1993:
38), and that, therefore, they together constitute the international system's
deep structure. Waltz's position was based, interestingly enough, on a com-
parison of the internal functions of the states in terms of government (cf.
Waltz 1979: 96-7). He appears never to have considered the possibility of
functional differentiation between states, although it is certainly not exclud-
ed by his three-part definition of structure. 1 This is quite remarkable seeing
that in certain parts of the globe, most notably the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there exists a clear division of labour
between states as far as the use of force is concerned. That Waltz failed to
take note of this type of functional differentiation, must be attributed to his
treatment of the role of force in the international system. If in national pol-
itics force serves as the ultima ratio, then this is the result of 'the previous
submission of force to methods of reason'. Such a submission had, howev-
er, not taken place in the international system, with the result that in 'inter-
national politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the
first and constant one' (ibidem: 113). Apparently, Waltz views the situation
of the states in the international system as essentially the same as that of
Thomas Hobbes' 'kings, and persons of sovereign authority', for whom the
state of nature is a fact of life, since in the Hobbesian state of nature no divi-
sion of labour is possible (llobbes 1946 11651J: 82 and 83; cf. Lieshout
1995: 120).
Buzan et al. also note Waltz's failure to consider the possibility of func-
tional differentiation between states. At one point they observe that Waltz
relies on a 'very partial characterization' of the effects of competition on the
behaviour of states, namely that it leads to imitation. In their view, this
approach 'discounts another side of the analogy from economic behavior,
which is the search for market niches, where differentiation of function pro-
vides (temporary) refuge from the full pressure of competition' (Buzan et al.
1993: 40; cf. also Schroeder's discussion of 'hiding' in Schroeder 1994).
Accordingly, they 'insist', and we agree with them on this, that the function-
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al similarity of states 'is not a logical consequence of anarchy. It is possible,
after all, to conceive of functionally differentiated units operating in an
anarchic system and there are substantial historical precedents for systems
with these structural features' (ibidem: 88). If we want to understand the
ways in which the states system works, then the second 'tier', as far as the
extent of the division of labour between states is concerned, cannot be left
out of consideration.
When we now ask ourselves whether there has been a change in the
degree of functional differentiation between states, then the answer must be
in the affirmative. In particular with respect to the use of force there has
been an increase in the division of labour between states. [n the course of
the last decade, the United States has developed more and more into the
world's policeman. Other states, even major ones like Germany and Japan,
are quite prepared to leave to the United States the task of actual peace-
enforcement in the world's trouble spots, even if these are situated in their
own back yards. However, this development has, as yet, had no major con-
sequences for the international system.
In view of the collapse of the Soviet Union, such a qualification certain-
ly does not apply to the changes that have taken place in the third part of
Waltz's definition, the 'distribution of capabilities across units', or the distri-
butional structure, as Buzan et al. have very conveniently called it. Tradition-
ally, three types of distributional structure are distinguished: a multipolar
structure, which means that there are more than two great powers in the
states system; a bipolar structure, in the case of two great powers; and a
hegemonic or unipolar structure, when there is only one great power in the
states system. By the mid-1950s (cf. Lebow 1995: 30-1) a bipolar structure
came into existence with the United States and the Soviet Union as the
'poles'. The disintegration of the Soviet empire implied the destruction of
this structure. As many have noted since the publication of Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, Waltz did not pay attention to the question of how the distri-
butional structure could change from one kind of polarity to another (cf.
especially Ruggie 1986). Very likely because he was confident that the then-
existing bipolar structure would endure, in particular since, as far as the rank
of great powers was concerned, the 'barriers to entry [hadI risen' (Waltz
1979: 177). Accordingly, Waltz's 'logic of anarchy' is of no great use if we
wish to understand the factors that led to the fall of the old distributional
structure and the rise of the new one. This understanding can only be
obtained if Waltz's narrow conception of structure is expanded by adding
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two other elements: first, the system's interaction capacity and, second, the
internal structure of the states, in particular the states' learning capacity.
Before we start our discussion of these elements, however, we should
address one other matter: the relationship between the first two 'tiers' of
Waltz's definition of structure and the third 'tier'. Ruggie has observed that
Waltz in Theory of International Politics assigned 'causal priority' to the first
two tiers. The deep structure 'prestructures' the distributional structure
(Ruggie 1986: 150; cf. also Buzan et al. 1993: 87 and 89). Although we agree
with Ruggie that in Waltz's approach the deep structure has causal priority,
the problem remains of what actually is meant by 'prestructuring' if anarchy
by itself can lead to three different types of distributional structure. A few
years ago, therefore, one of us argued that it is actually the other way
around. It is the distribution of capabilities across the interacting units - in
other words, the system's degree of polarity - that 'prestructures' a system's
ordering principle. In this approach anarchy and hierarchy are not seen as
two, opposing, ordering principles, but as manifestations of one and the
same ordering principle: the distribution of capabilities across the actors in
the system. Anarchical and hierarchical systems can then be placed on a
continuum of types of system on which they are ordered on the basis of
their degree of polarity. As capabilities become more concentrated in a sys-
tem, that system shifts on the continuum further and further in the direc-
tion of a 'perfect' hierarchy, whereas, conversely, as capabilities in a system
become more evenly distributed, that system shifts further and further in
the direction of a 'perfect' anarchy (cf. Lieshout 1995: 94-5 and 111). This
approach has the added advantage that it is more elegant. Anarchy and hier-
archy are no longer two distinct ordering principles that both have to be
assumed, but can be deduced from one ordering principle.
2.3 INTERACTION
In order to provide Waltz's theory with a 'transformational logic', Ruggie has
introduced the concept of 'dynamic density', which he took from Durkheim.
Dynamic density concerns 'the quantity, velocity and diversity of transac-
tions that go on within la system]' (Ruggie 1986: 148; cf. also Spruyt 1994:
12). Changes in dynamic density will lead to changes in the distributional
structure, and will also have their effect on the extent of the functional dif-
ferentiation between states. It is 'common knowledge' that the dynamic den-
sity of the international system has increased spectacularly in the last
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decades; not only in the form of the internationalization and globalization
of the economy, a subject we return to in Section 3, but also the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the consequences of which
we touch upon in Section 4.
Buzan et al. share Ruggie's point of view, although they prefer the term
'interaction capacity' to 'dynamic density'. They consider the introduction of
interaction capacity - which, according to them, has two aspects: technolo-
gy and 'shared norms and organizations' (Buzan et al. 1993: 70) - as one of
the most important elements in their project to extend the Waltzian frame-
work. Naturally the question remains at which level of the system interac-
tion capacity should be placed. Contrary to Waltz - 'interactions, as I have
insisted, take place at the level of the units' (Waltz 1979: 80) - Buzan et al.
advocate the introduction of a third level of analysis, seeing that interaction
capacity concerns 'a set of variables that clearly belong within a system the-
ory of international politics, but which are neither structural nor unit level
in character' (Buzan et al. 1993: 72). This is the 'process' level, orthe level of
'process formations', to which are assigned all the interactions between the
units of the system that cannot be considered to be simply attributes of
these units (ibidem: 1993: 48-50). In this they follow Keohane and Nye,
who some years before argued in favour of adding a third process level, as it
would enrich 'our ability to theorize' (Keohane and Nye 1987: 747). This
process level would refer to 'patterns of interaction: the ways in which the
units relate to each other' (ibidem: 745), and would contain such things as
'technological change, economic interdependence, and issue density', as
well as 'international rules, norms and institutions' (ibidem: 747).
In our opinion it is not necessary to introduce a third level of analysis.
The reason why Keohane, Nye, Buzan et al. and many others, have great dif-
ficulty in finding a place for 'process formations' in the simple structure-
unit scheme of systems theory, is that they tacitly conceive of structure - and
Waltz, of course, too! - as something that should be more or less perma-
nent, while 'process formations' can change very rapidly in a relatively short
period of time. However, this is a misconception. As De Vree has pointed
out, 'every system has a structure, however inchoate, disorganized or entrop-
ic it may be' (De Vree 1990: 640). As we see it, a system's structure amounts
to nothing more than the boundary conditions, which are themselves con-
tinuously subject to greater or smaller changes, to which the interacting
units have to conform if they wish to maintain themselves in the system. It
is up to the units to find out what these boundary conditions look like and
to decide whether or not they want to comply with them.'
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As far as the states system is concerned, a distinction then must be made
between the external structure of the states on the one hand, and the internal
structure of the states (which we discuss in the next subsection) on the other
hand. Deep structure, distributional structure, as well as process formations,
belong 10 the external structure. It refers to boundary conditions of the fol-
lowing kind: the way in which states are positioned vis-a-vis one another, the
degree of polarity of the states system, the degree of stabiliry of the states
system, the level of international cooperation (whether on an ad hoc basis,
or institutionalized in the context of international organizations), the
extent of the international division of labour, and the state of technology
(e.g. weapons or communication technology). Besides these more or less
'brute' aspects, the external structure also comprises 'soft' aspects, or, as
Wendt put it, 'the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and
interests in the system' (Wendt 1992: 401). The soft aspects involve both the
states' common 'principled beliefs' on how foreign policy and diplomacy
should be conducted, and their common 'causal beliefs' on the best way for
a state to survive in the international system (cf. Lieshout 1999: 16-17 and
Schroeder 1996 [1994]: x).
2.4 THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE STATE
The second addition to Waltz's three-part definition of structure necessary
to understand changes in the distributional structure of the international
system follows from the perception that the international system is an
'actor-dominant system' and not a 'parametric system' (Nicholson 1990
[19891: 116), or, put in economic terms, that it is an oligopoly and not a
perfectly competitive market. In a system of the latter rype, the behaviour of
the actors can be explained without any reference to their internal structure,
whereas in a system of the former type this is not possible, at least where it
concerns the behaviour of the most powerful actors in the system (the inter-
nal structure of the small actors can safely be ignored most of the time). We
cannot get a grip on the Soviet leadership's reactions to the Soviet Union's
steadily declining economic performance that, in the end, resulted in the
demise of bipolarity, if we do not take the Soviet Union's internal structure
into account. The Soviet leaders faced a 'double security dilemma'. Like all
'agents of the state' they were 'constrained not only by the international
structure associated with the balance of power, but also by the domestic
political structure ... like Janus, [they were] required to look in two direc-
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tions simultaneously. They were confronted by two sets of structures: one
internal and the other external' (Buzan et al. 1993: 120), where the internal
structure of a state refers to such things as the state's GDP, its military might,
the size of its population, its natural resources, its geographical situation
(does it border on the sea, or is it landlocked?), and the manner in which
political decision-making is organized (is the state a democracy, or is it a
dictatorship?), et cetera.
As we mentioned before, a crucial aspect of the state's internal structure
concerns the state's adaptability or learning capacity (cf. also Van Kersber-
gen's contribution to this volume). This refers particularly to the ways in
which the state processes information on its external and internal structure
and the changes therein, and its capacity for decision-making, whether col-
lective or not, in order to carry through the necessary adjustments. The better
the information, and the greater a state's capacity for decision-making - in
other words, the better its ability to learn - the sooner a state is able to take
advantage of these changes. In our view it is evident that in the last decades,
in response to the spectacular rise of the international system's interaction
capacity, the great majority of states have put much effort in increasing their
adaptability.
One should keep in mind that the changes in the external and internal
structure are not objectively given to the state. In the international system
there exists a certain 'dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity' (Keo-
hane 1989: 42; cf. Wendt 1992: 397). The 'realities' of the external and
internal structure as perceived by the state are always the result of a process
of active interpretation by the state in the light of its 'causal beliefs' (its 'the-
ories') about the nature of these structures. Indeed, the 'world is always an
interpreted "thing'" (George as cited in Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 271).
Which interpreted 'thing' corresponds better with reality, and which one
less so, subsequently can only be discovered through a process of trial and
error (cf. Lieshout 1995: 177).
In view of our discussion of the internal structure we have to address
one further question, namely, which elements in the system are to be con-
sidered as parts of the actor? Are there any elements left for her? We think
the answer must be in the negative. To be sure, we have assigned the actor a
motive to act, but this cannot be regarded as an element of the system in the
same way as 'brute' facts like capabilities or 'institutional' facts like norms
and values. The explanatory principle is a tautology. It is true in all possible
worlds. In systems theory the actor and, accordingly, the state, has no sub-
The Limits of Theory 51
stance. External structure and internal structure have a 'history', and both
histories weigh heavy on the states when making choices, but the states
themselves, being the actors in the system, have no history. They are time-
less. The state is no more than a 'category of though I necessary to clear
thinking about international relations' (cf. Can 1964 [19391: 150). It can-
not be denied that this makes 'the state' a rather elusive entity. The central
element in the international system around which everything is supposed to
turn, turns out to be no more than an empty shell! But before rushing to the
conclusion that this can only mean that a systems approach is too ridicu-
lous to deserve serious consideration if we wish to understand contempo-
rary change at the global level, it is well to realize that 'the state' is just as
elusive as that other ghost in the machine, 'the self'.
3 The Limits of Theory: Detecting Contemporary Global Change
3.1 CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
In this Section, we try to find out, by using quantitative historical data,
whether the presumed change in distributional structure and the increase in
interaction capacity accepted unquestioningly in the previous Section, can
be substantiated empirically.
As far as the distributional structure is concerned, one should realize
that there exists no one best way 10 establish the distribution of power in
the international system at a certain moment in time, if only because power
is such an elusive concept. In the first place, there are many possible empir-
ical attributes attached to the international power concept. Scholars who
have tried to measure international power have focused on such different
variables as: military potential, economic wealth, the size of the population,
the possession of natural resources, and the like. In the second place, it is
difficult to establish the international power position of states because the
outcome of political processes, which imply the use of power, is determined
not only by the possession of power resources; intangible factors such as the
skilfulness and the commitment of the wielders of power (often the mili-
tary) are also important. Thus, discussions about the nature of the Soviet
threat during the Cold War often concerned the supposed differences in
aptitude and commitment of the armed forces of the United States on the
one hand and those of the Soviet Union on the other. In the third place, the
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extent of state power is affected by the fungibility of resources. This term
refers to the possibility to use resources for more than one purpose. for
instance, money is a fungible resource, since it can be applied for invest-
ment in productive capital, for spending on consumption or for the build-
up of military might. Weapons, on the contrary, are a non-fungible resource
(this applies in particular to nuclear weapons).
With these restrictions in mind, we turn to some analyses of the distrib-
utional structure of the international system in the twentieth century. For
want of a perfect measure, we adopt a next-best approach by focusing on
countries' gross domestic product (GDP) and on the possession of nuclear
weapons'> We use GDP figures because data on GDP are readily available for
an extended period and for many countries. Moreover, GDP figures are a
function both of the size of the population and the level ofwealth of a coun-
try, which are two important components of the concept of power. We use
data on nuclear weapons because it is generally acknowledged that the pos-
session of such weapons is a necessary - though, of course, by no means a
sufficient - condition for great power status in the post-World War 11 period.
After World War 11, the United States and the Soviet Union came to
dominate the international system. The data has been taken from Maddi-
son's study of the development of the world economy (Maddison 1995).
The change to bipolarity is only partially reflected in GDP data, which have
been used to draw Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure 3.1 presents the development of the GDP of the Soviet Union/
Russia and the United States, as a percentage of global GDP, between 1950
and 1992. figure 3.1 indicates that for the entire period since World War 11
the two so-called superpowers together commanded less than half of world
GDP, and that the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union/Rus-
sia in terms of GDP remained very large.
The relative position of the two superpowers vis-a-vis each other is more
clearly depicted in Figure 3.2. This figure indicates that the ratio between the
GDP of the two countries was roughly 5 to 1 just after World War 11, with the
Soviet Union producing merely 20 per cent of the United States' GDP. Al-
though the ratio between the superpowers' GDP has changed considerably
in the 1945-1992 period, it never became less than 2 to 1. The best result
achieved by the Soviet Union was 45 per cent of US GDP in 1975.
The approach used here provides only partial understanding of the de-
velopment of the distributional structure during the Cold War. The United
States was clearly in the lead with a share of world GDP ranging between 30
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Figure 3.1: GDP Shares of the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States, 1950-1992
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Figure 3.2: Ratio between GDP of Soviet Union/Russia and United States, 1945-1992
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per cent just after World War II and more than 21 per cent at the beginning of
the 1990s. At the peak of its might, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union
produced between 10 and 11 per cent of world GDP. Both countries had a
clear lead over the country which was third in terms of GDP; at first, this was
China, then Japan, and from the 1980s onwards again China'
Our analysis of the distributional structure in terms of GDP shares is
partial also because it does not reflect adequately the build-up of military
might, especially the development of nuclear weapons and the military
presence of the United States and the Soviet Union in many parts of the
world, which demonstrated the clear dominance of the two superpowers in
international politics. The data presented in Table 3.1 illustrate the huge gap
in military capabilities that existed between the two superpowers on the one
hand, and the three other declared nuclear powers on the other hand. Table
3.1 also makes clear that this gap has persisted until this very day. The data
on Russia's military capabilities show why this country still holds some-
Table 3.1 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Arsenals of the Nuclear Weapons States, 1946 - 1998
------ ------------ --.------ -_.. --------.._- ._--------
Year United States Soviet Union United Kingdom France China
/ Russia
-----_.
1946 9
1950 400
1954 1,418
1958 2,610 186 40
1962 3,267 481 180
1966 4,607 954 194 36 10
1970 4,960 2,216 144 36 75
1974 9,324 2,795 144 86 165
1978 10,832 5,516 144 114 250
1982 10,515 8,904 128 130 300
1986 12,386 10,108 96 218 325
1990 11,966 10,880 96 452 324
1994 8,332 9,823 100 444 254
1998 7,2'56 6,210 160 429 197
--_ ... _------ .._---
Sources: SIPRI (1991), fable 1.8; SII'RI (1')94 j, Tables 8.1-5; SIPRI (1998), Tables lOA. 1-5
Now: The figures displayed refer to strategic nuclear warheads. The figures of 1994 and 1998 have been calculated by
us and refer to warheads all weapons systems with a range of 2,500 kilometres or more.
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thing of a special posItion in today's international politics, although the
economic base for its claims to great power status has been wiped out
almost completely (see also the contribution by Weenink and Correlje to
this volume).
At this moment, it is by no means clear what exactly has been the influ-
ence of the breakdown of the Soviet Union on the distributional structure in
the post-Cold War period. Again, as was the case with the analysis of US-So-
viet power relations, the analysis of GDP shares does not lead to an unequiv-
ocal result. Figure 3.3 represents the distribution of world GDP among the
eight largest economies in 1992. The United States remains the largest eco-
nomic power in the world, with a share of world GDP of21 per cent. It is ob-
vious that Russia's economic position has dwindled; with a share of little
over S per cent of world GDP the country has almost been reduced to eco-
nomic insignificance. At the same time, however, it is remarkable that China
has taken over the runner-up position in the world economy, at least in
terms of GDP size. What is even more interesting is that the ratio of Chinese
to US GDP has passed the level of 6 to 10, a level that was never reached by
the Soviet Union in the era of bipolarity. We will return to China's economic
position in Section 4.
Figure 3.3: CDr Share of the Eight largest Economies, 1992
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Russia 5%
USA 21 %
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The analyses presented thus far indicate that the end of the bipolar
international system can be illustrated with data on the distribution of GDP.
When the data on the possession of nuclear weapons systems is taken into
consideration, however, a somewhat different story needs to be told. At the
end of the 1990s, Russia remains one of the five declared nuclear weapons
states, with a clear lead, in terms of nuclear warheads, on France, China and
the United Kingdom. Russia's nuclear weapons arsenal. however. is relative-
ly old: the latest round of modernizations dates back to 1987. As one
authoritative source has commented: 'Russia's plans to modernize its strate-
gic nuclear forces continued to be severely constrained by shortfalls in the
Russian defence budget' (SIPR1 1998: 434). It can thus be expected that the
economic hardship presently hitting Russia will lead to a further deteriora-
tion of Russia's position as an important player in international political-
military relations.
At the moment it is unclear what type of distributional structure has
emerged, or is emerging, after the fall of the Soviet Union. As far as a return
to multipolarity is concerned, there is the obvious problem of the enor-
mous power differential between the United States on the one hand, and
the other candidates for great power status - presumably China, Japan, Ger-
many and Russia - on the other hand. This great difference in power makes
it very difficult to treat the latter as members of the same class the United
States is in. This also precludes the possibility that bipolarity still continues.
None of the four powers mentioned has attained a position comparable to
that of the Soviet Union in the bygone era, especially as far as nuclear
weapons are concerned. At the same time, we are quite confident that the
last possibility a change in the direction of unipolarity or hegemony, has
also not taken place. Such a change of distributional structure would require
a clear preponderance of one of the great powers. However more powerful
than the other states, the United States does not appear to have acquired
such a preponderance.
3.2 THE INCREASE OF INTERACTION CAPACITY
In the 1990s, many authors have written about the purported tendency
towards globalization or internationalization of relations in the interna-
tional system. These terms are generally used to describe two separate, but
linked developments in the contemporary system. Globalization, as defined
by Scholte, is a process resulting in 'global conditions [that] are situated in a
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space beyond geometry, where distance is covered in effectively no time'
(Scholte 1996: 46). The significance of territorial borders is reduced: 'bor-
ders are not so much crossed or opened as transcended ... Territorial distance
and territorial borders hold limited significance in these circumstances: the
globe becomes a single "place" in its own right' (Scholte 1997: 431). By con-
trast, internationalization is the intensification of cross-border relations (Sie
Dhian Ho and Hout 1997: 3).
The twin tendencies of globalization and internationalization indicate
an increase in the international system's interaction capacity5 We now wish
to determine the extent to which the interaction capacity has increased in
fact and assess the implications of this development.
A first and widely accepted indicator of interaction capacity is the level
of trade of national economies. Table 3.2 presents some data on the growth
of exports of major economies since] 820.
Table 3.2 Merchandise Exports as Per Cent of GDP
1820 1870 1913 1929 1950 1973 1992
France 1.3 4.9 8.2 8.6 7.7 ] 5.4 22.9
Germany NJA 9.5 15.6 12.8 6.2 23.8 32.6
Netherlands NJA 17.5 17.8 17.2 12.5 41.7 55.3
United Kingdom 3.1 12.0 17.7 13.3 11.4 14.0 21.4
Total Western Europe NJA 10.0 16.3 13.3 9.4 20.9 29.7
USA 2.0 2.5 3.7 3.6 3.0 5.0 8.2
USSRJRussia NJA NJA 2.9 1.6 1.3 3.8 5.1
Japan NJA 0.2 2.4 35 2.3 7.9 ] 2.4
China NJA 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.1 2.3
India NJA 2.5 4.7 3.7 2.6 2.0 1.7
Total Asia NJA 1.3 2.6 2.8 2.3 4.4 7.2
World 1.0 5.0 8.7 9.0 7.0 11.2 13.5
--------
Source: MaJJisoll (j ')')'1). I:lhle 24
NOIt': ':-J/A mC;HlS data not JVdibhlc.
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The general impression that one gets from Table 3.2 is that the level of
world exports, calculated as a percentage of CDI', has increased consider-
ably, both in the nineteenth and twentieth century. World exports have
increased, in an almost straight line, from 1.0 per cent of CDI' in 1820 to
13.5 per cent in 1992. The period of the Creat Depression and the Second
World War caused a temporary lapse in this development. The general ten-
dency of increasing exports holds for most of the major economies of the
world, even for relatively 'closed' ones, such as the United States, the
USSR/Russia, Japan and China. Among the larger economies of the world,
India is the exception to the rule. On the whole, one must conclude that
the level of internationalization, as measured by cross-border trade, has
increased considerably and, in 1992, reached a height unprecedented in the
history of the international system. At the same time, however, the data pre-
sented in Table 3.2 show that national economies are only in the process of
becoming internationalized, because economic activity is still predomi-
nantly focused nationally. Two exceptions should be noted. The first con-
cerns Western Europe. The increase of exports of member countries of the
European Union has reflected, to an important extent in result of the com-
pletion of the internal market, the growth of intra-European trade (cf. Van
Aarle 1996: 130). This is a sign of regionalism, and as such it must be dis-
tinguished, analytically at least, from full-fledged internationalization or
globalization. The second exception is formed by several East Asian coun-
tries, which have adopted a strategy of export-led growth and export their
goods predominantly to the United States and Western Europe.
A second indicator of internationalization is the increase of foreign
direct investment. The data on recent trends in foreign direct investment of
the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) are summarized in Table 3.3.
The two columns of Table 3.3 contain two different indicators for for-
eign direct investment in the OECD area. The first column contains the
index numbers of foreign investment of all OECD countries in current
prices. The second column presents the ratio of foreign direct investment to
the sum of gross domestic products of all countries in the OECD area. The
first column indicates that foreign investment from OECD countries
showed a Significant increase during the second part of the 1980s. After a
sharp fall in 1991 and 1992, foreign investment has picked up again and, in
1995, reached the 1988 level. In 1995, the total outflow of foreign invest-
ment of all OECD countries amounted to $265 billion. In spite of the rela-
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Table 3.3 Foreign Direct Investment of the OEeD Countries
Year Foreign Direct Investment
(1981~100)
Foreign Direct [nvestment
as a Percentage of OEeD GDP
1981 100 0.61
1982 55 0.33
1983 73 0.44
1984 100 0.58
1985 118 0.65
1986 186 0.83
1987 286 1.09
1988 341 1.23
1989 436 1.44
1990 455 1.37
1991 386 1.07
1992 345 0.87
1993 400 0.99
1994 409 0.95
1995 559 1. 19
Source: OFCD (1993 and 19'J6b)
tively large amounts of money involved, we must conclude that the impact
of foreign direct investment on the national economies - in terms of the
share of GDP involved - still remains limited. The OEeD countries have set
some steps on the road towards internationalization, but they cannot be
considered internationalized or globalized in terms of foreign investment.
Moreover, as far as the European Union is concerned, also with respect to
foreign investment there appears to be a tendency towards regionalization
(cf. Van Aarle 1996: 128-29).
Other possible indicators of internationalization and globalization con-
cern international financial flows. A first indicator is the total of loans on
international capital markets. The data presented in Figure 3.4 show the
spectacular growth of cross-border transactions that has taken place, espe-
cially in the 1990s.
There has been an increase in the quantity and variety of international
financial flows to the extent that national financial markets have lost much
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of their importance. The total of loans on international capital markets has
increased from $5.8 billion in 1970 to $1055.6 billion in 1996. The
demand for international loans soared during the 1990s: the total of loans
outstanding in 1996 was three times that of 1990. A large part of loans on
international capital markets takes the form of so-called Euro bonds. These
are bonds that are issued simultaneously in at least two countries and are
nominated in one or several foreign currencies - i.e. different from the ones
of the home country of the buyers and sellers of the bonds (OEeD 1996a:
280). As Scholte (1997) has argued, the issue of bonds in denominations
other than the national currency leads to an effective loss of power of the
national monetary authorities and may thus be interpreted as a sign ofglob-
alization.
A second indicator of international financial flows concerns the trading
of so-called financial derivatives. Derivatives are financial products that are
'derived' from traditional financial products traded on money and capital
markets; they consist of such diverse products as interest and currency con-
Figure 3.4: Total of Loans on International Capital Markets, 1970-1996
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tracts and options. The common feature of all derivatives trading is that
national financial authorities can barely keep track of the precise quantity
and nature of values being traded. Figure 3.5 shows that the value of deriva-
tives trading has increased enormously between 1986 and 1993. It also
becomes clear from this Figure that trade in derivatives is most important in
the United States, whose financial markets were liberalized relatively early.
In Europe, where financial liberalization is a fairly recent phenomenon,
derivatives trading has increased 140 times in the 1986-1993 period. In the
same period, derivatives trade in Japan grew by almost 1800 per cent.
Our analyses indicate that contemporary international relations are
characterized by a tendency towards internationalization. It would be a step
too far, however, to interpret the contemporary global order as fully interna-
tionalized or globalized. Although the importance of cross-border transac-
tions has clearly increased, contemporary international economic relations
are still predominantly nationally based. The data on international financial
flows show dear signs of globalization, in the sense that nowadays geo-
Figure 3.5: Trade in Financial Derivatives, 1986-1993
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graphical distance and national borders have only a limited significance. Na-
tional financial markets should be seen as parts of one large international fi-
nancial marketplace, rather than separate entities. As a result of the revolu-
tion in information and communications technology, developments in one
market are transferred to other markets almost without delay. Even so, in-
struments of governance are being created which can lead to the resurgence
of the state in the area of international finance (cf. Kapstein 1994: 180).
4 The Limits of Theory: Predicting the Future
4.1 GADDIS AND THE FAILURE OF IR-THEORIES TO PREDICT
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
In this Section we turn to the question of what, on the basis of our theoreti-
cal understanding of the international system and our empirical results, we
can say about the future of the international system. Before we do so, how-
ever, we must deal with Gaddis's claim that the inability of the 'major theo-
retical approaches' of international relations to predict the 'peaceful' col-
lapse of the Soviet empire at the beginning of the 1990s, demonstrated that
'one might as well have relied upon stargazers, readers of entrails, and other
"pre-scientific" methods ... clearly our theories were not up to the task of
anticipating the most significant event in world politics since the end of
World War 11' (Gaddis 1992/3: 18). Gaddis's Theory and the End of the
Cold War' was the first of an avalanche of articles in which mainstream JR-
theory was castigated for its failure to predict the dramatic demise of the
Soviet Union. As a result of Waltz's trenchant criticism in Theory of Interna-
tional Politics of the epistemological defects in the work of others, and his
proud claim that, by contrast, he had learned his epistemological lessons
well and accordingly had been able to develop a truly scientific systems
theory of international relations, his version of structuralism in particular
came under attack.
Although we agree with Gaddis that the suddenness and completeness
of the Soviet collapse was a total surprise to 'almost' everyone, we think it
only fair to point out that one of the most prominent 'cyclical evolution-
ists', Gilpin, in War and Change in World Politics (Gilpin J983 IJ981 J)
accounted for the possibility of the peaceful demise of a leading power. In
Gilpin's view, 'throughout history the primary means of resolving the dis-
The Umits afTheory 63
equilibrium between the structure of the international system and the redis-
tribution of power has been war, more particularly, what we shall call
hegemonic war' (ibidem: 197), but that, as a result of the establishment
between the United States and the Soviet Union of a strategic relationship
based on mutual assured destruction - one of the clearest manifestations of
the rise of interaction capacity in the international system during the last
decades, we may add - hegemonic war might be a thing of the past.
Gaddis's criticism is also unfair in another respect. In his view 'the role
of theory has always been not just to account for the past or to explain the
present but to provide at least a preview of what is to come. It follows, there-
fore, that one way to confirm the validity of theories is to see how success-
fully they perform each of the tasks expected of them' (Gaddis 1992/3: 10).
In order to do so Gaddis then proceeded to develop 'a relatively easy test'
(ibidem: 18) to establish the validity of the various theoretical approaches
involved. He required of them to have specified beforehand 'at least one of
[the following five developments] as likely': (1) the asymmetrical outcome
of the Cold War; (2) the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union; (3) 'the
increasing unworkability of command economies'; (4) the approximate
timing of the relevant events; and (5) the rough outlines of a world without
the Cold War. Not very surprisingly, Gaddis reached the conclusion that
'very few of our theoretical approaches ... came anywhere close to forecast-
ing any of these developments' (ibidem: 18; emphasis in original).
Gaddis justified his claim that 'good' theory must be able 'to forecast the
future of the Cold War' with an appeal to the physicist Hawking. In the lat-
ter's view 'a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of it,
and a set of rules that relates quantities in the model to observations we
make ... A theory is a good theory if it satisfies two requirements: It must ac-
curately describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model that
contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predic-
tions about the results offuture observations' (Hawking 1988: 9). Hawking's
'definite predictions', however, are definitely of an entirely different kind
from the ones Gaddis seems to have had in mind. rirst, because all scientific
theories contain, as Hawking would be the first to admit, a ceteris paribus
clause, which means that theories can be upheld even if the predicted events
fail to happen (cf. Lakatos 1972 [19701)6 Second, because Hawking's pre-
dictions are predictions about some future events of which it is known in
advance that they will take place, but this is precisely the kind of knowledge
that almost always is lacking in a dynamic system like the international sys-
tem!
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Whenever it concerns dynamic or 'historic' systems, no theory can pre-
dict when a certain concrete event will take place. This is only possible if all
kinds of accidental circumstances are taken into account about which the
theory - and this goes for all theories' - cannot say anything in advance. It is
simply impossible to know beforehand all the situations in which the theo-
ry will apply. Even Newton's theory of gravitation, perhaps the most suc-
cessful empirical theory ever developed, cannot predict the moment that a
leaf will fall from a tree or the trajectory of its fall. Both kinds of event can
only be 'predicted' ajierwards, provided that it is possible to retrieve all the
necessary information (this already poses a challenge in the case of the fall
of the leaves of a single tree). The types of explanation theories can offer
regarding such dynamic systems can be no more than 'explanations of the
principle', as Hayek called them (cf. Hayek 1967: 3-42). We 'know' what
the general mechanisms look like that play a role in these systems, but we
do not know which outcomes these mechanisms will 'produce' in combina-
tion with certain specific circumstances, as the latter, in the words of
Edmund Burke, 'are infinite, are infinitely combined' (quoted in Morgen-
thau 1965 119461: 220). To trot out the example of the falling leaf once
more, it is thanks to the theory of gravitation that we know that every leaf
on a tree will in due course fall to the ground. It is thanks to the biological
theory of the growth and decay of leaves that we know that the probability
of a certain leaf falling to the ground in the autumn is greater than at the
beginning of summer. Nevertheless, it may happen that, as a result of a vio-
lent summer storm, the latter probability will be realized. Likewise, it is
meteorological theory that tells us the possibility of such storms occurring
cannot be excluded. However, it is impossible that this theory can tell us
beforehand when and where this possibility will be realized.
4.2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Against the background of our remarks on the possibility and impossibility
of predicting future states of affairs in dynamic systems like the internation-
al system, we now turn to a discussion of the international system's future.
In particular, we try to formulate an answer to the question of whether the
recent changes in the distributional structure and the increase in the sys-
tem's interaction capacity will lead to a 'systems change' (cf. Gilpin 1983
and Spruyt 1994): the destruction of the international system's deep struc-
ture. Will anarchy be replaced by hierarchy?
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As far as the distributional structure of the system, and possible changes
therein, is concerned, we have noted above that the United States is still the
predominant power in the international system and that none of the other
great powers in the 1990s has reached a level of power that is even compa-
rable to that of the US. The first three columns of Table 3.4 below, drawn
from a recent study by Maddison (1998) on China's economic perfor-
mance, illustrate that, in 1995, China became the second-largest economy
in the world. Its total GDP was about half that of the United States, but big-
ger than Japan's. In terms of population, China is by far the largest country
in the world. The level of wealth in China, with a per capita GDP of $2,653
in 1995, is only about one-tenth of that in the United States.
The last three columns of Table 3.4 give Maddison's calculations of the
possible distribution of GDP among countries in 2015 on the basis of dif-
ferent growth expectations for several parts of the world. Maddison's results
make clear that the international system is not heading for unipolarity
- arguably the first step necessary for a systemic transformation from anar-
chy to hierarchy. The expected growth rate of the United States is expected to
remain between 1.3 and 1.4 per cent per year, which represents a fall of 0.15
percentage point compared with the previous period, while the United
States' share ofWorld GDP is expected to decrease from about 21 per cent to
about 17 per cent. As far as China is concerned, while its per capita GDP
grew by 6.04 per cent per year between 1978 and 1995, it is expected that it
will drop to a yearly average of around 4.5 per cent in the 1995-2015 peri-
od, because of the slowing down of labour input growth (Maddison 1998:
96-7; cf. also Krugman 1996). For Japan, Maddison also expects a growth
rate of 1.3 to 1.4 per cent per year, which means a fall of 1.4 per cent in
comparison to the previous period.
The figures in Table 3.4 demonstrate that the wealth gap between the
'Western' countries (Europe, the United States and also Japan) and coun-
tries in Asia will persist despite the much higher growth figures expected in
China and the dynamic Asian countries. Even though Maddison expects
economic growth in the latter two groups of countries to be much higher
than in the Western countries, GDP per capita in the dynamic Asian coun-
tries will not increase to much more than 50 per cent of the wealthiest
group of countries. China's per capita GDP, in Maddison's calculations, will
remain at around 25 per cent of that of the advanced capitalist countries.
As we have noted above, the economic power base of countries is only
one factor in explaining which countries will acquire a great power position.
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Table 3.4 Levels of World Performance and Potential, 217 Countries, 1995 and 2015
----- - ----
----._------
1995 2015
Per Capita Population GDP Per Capita Population GDP
GDP GDP
China 2,653 1,204.9 3,196 6,398 1.470.2 9,406
7 Dynamic Asia 6,236 350.1 2,183 12.408 444.4 5,514
India 1,568 916.5 1,437 3,120 1,210.3 3,776
31 Other Asia 1,445 543.7 786 2,147 776.8 1,668
Japan 1'J, 720 125.6 2,476 25,533 130.7 3,337
United States 23,377 263.1 6,150 30,268 308.5 9,338
32 Advanced
Capitalist 16,810 436.6 7,339 22,199 463.6 10,291
44 Latin America 5,031 489.0 2,460 6,776 645.7 4,375
15 Former USSR 3,590 290.9 1,044 5,882 296.7 1,745
12 Eastern Europe 5,145 11 6.8 601 9,292 116.8 1,085
16 Middle East 4,138 211.9 877 5,049 333.8 1,686
56 Africa 1,220 715.2 873 1.489 1,172.0 1,745
217 World 5,194 5,664.0 29,421 7,323 7,369.4 53,966
-------- ---------
SourCE': MaJdisol1 (1')98), Table 4.1
Nore: Population in millions .It rnid-yeM. per c<lpi\<1 CDI' ill 1990 intrrn"tional dollars, GDI' in billion 1990
international dollars
From Maddison's calculations, we can draw the conclusion that China, in
the next century, is likely to possess the economic power base to become a
great power in a military sense also. Although this is less clear at the present
stage, we feel that China very probably will also be willing to use its eco-
nomic power to that effect. Over the last decades, China has developed into
a regional power in East Asia whose actions are being closely monitored by
the other countries in the region (cf. Breslin 1999). As China's economic
clout increases, and, concomitantly, its military might, the international sys-
tem will see a return to bipolarity.
It is much less likely that the international system will change into a mul-
tipolar system. As we remarked above in Section 3.1, the European Union
has the economic potential to become a great power. In terms of its GDP, the
EU's economy is comparable to that of the United States. Many commenta-
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tors have pointed to the lack of political unity among the EU member states,
as well as the absence of a central locus of power as the main obstacles for
the Ell to become a great power on a par with the United States. Although
the EC/Ell has had a foreign-policy component since 1970 - first in the
shape of the so-called European Political Cooperation, and, since the 1992
Maastricht Treaty, the Common foreign and Security Policy - there has
never been anything like an Ell foreign policy taking precedence over the
foreign policies of the member states. There has been even less progress in
creating a truly unified military capability
The increase in the international system's interaction capacity, although
considerable as far as international financial flows are concerned, also does
not warrant the conclusion that the international system is on the brink of a
systems change from anarchy to hierarchy Internationalization is definitely
on the increase, but its impact on the national economies will remain limit-
ed for the foreseeable future. Moreover, even if the present rise in the inter-
national system's interaction capacity were of the same magnitude as the
one that took place from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, which
eventually resulted in the transformation of the old order under the spiritu-
al and secular authority of Pope and Emperor, not based on territory, into
the Westphalian order based on territory, then there is still one, very vital,
difference. At the end of the Middle Ages, as Spruyt has pointed out, there
existed competing institutional solutions to the problem of political organi-
zation, such as city-leagues, city-states and sovereign, territorial states, of
which the latter in the end proved to be the most successful (cf. Spruyt
1994). As far as we can see, however, at the present time there are no viable
contenders to the state, that is to say, there do not exist institutional solu-
tions which are at least as 'effective and efficient' as the state in dealing with
the problems posed by the increase of interaction capacity Ifwe understand
anything of the mechanisms that govern the international system, its deep
structure will remain anarchic well into the twenty-first century. The inter-
national system is a dynamic system, though, and there is nothing in our
theory of it that excludes the possibility of a systems change from anarchy to
hierarchy As far as predicting the future of dynamic systems is concerned,
theory definitely has its uses but they remain limited indeed'
In view of I Juber's famous definition of sovereignty, we suggest it would not be COfTect
to argue that this internal functional similarity is a necessary consequence of sovereign-
ty. According to fluber, who was arbiter in the island of Palmas case brought by the
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Netherlands against the United States, 'territorial sovereignty.. involves the exdusiue
right to display the activitie" afa Slate' (Island of Palmas Case [Netherlands u. U.S.A.] 1928;
our emphasis). In our opinion this means that a state can entrust (farm out?) all 'the
activities of a state' to other agents without this diminishing the state's sovereignty in
any way.
2 Although we have to admit that those wishing to make a distinction between 'structure'
on the one hand, and 'interaction' on the other hand, have a point in that certain parts
of the system's structure can be influenced by the actors, while others cannot - for exam-
ple because they are the consequence of prior interactions (cf. Archer 1995: 77-8). But
in our view this is a difference of degree, not of principle. Both kinds of the structure
function as boundary conditions. With reference to the ongoing discussion within IR-
literature on the exact nature of these boundary conditions (e.g. Wendt 1992 and Ruggie
]998), we may add that boundary conditions 'enable' or 'empower', as well as 'con-
strain' the interacting units. We may even go further: if boundary conditions would not
'constrain' the units, then there is no way that they could 'empower' them (cf. Lieshout
1995: 7-15).
3 We have decided not to use composite power indices (such as the widely Llsed index
introduced by Singer et al. 1974) because we feel that these have some important
methodological disadvantages if one tries to make comparisons through time (cf.
Organski and Kugler 1980: 36). Organski and Kugler argue that 'a GNP index is evi-
dently more parsimonious from the user's point of view' than the composite Singer-Bre-
mer-Stuckey index, the more so, as the performance of both indices does not differ very
much (ibidem: 38). Our focus on COP shares and nuclear weapons at least has the
advantage of providing intuitively clear interpretations.
4 Of course, inclusion of the sum of COPs of the member states of the European Com-
munities/Union would produce a different result. It is the lack of political unity and
identity of the EC/EU that made us decide not to include this economically very powerful
bloc in the analysis at this point.
5 Note that we use the terms globalization and internationalization in a different way
from Ilirst and Thompson (1996: 10). In their view, '[al globalized econorny is an ideal
type distinct from that of the inter-national economy and can be developed by contrast
with it. In such a global system distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticu-
lated into the system by international processes and transactions. The inter-national
economy, on the contrary, is one in which international phenomena are outcomes that
emerge from the distinct and differential performance of the national economies. The
inter-national economy is an aggregate of nationally located functions.' As one of us has
remarked elsewhere, conceptualizing globalization in such extreme terms means that it
is very unlikely that the present-day international order can be understood as a global-
ized economy (cf. Ilout 1997: 102).
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6 For this reason, it is actually the other way around. Scientific honesty requires that 'any-
one who advocates the empirical-scientific character of a theory... must be able to spec-
ify under what conditions he would be prepared to regard it as falsified; i.e., he should
be able to describe at least some potential falsifiers' (Popper 1983: xxi). This is a point
Waltz entirely overlooks in his recent defence of his theory of the balance of power. On
the basis of Lakatos's treatment of the ceteris paribus clause, Waltz argues that 'falsifica-
tion is untenable' (Waltz 1997: 914). But he fails to see that I.akatos, following Popper,
insists that falsification remains the regulating principle of the empirical-scientific enter-
prise. According to Waltz the theory predicts no more than that 'willy, nilly, balances
will form over time', and that 'balances recurrently form. The theory cannot say how
long the process will take' (ibidem: 915 and 916). This implies that it is not possible to
refute the theory. Whatever behaviour the units in the international system exhibit, it
always agrees with the theory. At the end of his essay, Waltz shows himself to be very sat-
isfied with his theory of the balance of power. According to him it has stood the 'test of
seriousness' (ibidem: 916). We sincerely doubt the validity of this test.
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4National Political Systems:
the Changing Boundaries of Politics? 1
Kees van Kersbergen
1 Introduction
For any comparative political scientist, statements like the following must
sound alarming:
the terms 'country', 'state', 'national political system' have become obso-
lete as useful units of analysis in comparative political studies;
the increasing interdependence of nation states and the decline of the
autonomous power of public decision-making imply that cross-nation-
al research is increasingly meaningless (cf. Daalder 1993: 170-71);
we do not have the conceptual tools to describe and adequately explain
the growing dissociation between authoritative allocations, territorial
constituencies and functional competencies (cf. Schmitter 1996);
theoretically, the discipline cannot make sense of the diffusion of polit-
ical authority;
the independence of the nation state is eroded to such an extent that it
is pointless to use the term 'sovereignty' any longer;
the autonomous capacity of policy-making of nation states is rigidly
constrained as a result of which the very idea of a national political sys-
tem is out-of-date;
the authoritative primacy of the state is dilapidated and the convention-
al notion of 'politics' has become antiquated.
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The main driving forces of these developments are globalization and
European integration (cf. Ingelhart 1997 for other relevant processes). But is
the sovereign nation state really in decline? The answer obviously depends
on whether these end-of-sovereignty arguments are theoretically sound and
empirically correct. In this chapter I argue that, in fact, they are neither.
First it is necessary to delineate to what precisely the arguments are re-
ferring. This is not easily done. The problem is complex, the propositions
are very dissimilar and the confusion is accordingly vast. The Belgian po-
litical scientist Huyse (1994) argues that 'politics is crossing borders', that is
to say national borders because national governments and parliaments trans-
fer competencies and means to international organizations; and imaginary
borders because traditionally non-political sectors are politicizing. It is not
necessarily democratically elected politicians anymore who take political
decisions; decisions, that is, which are binding for society as a whole (ibi-
dem: 88).
We seem to be dealing with a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one
hand, many formerly non-political domains are swiftly politicizing, while
on the other hand the power of the state to steer and command is equally
rapidly evaporating. A broadly shared anxiety concerns the decomposition
of democratic control over political authority and public power (Guehenno
1993). Political authority and power are 'migrating', but democracy is not
moving along with it (cf. Bovens et al. 1995; Ankersmit 1997; De Beus
1997). A more optimistic view is found in Held (1995), in which he argues
that democracy can survive under conditions of a leakage of state power, but
only if democracy becomes truly cosmopolitan (cf. also Albrow 1996; Bhag-
wati 1997; Giddens 1995; Hirst and Khilmani 1996; Mulgan 1994).
The many, often highly speculative discourses about the end of the
nation state, politics and democracy tend to produce feelings of uneasiness.
One is increasingly inclined to ask whether there is any truth in the suppo-
sitions. There are three major reasons to be dissatisfied with these apocalyp-
tic accounts. First of all, the debate on crucial concepts such as 'politics',
'state', 'sovereignty', 'political' or 'policy capacity' and 'political institutions'
is very confused and confusing as a result of which there remains consider-
able conceptual vagueness. Second, the extremely pessimistic arguments are
not always as consistent as they should be (cf. Streeck 1996b). There is
much ado about the ultimate causes of the collapse of the nation state
- globalization, European integration - while the very same arguments can
be employed to defend the thesis that the nation state remains meaningful
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and consequential. Finally, the sweeping hypotheses and generalizations
need to be tested empirically. However, the search for the empirical studies
that meticulously document the alleged disintegration of the nation state
and the end of national politics is not very fruitful, for thorough empirical
and comparative studies are hard to find. To the extent that they can be
found, they offer a much more nuanced portrayal (cf. Kasim and Menon
1996; Forder and Menon 1998). In other words, there is an abundance of
grand, compelling, but unfortunately also rather tempestuous theoretical
conjectures and a shortage of empirical studies that can demonstrate the
correctness or incorrectness of these wild speculations.
I do not wish to argue that there is only smoke and no fire. There are
complex shifts in the relative range of power, the distribution of power and
the competence of the nation state. There are intentional as well as uninten-
tional transfers of the competencies and authority of national political sys-
tems to international organizations. These changing boundaries of politics
force comparativists to reflect seriously upon the concepts, theories and
methodology of their discipline. No doubt, the research agenda of compar-
ative political science will change more and more in the context of this
intellectual debate on the transformation of national political systems. This
transformation is possibly even undermining the manner in which we, until
now, have analyzed national political systems. It is conceivable that in the
end we will have to rethink thoroughly the conventional definitions of con-
cepts such as sovereignty, state and politics. However, as far as I can see, we
have not yet reached that point. The main thrust of this chapter is that I
doubt very much that we will ever reach it.
First, I offer conceptual considerations and criticisms of key concepts
such as 'politics', 'state', and 'sovereignty' and argue that they remain politi-
cally relevant and analytically useful. Next, I consider the two developments
that are believed to undermine the political significance of national politi-
cal systems - globalization and European integration - and conclude that
what is widely interpreted as the emasculation of the power of the nation
state is, in fact, a transformation of the manner in which state power is exer-
cised.
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2 Conceptual Considerations and Criticisms
2.t POLITICS
What does the core concept of the 'political' mean in the expression 'nation-
al political system'? There are essentially two rival conceptions of politics.
The first approach holds that 'politics' can be equated with 'the political',
that is to say with collective decision-making over issues for which there
exist no generally accepted rules regulating conflicts of interests. In such dis-
cordant situations the power relations between actors are decisive. As a con-
sequence, politics is an aspect of all social (sub)systems. This view was most
lucidly defended by Robert Dahl in his Modern Political Analysis (1984: 10),
where he defines politics as 'any persistent pattern of human relationships
that involves, to a significant extent, control, influence, power, or authority'.
'Politics is power' is the most concise way of representing this approach.
The second approach maintains that politics is anything that is going on
in the political domain. The political domain can institutionally be distin-
guished from other societal spheres. The differentiation of society has led to
the institutionalization of the relatively autonomous subsystems of family,
economy, religion and politics. The state and its bureaucratic organizations
constitute the institutionalization of the political, the embodiment of the
political domain. Surely, power enters into every social sphere and all do-
mains may be politically relevant, but only those power relations and strug-
gles that occur at the level of the state and its constituent parts, the political
institutions, are political (cf. Becker 1996). 'Politics is the state' is the short-
est possible description of this object-oriented conception of politics.
The view that politics is the state has always been - possibly as a matter
of preference, but conceivably from necessity - the definition with which
comparative political researchers have worked. The existence of sovereign,
relatively autonomous, divergent political systems has made comparative
political analysis a fruitful activity.
2.2 THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY
The debate on the end of the nation state is partly concerned with the exact
interpretation of sovereignty and how we define the state. Sovereignty is an
essential characteristic of the (modern) state (cf. Camilleri and Falk 1992;
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Held 1995; Stirk and Weigall 1995; lackson 1999a). The core of the doc-
trine of sovereignty is that there is no higher authority than the state. The
theory of sovereignty paints a picture of the world in which the state holds
supreme authority over a specific territory. Outside the borders of the state
exists a world of other sovereign states. The state has established itself as the
dominant power on its territory; it must be viewed in terms of organized
dominion (cf. Weber 1984: 33-7). The state has the monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of violence on its territory; it is the only institution that can
enforce obedience of the population to the rules and regulations for that
territory; it is the institution that is legitimized to levy taxes, initially to
support the repressive state apparatus (army, police, judiciary) that is to
maintain and reinforce dominion, but increasingly also to finance the com-
prehensive set of laws and regulations that belong to the welfare state.
Of course, no state has ever enjoyed complete and uncontested domin-
ion. That would exaggerate the actual and diffuse differentiation of compe-
tencies within the nation state (cf. Olsen 1996; Dehousse 1997). Moreover,
sovereignty will always remain to a large extent an aim, an aspiration or a
claim of the ruling elite rather than an accomplished goal. It is also true that
no state has ever reached complete autonomy to the extent that borders have
always been penetrable (cf. Koch 1997; Offe 1996; Poggi 1990). Perhaps
Claus Offe (1996: viii) is right when he argues that the idea of political au-
thority as located at a relatively fixed site has become obsolete: 'What turns
out to be surprisingly and essentially contested is the answer to the question
"who is in charge?"'. According to Offe, there are roughly four causes of this
uncertainty: (1) the evaporation of a world with clear loci of authority (e.g.
the collapse ofthe Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War) and the arrival
of new actors and their claims; (2) the penetrability offrontiers (e.g. global-
ization, European integration); (3) the decline of relatively fixed collective
identities and the advent of ascriptive identities; and (4) the erosion of (the
possibility of) collective categorization. These causes 'may be responsible for
the widely shared sense that sovereignties have become nominal, power
anonymous, and its locus empty' (ibidem: ix). The nation state has lost its ex-
clusive claim on authority and decision-making (cf. Strange 1995; Cable
1995). In addition, a state no longer enjoys unqualified control over its terri-
tory and population because an 'international community' has progressively
evolved, which guards human rights. The claim to national sovereignty is no
longer an automatic barrier to intervention when the fundamental rights of
citizens are violated (cf. Taylor 1997). Under such circumstances the princi-
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pie of non-intervention is bounded by the conditions of 'good behaviour'
and 'good governance'. In this sense sovereignty has developed into 'condi-
tional sovereignty' (cf. Hague et al. 1998: 45).
These suppositions seem to share the assumption that fading or shifting
state borders also imply the disintegration of the traditional property of sov-
ereignty, namely supreme power over land and inhabitants within clearly
defined borders (cf. Anderson 1996). However, it would be unjustifiable to
brand the concept as obsolete. As argued in the introduction, sovereignty
has a double connotation. On the one hand it refers to the (formal) inde-
pendence and autonomy of a state in its international relations. On the
other hand, the term also functions as a synonym of supreme authority. The
same kind of confusion arises with respect to both connotations. First, if
one fails to make a distinction between formal independence and material
sovereignty, one mistakenly assumes that states are never committed to or
bound by international law or that formal independence means autonomy.
Second, if one confuses the supreme authority of the state with the omnipo-
tence of the state, one could wrongly suppose that sovereignty excludes the
constitutional state or democracy, because the state would not be con-
strained by the rule of (constitutional) law. Astate can still be said to be sov-
ereign, in spite of its internal, material dependence on other states, its
submission to the international legal order, and the internal, constitutional
constraints of its power, and despite the fact that it has possibly delegated
(rather than transferred) certain competencies to international organizations
(cf. Schrijver 1998; fackson 1999a; Barkin and Cronin 1994).
As yet, there seems to be no decisive reason to suppose that the nation
state, or rather the territorially based model of the organization of political
authority that since 1648 we have identified as the nation state, is vanish-
ing. At the Montevideo Conference of 1933, where the United States and
the Latin-American countries made a pact on non-intervention, it turned
out to be possible - in spite of vast differences in power and conflicts of
interests - to reach agreement over the definition of a national, sovereign
state. Such a state was characterized by: (1) a permanent population; (2) a
(more or less) sharply defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) the
authoritative power to enter into relations with other states (cf. Rosenau
1989; Piano and Olton 1982). Roughly speaking these characteristics still
hold true today.
Abandoning too quickly the analytical usefulness of the concept of sov-
ereignty in its formal or strict sense involves the risk that one mistakes every
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curtailment of national policy space for a loss of sovereignty. One cannot
infer from the erosion of the internally established dominion that a state
has dropped its ambition or claim to sovereignty. It would be very difficult
to understand why those who govern never tire of stressing that they above
all value the sovereignty of the nation state and the integrity of its territory,
whether these are threatened externally by another state or internally by
separatist movements, and that others struggle fanatically to obtain sover-
eignty (cf.lackson 1999b: 454-56).
2.3 THE CONTINUING POLITICAL RELEVANCE AND ANALYTICAL
USEFULNESS OF 'SOVEREIGNTY'
If there is one single characteristic of national political systems that should
be emphasized, it is their adaptability (cf. also the contribution by Hout
and Lieshout in this volume). At times nation states adapt by preserving
certain meta-rules and political-cultural patterns and at times adaptation
involves the transformation of such rules. A national political system can
radically change with unchanging sovereignty, as in the case of a revolu-
tionary change of political regime, or an evolutionary development of a
gradual and progressive democratization of authoritarian, totalitarian or
absolutist regimes. Obvious examples are the French revolution of 1789 or
the more recent transformation of political regimes in Spain, Portugal and
Greece.
One can interpret the disintegration of a federal system as the end of a
sovereign, federal state, but with good reason one can also stress the other
side of the coin, namely that out of such a process of devolution new, sover-
eign states emerge. Thus the collapse of the communist regime of the Soviet
Union led to the establishment of the sovereignty of the Baltic republics of
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It is noteworthy that in 1989 the Supreme
Soviets of these states themselves proclaimed their sovereignty. As is well
known, this action was warmly welcomed by the population of the Baltic
states and at the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact a human
chain of over two million people united the three capitals in an impressive
demonstration of national sovereignty (cf. Henderson and Robinson 1997:
55-6). These dramatic events would be very difficult to interpret without a
proper understanding of sovereignty.
Eleven other former Soviet republics recovered their sovereignty also as
a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, the former 'satel-
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lites' exercised their authoritative power to enter into relations with other
states by concluding new alliances and aspiring to the membership of inter-
national organizations like NATO. The Russian federation - which already
consists of 21 republics, one autonomous region (ablast), 10 autonomous
'national areas' (a/nugs), 49 Russian regions (oblasts, including Moscow and
St. Petersburg) and 6 'territories' (/nays) - proclaimed its sovereignty in June
1990. In terms of political authority it put itself on a par with the then still-
functioning central Soviet state and claimed the right to levy taxes and the
right to enter into international relations. In the end, the new Russia estab-
lished a fairly loose confederation with the other Slavic states, the Trans-
Caucasian republics and the Central Asian states (the Commonwealth of
Independent States, CIS). Here, too, one must stress that these develop-
ments are difficult to grasp without a thorough comprehension of sover-
eignty and its enduring political significance.
Decentralization, deconcentration and devolution - ultimately the del-
egation of authority and competencies from the central level of the unitary
state to the regional or local level - may occur precisely in order to preserve
the sovereignty of the nation state. The expansion of regional autonomy in
Italy, the struggle over the competencies of the regional parliaments in Scot-
land and Wales, the federalization of Belgium, the granting of the so-called
'Autonomy Statute' for the Spanish autonomous communities (including
the special position of Catalonia, Andalucia and Basque Country), are all
examples of the manner in which the sovereignty of the state is safeguarded
by means of quasi-federal structures within - possibly former - unitary
states.
Reflecting upon these issues it seems remarkable that there exist such
vehement speculations about the end of the sovereign nation state, particu-
larly at the end of an era in which the number of such states has actually
increased. The Baltic states, the former Soviet republics and the ex-commu-
nist states in central and eastern Europe have been mentioned. Eritrea
comes to mind too, as well as the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Finally,
everyone is painfully aware of a decade of bloody struggle over power in
Yugoslavia, from which - so far - 5 new states have emerged: the Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and (the
former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia. Recently, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Kofi Anan, gave a speech entitled 'Why conservatives
should support the United Nations' (23 October 1998) in which he said:
'Despite globalization and the emergence of more and more problems that
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transcend borders - which I call "problems without passports" - nothing ...
has yet challenged the status of the State as the cornerstone of international
relations'.
3 Challenges: Globalization and European Integration
Let us consider the two important developments that, theoretically, are
believed to undermine seriously the political significance of national politi~
cal systems. These concern globalization and European integration and
their effects.
first of all, it is important to stress the distinction between these pro~
cesses. European integration, as Lieshout (1999) rightly points out, is fun~
damentally a political process: the creation and establishment of the inter~
national market, the common political institutions and the single currency
are the result of political decision~making and not of some elusive econom~
ic and apolitical process. Second and precisely because of economic inter~
nationalization, European integration must also be understood as an
attempt by nation states to keep a hold on their economies. Thoroughgoing
international cooperation was considered to be the appropriate method for
this. The change in the power of the nation state is both the unintended and
unforeseen effect of the internationalization of the economy and - in the
case of European integration and other forms of international cooperation
- the intended and anticipated result of the delegation of competencies.
3.1 GLOBALIZATION
What does the strong thesis of globalization imply (in contrast to the more
balanced arguments by Hirst and Thompson 1996; Keohane and Milner
1996; Boyer and Drache 1996; cf. also Hout and Lieshout in this volume)?
Consider the following statement by Roger Cohen: 'Throughout the world
today, politics lags behind economics, like a horse and buggy haplessly
trailing a sports car. While politicians go through the motions of national
elections - offering chimerical programs and slogans - world markets, the
Internet and the furious pace of trade involve people in a global game in
which elected representatives figure as little more than bit players. Hence
the prevailing sense, in America and Europe, that politicians and ideologies
are either uninteresting or irrelevant' (as cited in Garrett 1998: 1). The thesis
National Political System5 79
of the globalization prophets is that the forces of the global economy are so
strong that the nation states cannot but cater to the whims of the global
market. For various reasons the capacity of companies and investors to
transfer production and capital all over the world has increased and this has
led to a profound change in the character of the post-war mixed economies.
In addition, the mobility of financial capital forces governments to mini-
mize their intervention in the economy or at least to take measures that
meet the wishes of financial markets. The diminishing economic relevance
of borders is drastically decreasing the national policy space. If a govern-
ment does not comply with the demands of the market, it will increasingly
become incapable of providing the level of social and economic security
necessary for winning elections.
The rhetoric of globalization is often based on an anti-interventionist
liberalism; it is generally associated with pleas for the deregulation of
national economies, the support of multinational corporations and the lib-
eralization of markets, particularly financial markets. Hirst and Thompson's
(1996) study of the myth and reality of globalization, however, concludes
that there exists no fully globalized economy (cf. Hout and Lieshout in this
volume). They prefer to speak of internationalization and the intensifica-
tion of international dependencies. In contrast to what the theory of global-
ization presumes, Hirst and Thompson show that national economies are
still the central units in the world economy, multinational corporations
retain a national home base, and public regulation of the economy still
plays a crucial part in the economy (cf. Milner and Keohane 1996; Ilout and
Sie Dhian Ho 1997).
From the many analyses of the character and consequences of interna-
tionalization, a certain consensus appears to be arising over the following
effects:
the increased mobility of capital undermines the effectiveness of macro-
economic policies;
economic internationalization augments the pressure on those social
and economic institutions that traditionally offered the framework for a
politics of exchange between, on the one hand, an efficient, external ad-
justment to the world market, and, on the other hand, internal compen-
sation, primarily in the form ofextended social policies (cf. Evans 1997);
internationalization affects the political power relations at the domestic
level. The power of capital has increased, because the credibility of the
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threat of investment strikes, of capital flight and of a transfer of produc-
tion capacity has increased. The countervailing power of workers and
unions cannot keep up, among other things because labour simply does
not have corresponding escape routes and because internationalization
is particularly detrimental to low- and unskilled labour.
These developments increase the probability that the resistance against
change, which is inherent to nationally established social, economic and
political institutions, is breaking. As a result, a type of political and institu-
tional reform is possible that diverges considerably from the traditional
paths of the established national (welfare) states.
Too many analyses, however, incorrectly consider the constraints
imposed by internationalization in absolute rather than relative terms. As a
result, the end of the powerful state and the nation state are too easily pro-
claimed, while in effect there is an evolution of state activities and capaci-
ties. The 'strong' stoty of globalization is problematic, also because the
intervention capacity of the predecessor of the so-called powerless state, the
Keynesian welfare state, is being exaggerated. In addition, the thesis of glob-
alization neglects the divergent manners in which states in reality react to
common challenges. Next, the very idea that the economic challenges and
hazards of globalization are identical for all national political systems is
wrong, because the political economies of nation states vary significantly
(cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1997; Van Aarle and
Garretsen 1997). Finally, in a normative sense the globalization thesis
either stresses the blessings of deregulation and privatization, or - in the
Leftist critique - the misery caused by global capitalism (cf. Weiss 1998:
188-193).
Specifically national institutions, such as deeply rooted systems of social
and economic consultation and interest intermediation, are capable of
functioning as a buffer absorbing external shocks (Van Kersbergen et al.
1997). Different institutions filter, so to speak similar external pressures
differently and this explains the cross-national variation in policy out-
comes. The political and institutional differences between countries critical-
ly affect the manner in which the growing intensity of economic interde-
pendence is being dealt with.
This train of thought on institutions as filters and buffers can be extend-
ed more radically. The significance of the nation state, national institutions
and national structures of power may be increasing rather than diminish-
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ing. This is not to contradict or deny the development of a global economy.
On the contrary, precisely because of the insecurity generated by interna-
tionalization, the level of (social) security guaranteed at the national level
will increasingly influence the decisions of investors to invest and of voters
to vote.
Let me defend this line of argument. The prophets of the end of the
nation state fail to make a distinction between the state's adaptability and
its evolving policy instruments. It is crucial to make this distinction in order
to avoid the automatic conclusion that a limitation of possible policy
instruments implies the restriction of the state's capacity to adapt. As Weiss
(1998: 197; emphasis in original) has rightly pointed out: 'Economic inte-
gration does not so much enfeeble the state as weaken the efficacy of specif-
ic policy instruments'. Some instruments, like Keynesian demand manage-
ment - insofar as it ever worked - may have lost their effectiveness entirely,
but this does not mean that every possible policy instrument has become
impotent. True, some social-policy models, for instance those that are
biased towards benefit transfers rather than services, have reached their lim-
its. However, this does not imply that all types of social policy are excluded.
In fact, recent changes in Dutch and Danish social policy, particularly the
transformation from passive to active labour-market policies, are better
understood as a sign of the continuing intervention capacity and adaptabil-
ity of the state than as a manifestation of powerlessness. The capacity to
adapt, however, is increasingly dependent on the extent to which a govern-
ment is capable of tapping new social and political sources and mobilizing
political support for policy review, including the perhaps necessary break-
ing of 'institutional resistance' (cf. Huber and Stephens 1998; on the poten-
tial role of international organizations in this process, cf. Reinalda in this
volume). This capacity hinges only partially on the extent to which a
national economy is integrated in the global economy or on institutional
path-dependency and increasingly on institutional and political flexibility
at the national level.
In addition, states are not the passive victims of economic globaliza-
tion, but they are themselves actively involved in facilitating the competi-
tiveness of their economy. There are innumerable ways in which states try to
help their nationally organized producers to meet the challenge of interna-
tional competition. That, too, is a form of adaptation. The state is one of the
actors in the process of internationalization. In fact, one could see the
actions of states as one of the root-causes of globalization, for it were gov-
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ernments that decided - for whatever reason - to liberalize markets by
actively seeking to annul politically erected trade barriers, to privatize
nationalized industries, and to abolish cartels.
Moreover, there is a clear alternative to the powerless state (cf. Garrett
1998). National governments are still well capable of implementing social
and economic policies that redistribute wealth and risk in such a manner
that the potential victims of the global market are protected (cf. Cameron
1978; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1996). Such policies are beneficial to eco-
nomic growth, because they yield collective goods that the market cannot
produce. These especially concern investments in human capital and the
infrastructure.
Comprehensive (corporatist) labour-market institutions are crucial to
prevent employees exploiting the policy of social protection and investment
by driving up wage claims. It also turns out that a nation's economic, polit-
ical and social stability is increasingly important for investment decisions,
particularly for those investors who are forced to take their decisions under
conditions of uncertainty and high risk (cf. Garrett 1998: 130). Clearly, cer-
tainty and predictability are highly valued in an increasingly uncertain and
volatile global economy. The state is crucial in providing such certainty.
States attempt to retain a certain level of control over their economies by
fostering new or reinforcing existing social coalitions and international
alliances. Both the internal strategy of innovating social and economic insti-
tutions and (re- )forming political coalitions and the external policy to
establish a high degree of policy coordination by way of international co-
operation may include the purposeful delegation of competencies. It is
exactly at this point that confusion over the end of sovereignty and the
nation state emerges. Obviously, the delegation of competencies is an
aspect of the 'relocation' of politics. However, it is by no means self-evident
that this implies an emasculation of the power of the nation state; it is
rather a transformation of the manner in which state power is exercised.
This latter issue deserves further consideration. It may very well be that
- in spite of the many, usually ill-considered, speculations to the opposite -
we are in fact witnessing an increase in the role of the nation state. We may
be mistaking the metamorphosis of the state for its decline. Following Lind
(1992), Weiss (1998) envisages the emergence of the so-called 'catalytic
state', that is to say a state that fosters international cooperation with other
states and national coalitions with interest groups, (multinational) corpora-
tions and transnational actors, rather than attempting to regulate by direct
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intervention. The goal is to effect a high degree of policy coordination to
compensate for the loss of effectiveness of national policy instruments. The
hypothesis is that the better states manage to foster international, national
and sub-national coalitions and alliances, the greater the chances of suc-
cessful adaptation. International cooperation, regulation (GAIT/wrO, IMF,
Ell, OECD), consultation and coordination (G7/G8) enhance the trans-
parency and predictability of interdependency at the global level and there-
fore temper the vicissitudes of the world market. Such regulations, however,
can never replace the internal functions of, for instance, social policy, part of
which is aimed at internally monitoring the social outcomes of dynamic
international markets. International economic cooperation and regulation
in a sense increase the national policy scope beyond national borders (cf.
Rieger and Leibfried 1998: 381). lt is likely that cross-national differences
remain substantial, precisely because the essentially political process of
national and international coalition formation co-determines outcomes.
3.2 EUROPEAN tNTEGRATION
These considerations lead me to the issue of European integration, for this
is the example par excellence of the manner in which sovereign states have
reached agreement over extensive cooperation and policy coordination
(Haverland in this volume). lt is important again to make a clear distinction
between the deliberate delegation of competencies and authority of nation
states and the presumed loss of sovereignty. The historian Alan Milward
(1992), in his study of the origin and early development of the European
Community, shows how crucial the motivation of the preservation of sover-
eignty in fact was. Governments of nation states were prepared to delegate
certain competencies to the supranational organization if, and only if, they
assumed that the solution of pressing problems was beyond the capacity of
the nation state, while the solution was nevertheless vital for the very sur-
vival of the nation state. In fact, only by closely cooperating at the European
level could the European nation state after the Second World War re-estab-
lish itself as the fundamental unit of political authority. European integra-
tion was an aspect of the post-war reconstruction of the nation state. The
European nation states pursued a strategy of integration because this was
' ... one way of formalizing, regulating and perhaps limiting the conse-
quences of interdependence, without forfeiting the national allegiance on
which its continued existence depends' (Milward 1992: 19).
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The foundation of the European Union (Ell) can be understood as the
manner in which the member states have tried to parry the loss of political
control, particularly over their national economies, by increasingly delegat-
ing power to the European level. The interrelation between the states, the
supranational organization, and the interaction between the various levels
of governance have by now acquired such a scale and have become so com-
plex that a new and unique system of multi-level governance has emerged
(cf. Marks et al. 1996; Marks 1997). In comparison to other international
organizations the particular nature of the EU seems to be its complex insti-
tutional configuration (cf. Bulmer 1998), its broad range of policies and its
mixture of intergovernmental and supranational arrangements. According
to Nugent (1994: 433) it is ' ... a system which is quite unique in the extent
to which it involves states engaging in joint action to formulate common
policies and to make binding decisions'. The EU can be understood as a
political system (in Easton's sense), because it has the following characteris-
tics: (1) formal rules of collective decision-making (polity); (2) the produc-
tion of policy; and (3) the mobilization of citizens, interest groups and
political parties (politics) (cf. Hix 1998; Keman 1993). However, the Ell is
not a state, precisely because the allocation of values for its society is bind-
ing only to the extent that the member states are willing to comply with
European law (cf. the introductory chapter to this volume).
A major distinction in comparison to federal states is that in the Ell
the member states still prevail (cf. Pierson and Leibfried 1995). The Ell con-
tinues to be a political construction built by sovereign nation states. In this
context Peterson's (1995) distinction between 'history-making' (supra-sys-
temic decisions), 'policy-setting' (decisions at system level) and 'policy-
shaping' (decision-making at meso-Ievel) is helpful. The governments of
the member states are undeniably the predominant actors when decisions
with respect to the enlargement of the Ell, a change of legal procedures or a
transformation of the internal institutional structure are at stake. At the
other levels of decision-making, the role of national governments is obvi-
ously less predominant. It goes without saying that at the 'history-making'
moments it is the protection of the national interest and sovereignty which
constitute the leading motives to act (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 1998; Lieshout
1999). However. the more the Ell evolves, the higher the constitutional,
legal, political and economic costs will be for a member state to opt out (cf.
Cecchini 1988). In this sense the room to manoeuvre for member states
becomes more and more constrained.
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The thesis that European integration has had a momentous impact on
national political systems is not particularly controversial. The legislative
procedures and policy implementation are more similar to the functioning
of federal systems than to international law. Lawyers stress that the EU legal
order takes precedence over national law. This issue, however, continues to
be controversial as became clear during the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty on Ell, when the German Bundesverfassungsgericht refuted the prima-
cy of Community Law and disputed the direct effect of the rulings of the
European Court of Justice (ECI). In addition, the EU, in this case the ECL
lacks the means to enforce the implementation of European law against the
will of a member state. Of course, there are numerous provisions (e.g. sanc-
tions), but the effectiveness of decision-making is ultimately dependent on
the voluntary agreement of member states and the willingness to act in
accordance with the ruling of the ECJ (cf. Nugent 1994; Wallace and Wal-
lace 1996; Besselink ] 997).
3.3 STATE BUILDING AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The complicating yet fascinating aspects of the EU as a multi-tiered political
system are that it has the nation state as one of its components, that nation-
al and sub-national actors try to influence the Union's policies and that the
Union, in turn, affects the national political systems directly. One of the fun-
damental, yet often-underestimated differences between national political
systems and nation-state building on the one hand, and European integra-
tion on the other, concerns the relationship between the ruling elite and the
political and cultural attitudes of the population. The formation of nation
states was directly associated with the rise of nationalism and the political
construction of national identities that were to support and legitimize the
centralization of political authority. In contrast, European integration is
hardly, if at all, accompanied by the emergence of a European political iden-
tity. The political legitimization and public acceptance of the authority of the
European institutions and policies seems therefore problematic.
However, the theoretical models that we have at our disposal for analyz-
ing state and nation building (cf. Rokkan 1975; Tilly 1975, 1993; Stuurman
1995; Klausen and Tilly 1997) spell out that we cannot draw a parallel
between the formation of nation states and the process of European inte-
gration (see Van Kersbergen 2000). If we compare the stages of nation state
formation (e.g. following Rokkan 1975) with the evolution of European
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integration, it is clear that in the latter case there is no centralization of
political authority at the cost of the 'periphery'. The political elites of nation
states are creating a new political centre next to, or perhaps on top of, exist-
ing centres. There is no construction of a European identity that is in any
sense comparable to the standardization and nation building that came
about in the course of the process of state formation in Europe. The mecha-
nisms and institutions necessary for the formation of a shared and some-
what unified European political identity, such as schools and mass media,
continue to function primarily at the national level. Active political partici-
pation is one of the central political predicaments of the present phase of
European integration. The limited political rights and the lack of democrat-
ic control at the European level are notorious deficits. In addition, the poli-
tics of social and economic redistribution that concluded the formation of
European nation states is of marginal consequence in the EU, if only
because of the, comparatively speaking, very limited budgets that the EU
has available. The EU 'is not at all an embryo of established nation states. Its
basic structure, or template, is quite different. It does not have a core gov-
ernment, a strong centralized bureaucracy, nor authority structures radiat-
ing out from a center to all reaches of its jurisdiction. It has no power 10 tax
and spend. It is not an issue of "immature" state or "not enough time to
develop'" (Caporaso 1997: 580-1). The political system of the EU simply
does not follow the developmental path of nation states familiar to us.
4 Conclusion
The internationalization of the economy and European integration affect
the policy space and policy capacity of nation states in various ways and
degrees of intensity. Such events, however, must not be confused, let alone
be equated, with the breakdown of the nation state. Admittedly, the eco-
nomic significance of national borders has declined, but one cannot infer
from this, therefore, that the nation states are wholly powerless vis-a-vis
global markets. Admittedly, the governments of national political systems
have delegated competencies to the EU and this affects their relative posi-
tion of power, but this does not imply the acute and conclusive end of
national sovereignty. The adaptability of nation states is highly variable and
- partly because of this - the effects of economic internationalization and
European integration are likely to vary cross-nationally. The consequences
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for a nation state of these challenges depend to a large extent on its chang-
ing policy capacity and adaptability and these concern, in essence, issues of
political power mobilization and coalition formation. What is widely inter-
preted as the enfeebling of the nation state, is in fact a transformation of the
manner in which state power is exercised. Linda Weiss (1998) was right
when she concluded that the powerless state is a myth.
Por their critical comments I wish to thank Wil Haul, Bob Reinalda, lnger Stokkink and
Bertjan Verbeek.
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5Changing Shape, Changing Form:
Liberal Democracy without the Classical State
Marcel Wissenburg
1 Introduction
Political theory, particularly the mainstream liberal school l with its interest
in the design and vindication of liberal-democratic institutions, is to a large
degree predicated on the existence of a sovereign nation state as a necessary
condition for the existence and protection in sociery of liberal-democratic
values. It might be argued that the idea of the sovereign nation state as the
central unit of politics no longer corresponds to realiry. The state may still
be sovereign and (up to this day) be central to political life, yet cracks are
appearing between the actual power of states and the formal marks of their
sovereignty, such as the monopolies on violence and on the attribution of
rights within their territories. In addition, the nation state as a state for one
'people' - whatever that may mean, exactly - is becoming increasingly rec-
ognized as a construction rather than as a 'real' category. It appears - and for
the sake of argument I shall assume this to be true - that a fundamental
political change is taking place: the state's legitimate powers seem to be
'fragmenting' and 'leaking away' in various directions - to international
institutions, to the non-political sectors of civil society, to autonomous
regions and so on. If sovereignty becomes a fiction, if the state is no longer
in control, liberal political theory has a conceptual problem: to what enti-
ties other than the state can or should the adjective 'liberal democratic'
refer?
89
In the next few Sections, I shall first explain why political plurality, that
is, the diffusion of political power over and among political entities other
than the state, is worth investigating at all (for a liberal political theorist).
Next, I shall discuss the effects of the fragmentation and diffusion of power
on the viability of liberal democracy, albeit in a rather superficial way: I
shall be mapping and charting terra incognita. The aim of this chapter is, first
of all, to show that the 'disappearance' of the state's monopolies does in fact
pose serious problems, not just for liberalism as a political theory but also,
in the real world, for liberal democracy itself. In addition, I shall argue that
two of these problems are more important and more fundamental than
others: (1) possible logical contradictions between the systems of rights that
competing political institutions impose upon their members, and (2) the
dissolution of the polis into a multitude of competing institutions, resulting
in a fragmentation of the individual's ties and loyalties. Issues like these
require us to see the emergence of political plurality as a - from a liberal
point of view - fundamental political change, one in which politics not
only changes in shape but also, to abuse a platonic term, in form.
2 Moral Pluralism and Political Plurality
What exactly is liberal democracy all about, and why do liberals associate it
with the existence of a state? The first part of this question seems to call for
a definition. To avoid wasting time on discussions of the importance and
quality of definitions, I shall simply list a set of ideas to which I attach the
label 'liberal democracy' (cf. Wissenburg 1998, 1999; cf. Hawkesworth and
Cogan 1992 on liberal democracy). It so happens that this set overlaps with
other definitions or implicit understandings of liberal democracy, some-
times being narrower and sometimes broader, but I shall consider that, in
the context of this chapter, a mere coincidence.
Liberal democracy, then, is first and foremost a combination of two sets
of ideas: liberal values on the one hand and democracy on the other. In its
liberal aspect, liberal democracy is a political system that both aims to satis-
fy in its structure, and aims to protect in its actions, a series of normative
principles considered to be near-absolute, valuable in themselves and non-
negotiable. The exact formulation of these principles may differ from time
to time, system to system, person to person, but they cover at least the fol-
lowing ideas:
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equal consideration for the interests of individuals;
equal respect for their opinions;
liberty of conscience, i.e. of conceptions of a life worth living;
liberty of action in the pursuit of a life worth living;
protection of individuals on these four points against interference by
others (individuals or institutions);
a just distribution of individual rights to the (im)material benefits and
burdens of social cooperation, compatible with at least the above five
points.
In the vocabulary of one of the greatest liberal theorists, lohn Rawls, this
could be rephrased as saying that liberalism (1) acknowledges moral plural-
ism, that is, acknowledges that individuals have different plans of life and
different theories of the good; (2) admits that these divergent views on life
are either practically or theoretically (or both) irreducible to one substan-
tive idea of the good; and (3) tries to accommodate the basic structure of
society to these raw facts or moral imperatives.
In its democratic aspect, liberal democracy is concerned with reflecting
the preferences of individuals in the structure and actions of their shared
institutions. Again, the idea is open to further specification. It is usually
reflected in institutions like universal suffrage, an elected parliament of re-
presentatives, a parliament controlling government, and majority decision
rules for members of government and parliament. The exact shape and
form of these institutions may differ, moreover, (we can imagine alternative
constellations) and the aim of democracy, reflecting the preferences ofindi-
viduals, is itself contentious.
Liberal democracy is, in addition to its concern for liberal values and
democracy, a political system that tries to reconcile these two, in a logical
sense mutually exclusive, ideals (cf. Wissenburg 1999; also Hyland 1995;
Weale 1999). After all, guaranteeing liberal values implies that the people's
preferences may not be satisfied, and satisfying the latter may mean that lib-
eral values must give way. Since liberal values do not necessarily cover the
whole of social life and therefore leave room for democratic decision-mak-
ing, but democracy cannot permanently guarantee liberal values, the priori-
ty lies with liberal values. Constitutions and bills ofrights usually enshrine
the latter and prescribe the limits they pose on democracy.
Finally, like many other political systems, liberal democracy is con-
cerned with stability. Note that the managers of political systems do not by
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definition aim for stability or understand society as a cooperative venture to
mutual advantage. For one, the dictator of a banana republic may be con-
cerned only with gaining maximum financial profit in a minimum amount
of time and making a safe escape before the next coup d'etat; for another,
tbere are political theories that recommend a state of permanent revolution
in order, ultimately, to abolish the state. In liberal democracies, stability is
understood not only as formal institutional stability, i.e. the persistence over
a longer period of time of political and social institutions, but also as sub-
stantial and individual stability Liberal democracy puts a high value on con-
tinued substantial support from its citizens: in acting on and internalizing
the values of the system, and in at least tolerating and, if possible, support-
ing the workings of the institutions (legitimacy). Being concerned with the
fate of individuals, it also aims to ensure a stable basis of expectations for
them: guarantees for and protection of individual rights, an unambiguous
attribution of rights. In all this, the legal system plays a key role - and this is
where the state comes in.
Liberal political theorists have, in their analyses of liberal democracy,
come to depend heavily on the notion of the nation state. There are histori-
cal and biographical reasons for this: liberal theorists generally grow up in
nation states. Hence, the assumption tbat it takes a nation and a state to
realize and uphold liberal democracy and to inhibit arbitrary and illegiti-
mate use of power by private interests, groups or sections within civil society
(or the state apparatus itself) - all this seemed natural and went unques-
tioned for a long time (cf. Ackerman 1980; Barry 1995; Canovan 1996;
Miller 1995; 1998; Rawls 1973, 1993a; Shapiro 1996). However, the redis-
covery of minority cultures and the emergence of 'unstately' political insti-
tutions like the Ell are starting to gnaw away at the basis of the existing con-
sensus. Mainstream political theorists discussing issues like multicultural
citizenship (cf. Kymlicka 1995) or nationality (cf. Barry and Goodin 1992;
Miller 1995; Canovan 1996), try to retain the framework of states but admit
meeting increasing difficulties. It was only in early 1998 that one leading
political philosopher, David Miller, for the first time summarized an exten-
sive list of 'state-fragmenting' phenomena ranging from political and eco-
nomic globalization to nationalism, religious fundamentalism and deregu-
lation. He then posed the crucial question: ' ... are we still living in a world
in which it makes sense to speculate and theorize about social justice[?]'
(Miller 1998), moving on to argue that many of the preconditions of liber-
al democracy in general threaten to dissolve - even though states can still
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perform an important role. In addition, several political theorists have
recently begun to take an interest in the 'constitution of Europe', i.e. the
desirable and feasible shape of the European Union in relation to its mem-
ber states (cf. Weale and Lehning 1997; Weale and Nentwich 1998).
Nonetheless, there are or were also sound theoretical reasons for associ-
ating liberalism with the nation state. Democracy and liberal values need
protection on the one hand, support on the other. They need support in
that they require a shared interpretation and internalization by the mem-
bers of a reference group, say, a polis: without shared concepts and aims,
cooperation in any form becomes impossible. Liberal values and democra-
cy cannot exist without a kind of basic consensus within this reference
group, implying that this general consensus cannot be too thick nor too
thin. If there is too much consensus, if there are too many like-minded
minds, deviant views of the good will become heresies and majority views
public prescriptions; if there is too little consensus, cooperation will be
impossible. The international community with its hundreds of states, thou-
sands of cultures, millions of shared histories and billions of diverging indi-
viduals seems too large and diverse; local communities and cultures seem
too closed and too small to exist as viable schemes of cooperation. The
'thing' in the middle however, that half-mystical, notoriously underspeci-
fied idea of a nation, seems ideally suited for a balance between thin and
thick consensus. In it, the idea of a viable, Le. independent scheme of co-
operation (society) conflates with the idea of a shared basis of understand-
ing (culture).
Democracy and liberal values also need protection. Without codifica-
tion and coordination and without institutions to control their being
respected, their survival would be in the hands of individuals and factions
within the nation. Factions and individuals might see a relative advantage
in violating them; society as a whole might evolve into a set of subsystems,
each with its own rules contradicting in word or effect those of other sub-
systems. Apart from these incidental violations of democracy and liberal
values, the absence of coordinating mechanisms threatens the structural sta-
bility of society. A nation therefore needs a hierarchic ordering of legitimate
power: a point of origin for the (coordination of the) attribution of rights,
endowed with powers (including the famous last-resort monopoly on vio-
lence) to implement its rules against any subordinate entity. In short: liber-
al democracy seems best associated with a nation and sovereign state.
The real world, however, seems to contradict theory, insofar as the point
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of reference for liberal democracy, the nation state, may appear to become
an endangered species. In the international arena, states increasingly co-
operate. The establishment of the United Nations Organization gave a new
impetus to the development of an international system of law; the political
evolution of Europe (ECSC, EEC, EC, Ell) implied that legislative and execu-
tive powers moved from individual states to Brussels. On the national and
sub-national levels, states have transferred power to 'minority' nations,
granting different degrees of autonomy and self-government to cultural and
ethnic minorities and regions. They have started to share power with or even
handed over power to sections and factions within their respective civil soci-
eties. Finally, states are increasingly confronted with 'governance without
the state': sectors within civil society addressing new political issues and
resolving political conflict among themselves, with the state playing only a
minor role or none at all except that of bystander (cf. Young 1997). In sum,
it appears that we are witnessing the re-emergence of political plurality, in a
shape possibly more complicated than mediaeval Europe ever experienced.
In the next two sections, I shall inspect several types of political plural-
ization with an eye to their effects on the viability of liberal democracy. I
shall look in particular at the threat they may pose to six important ele-
ments of liberal democracy introduced above: liberal values, democracy, the
balance between these two, the basic consensus in the reference group, the
formal stability of the system, and the stability of individual expectations.
3 Internationalization
Many of the ways in which states can lose power can be placed under the
heading of internationalization; what unites them is merely the fact that
power crosses a border. International cooperation between states is a first exam-
ple, insofar as it involves self-binding: any state that commits itself to others
to use its power in a particular way also loses power in a particular way. This
is not to say that states lose their de jure sovereignty; unless they merge com-
pletely, they do not. What they give up by cooperating is the ethical right
and - by their own internal standards - legal power to act differently, plus
in some cases the actual physical capability to act in certain ways. In theory,
any form of cooperation is voluntary and can be terminated voluntarily,
states being sovereign, although this may prove to be difficult in practice.
There are degrees of cooperation and thereby degrees of power loss: inci-
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dental cooperation on one specific issue is quite different from, say, enter-
ing a mutual defence treaty, military cooperation within NATO or delegat-
ing legislative, executive and judicial powers to the European Union. It is far
easier to end cooperation on a search and rescue operation than it is to step
out of the European Union - the latter may even be economic, organiza-
tional and political suicide. Yet these are matters of degree, not of principle.
It is difficult to imagine states cooperating, even on an incidental basis,
without binding themselves: if, by order of their individual authorities,
naval ships of two states cooperate to save castaways in a storm, the states in
question already commit themselves not to use their powers (in this case,
the capacity of their ships) in the area where the other ship is sailing. The
point is this: where and insofar as states cooperate, they deny themselves
the legitimacy of using their power to deviate from the conditions of coop-
eration. 2
In this respect, supranational (global) cooperation, as for instance in the
establishment and implementation of international commercial, criminal,
civil and martial law and human rights, is usually basically the same as
international cooperation (cf. Nugent 1997; Marks et al. 1996). The differ-
ence is one of degree of participation, not in the nature of the loss of power
itself. One caveat is in order here, though: international law and suprana-
tional organizations occasionally recognize native peoples as legitimate
actors on a par with sovereign nation states. The result of this can be para-
doxical: the implication is that a state may at the same time claim sover-
eignty over a native people and, as a sovereign state within a supranational
structure, recognize that people as practically sovereign itself, thus both
claiming and denying itself the power to dictate the terms of cooperation
within its borders.
A third form of internationalization appears at first sight to bear no rela-
tion whatsoever to the perception of states losing or delegating power: the
'expansion' of national law (and thereby sovereignty) across the borders of a
state.' Well-known examples are the prosecution by Germany and the
Netherlands of citizens for various paedosexual offences committed in the
Far East; the British government arresting Chilean former-dictator Pinochet
on charges of murder of Spanish citizens; and (given a slightly different con-
ception of law) the death sentence imposed on the author Salman Rushdie.
It would seem that if state X arrests, tries and convicts its citizens for heresies
committed in other countries, or visitors from other countries for heretical
acts committed elsewhere against citizens of X, X only expands its powers.
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However, one state's gain is - at least in principle - another's loss: by
expanding its legal domain across its borders, X actually imposes its laws on
other sovereign states and their citizens.
Fourthly, there is governance without government (cf. Young 1997): rela-
tively independent international non-state actors (often made up of mem-
bers appointed by governments) arranging affairs that could, and would
otherwise, belong to the dominion of the state. Examples of this range from
the International Air Transport Authority via the Great Lakes International
Joint Commission to the Antarctic Treaty System. The idea of governance
without government must be taken with a grain of empirical salt: non-state
actors turn out to be only relatively independent from the state, states do
have direct influence on their policies, an international civil society provid-
ing an independent basis of power and legitimacy for state-less governance
is still lacking in most areas, and so on. Yet we see here, once again, ethical
and legal loss of power: states binding themselves to a regime and denying
themselves the moral and legal right to use their power to deviate from the
terms of cooperation.
There is one special instance of governance without government where
the diffusion of power is of a radically different nature: economic globaliza-
tion (cf. Hout and Sie Dhian Ho 1997). Economic globalization, at least in
the form of the globalization of capital, can be placed under this heading
precisely because it involves international non-state actors (companies)
arranging affairs that would normally be dealt with by sovereign states: the
distribution of wealth, welfare and opportunity over a society is part of their
monopoly on the attribution of rights. The two fundamental differences
from other forms of state-less governance are that economic globalization
does not require states to abstain from their legal or ethical rights, and that
it does involve a practical loss of power.
So what do all these developments mean for liberal democracy? Insofar
as typically liberal values are concerned (liberty. equality, justice), their
effects are limited and mixed. Possible negative effects are fairly obvious.
Governance without government may mean that existing or new control
mechanisms are insufficient to guarantee them. Supra- and international
cooperation may result in 'lowest common denominator liberalism', that is,
liberty or equality or justice only in areas on which participants agree and
only to the degree that they agree: no Dutch tolerance for soft drugs and
prostitution, no Danish or Belgian tolerance for racist printed material, no
European-type welfare state, and so on. It may also lead to a more far-reach-
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ing international redistribution of power and welfare and in an ever increas-
ing flow of individuals from excluded have-not countries to included haves
- but these are in no way new or fundamental problems for liberal democ-
racy. In some form or other, they already exist, are dealt with, and are dealt
with more or less successfully. Internationalization can, on the positive side,
protect and stimulate liberal values, as in the case of international law or in
that of international cooperation aimed at countering the negative effects of
economic globalization.
Only in one respect does there seem to be a fundamental problem here,
re-emerging from the mists of history. The expansion of national sovereign-
ty, with its subjection of individuals to two or more distinct supreme
authorities and their incompatible rules, will leave individuals in the cold
with regard to their rights and freedoms: whose rules are they to follow?
Below, we shall see that this will turn out to be a pivotal problem in all
instances of political pluralization. Note also that, to some degree, gover-
nance without government and the recognition of non-state actors as prac-
tically sovereign can have a similar effect.
As a rule, the effects on democracy of internationalization processes are
equally double-edged and circumstantial. On the one hand, they can impro-
ve the democratic element of public life. Internationalization offers a chance
to include more and more people in the anonymous and previously uncon-
trolled processes that shape their lives. On the other, internationalization is
not necessarily democratic or aimed at furthering democracy. It can involve
the creation of new institutions and policy fields where (inter)national elites
and interest groups, in the widest possible sense of the word, can divide and
conquer without publicity, interference or popular control. Again, these are
neither new nor fundamental problems, and again, there is a fundamental
problem preceding their solution: the existence of a reference group.
Democracy requires a will or, at the very least, a need to live together and co-
operate, including a shared basic consensus on the terms of cooperation,
thus creating a po/is out of accidentally co-existing individuals. As observed
above, in an international context this consensus may be too thin or even
absent.
This same problem reappears when we consider whether 'international-
ized' political systems can find and guarantee a balance between liberal val-
ues and democracy. The practical results of such efforts are unpredictable,
yet theoretical criteria can be designed. One example may suffice to illus-
trate the problem: the currently most popular type of liberal theory of jus-
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tice evaluates political institutions on the basis of the so-called reflective
equilibrium approach (cf. Rawls 1973, 1993a; Singer 1976, 1987). This
demands a repeated two-way comparison between, and if necessary adapta-
tion of, moral intuitions on the one hand and preconditions for an impar-
tial judgement (think of John Rawls' veil of ignorance) on the other, until a
match between the two has been found. If we want just international insti-
tutions to be democratic and if they are more than one-shot cooperative
ventures, an equilibrium will have to be found among the intuitions of all
involved, regardless of nationality, creed and level of development (cf.
Goodin 1992). John Rawls had already concluded that the difference
between an affluent and a poor sociery in its appreciation of the relative
value and substitutability of economic and political liberties was enough to
justify two distinct conceptions of justice, one for poor, and one for affluent
societies (cf. Rawls 1973). A reconciliation between the intuitions of mem-
bers of both poor and affluent societies was considered impossible; Rawls
therefore rejected and still rejects the idea of an international reflective equi-
librium (cf. Rawls 1993a, b). There would simply be no basic consensus
among them.
The width and possible absence of a basic consensus is ultimately an
empirical issue. There are indications for the evolution of an international
civil society (cf. Young 1997), yet even if these feeble signs are signs of life,
they may not be enough. A basic consensus for a society requires more than
shared interests and a limited set of (apparently) interculturally accepted
legal criteria. It also takes a shared identity and identification, schemes of
cooperation without which everyone would be worse off, a shared percep-
tion and culture. In other words, a real-life basic consensus presupposes the
existence of a unifying context, a reference group performing all these func-
tions. The more the nation state appears to be withdrawing, the less it serves
as a reference group. The question then arises whether the new institutions
that fill in for the state can serve as reference groups. I shall return to this
question in my Conclusion.
As far as the formal stability of political institutions is concerned, inter-
nationalization again does not have to have adverse effects. The liberal
democratic nation state, being historically contingent (cf. Spruyt 1994), had
predecessors that were stable and 'international', insofar as the word nation
is appropriate, yet, lacking complete monopolies, failed to meet modern
definitions of the sovereign state. One example is the Roman empire with
its centre of power and tributary allies; another is mediaeval Europe without
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a clear centre of power, but with a system of mutual obligations binding
individuals to the often-contradictory rules of feudal lords and princes of
the Church, cities, guilds and so forth.
The example of mediaeval Europe also highlights why internationaliza-
tion may result in instability of expectations, a threat to which no known
answers exist. Liberal democracy exists - in part - because there is a monop-
olist attributing rights, an actor who is prepared to exercise its monopoly on
the use of force to protect this first monopoly, an actor finally whose
authority rests on legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects. Where the monopoly
on the attribution of rights crumbles, freedoms and obligations become
insecure. Where two or more authorities attribute rights to the same indi-
viduals, and in the absence of a higher authority prioritizing rights, odd sit-
uations can occur. If one independent authority grants me an absolute right
to freedom of movement, and another grants you an absolute ownership
right to your car, meaning you can do with it as you please, our two rights
logically contradict one another. Not only can they physically efface one
another when we happen to be in the same place at the same time exercis-
ing our respective rights, they also conceptually cancel one another: their
combined implication is that we both have an absolute right to fill the same
space in the universe at every moment in time. In deontic logic, this prob-
lem is referred to as that of the incompossibility of rights (cf. Steiner 1994;
Wissenburg 1998, 1999): the attribution of rights to contradictory or mutu-
ally effacing ('existentially overlapping') acts of one or more agents. Partly
because legal forums still created a form of hierarchy acknowledged by all, if
necessary with force, mediaeval society could live with a degree of incom-
possibility;4 liberal democracy, however, cannot. If a political constellation
(a state, an international organization or whatever) ceases to guarantee lib-
erty, equality and justice, it ceases to be a liberal democracy.
4 Other Types of Political Pluralization
A pattern is emerging, allowing us to move more swiftly past other types of
diffusion of power and political pluralization to a separation between fun-
damental problems of principle and less fundamental (though not neces-
sarily less simple) practical problems for liberal democracy.
Next to internationalization, then, we can distinguish political delega-
tion of power as a distinct way in which states can lose power. A classic
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example is the recognition by states of (the exclusive authority of) pre-state
institutions within their domain, ranging from precolonial kingdoms in
Africa and Asia to the Ottoman, more or less clan-like, authorities on the
Arabic peninsula. Although in temporal terms the state's power exists by
virtue of whatever powers such institutions lost, logically speaking a state
loses power to them: it must be sovereign prior to refraining from exercising
its powers. A more modern example is offered by border-crossing regional
authorities (e.g. Euregions) to which two or more states have delegated
power, in some respects (those in which the regional authority is auto-
nomous) creating a new state.
The consequences of political delegation of power for liberal democracy
do not differ too much from those of internationalization. In terms of lib-
eral values, democracy and the balance between both, the effects can be
both negative and positive. Obviously, new borders and limits are created
both for individual liberty and participation: the creation of an auto-
nomous Scotland could exclude the English from political positions and
participatory rights in Scotland, and the Scots from the English equivalents,
for instance. Yet these borders need not be oppressive. They may actually
create a more stable basis for individual development in protecting a shared
but endangered language, culture and history and, as a consequence, indi-
vidual members of a people against cultural schizophrenia (cf. Kymlicka
1995; consider here native Canadians). A further effect may be that more
weight is given to those affected most by collective decisions: the Scottish
vote obviously carries more weight in a Scottish parliament than in West-
minster. It all depends on how the polity is defined and on how liberal its
constitution allows it to be.
Nor does delegation have to result in formal instability or in instability
of expectations: whatever else may be said about the British, French and
Dutch colonial empires, they were clear examples of how relative autonomy
within a hierarchical structure could avoid incompossibility and promoted
the system's stability. Again, it is only the question of a basic consensus that
poses problems, albeit in the opposite direction. All of the above possibili-
ties for liberal democracy are predicated on a well-balanced basic consensus
within the polity, yet the smaller the size and the higher the autonomy, the
higher the risk that the consensus is just too thick. As mentioned before,
culturally closed communities can be quite oppressive for plans of life,
lifestyles and habits that deviate from the norm. More fundamentally, the
success of political delegation of power also depends on the existence of a
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reference group, but like internationalization, it creates institutions next to
the state, hence more than one potential reference group to which to relate.
A third type of fragmentation of power occurs inside the borders of the
nation state: the depoliticization of power. In essence, this means that the
state retreats from certain policy areas, a phenomenon often misleadingly
referred to as deregulation - misleadingly, since rules, rights and duties do
not disappear but merely originate in other spheres within society. In
Moslem countries, depoliticization of power often takes the shape of an
(informal) transfer of executive and judicial responsibities from the state to
organized religion, allowing the interpreters of the Koran to interpret also
civil law and outline legitimate policy aims and means. In the West, it takes
at least two forms: that of a transfer of power to civil society and, more
recently, as one of the defining characteristics of Third Way social policy, to
the private sector (privatization of public and social services) (cf. Schuyt
1997; Cable 1995; Social Philosophy and Policy 1997/2).
Depoliticization of power exhibits the same diffuse pattern of effects on
(the viability of) liberal democracy. [t can, but need not, increase individual
autonomy and freedom of choice; it can but need not improve participation
yet may also reduce responsiveness; it can mean that new checks and bal-
ances are introduced to secure a balance between liberalism and democracy,
yet it can also endanger that balance by bringing forth an uncontrolled and
uncontrollable dominant sphere in society, a fear voiced by Michael Walzer
(1983) as well as llirgen Habermas (1981) and John Dryzek (1990). The
system can be (formally) stable, as the mediaeval experience has shown, but
is also in danger of threatening the stability of the individual's expectations:
incompossibility of the rules of distinct social spheres is a far from imagi-
nary threat. Finally, depoliticization can have a positive effect in terms of the
basic consensus required to ensure social cooperation, in that the rules for
the distribution of rights in one social sphere (say, education) may be
devised more consensually without the rules of another (say, production)
dominating (cf. Walzer 1983), yet it also results in a fragmentation ofinsti-
tutions, the reference group and loyalties.
A fourth type of political pluralization bears some resemblance to politi-
cal delegation of power: the separation of nation and state. [t takes many
forms, from ethnic nationalism and tribalism to mere demands for the
recognition of a regional language or customs, but the result is essentially
the same: national minorities see their existence recognized and their
autonomy increased (cf. Miller 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Anderson 1996). The
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effects are also essentially similar to those of political delegation: apart from
the threats posed by the incompossibility of systems of rights and the frag-
mentation of reference groups, it all depends on contingent empirical cir-
cumstances.
Finally, mimicking depoliticization, new political issues tend to be dealt
with more and more in arenas other than the state, or with the state playing
only a minor role. The difference with depoliticization is that these issues
either never even reach the agenda of the state, or are dealt with by others,
pre-empting the state. Ulrich Beck (1997) has referred to this phenomenon
as sub-politics. Examples can be found in the environmental arena, where
companies and environmental movements increasingly operate together on
the basis of covenants, in the area of emancipation, but also in those of
more recently 'repoliticized' issues like physical security (crime in the
streets) and socio-economic security (cf. Schuyt 1997). To cut a long story
short: the effects of sub-politics resemble those of depoliticization. Again,
only incompossibility and the fragmentation of the reference group seem
unavoidable; everything else depends on contingent circumstances.
5 Conclusion
The power of the nation state is fragmenting, flowing away to other political
entities, creating a politically plural world. Being sovereign, the state has
reserved for itself the legal authority to regain what it loses or delegates, but
in many instances in the real world this may be or become impossible. The
price of retreating from international cooperative structures may be too
high, in terms of economic prosperity, reliability or viability, and the resis-
tance from among citizens, civil society, the private initiative and/or minori-
ties - who all stand to lose often dearly gained freedom - may be too severe.
For those accustomed to moral pluralism or even committed to the val-
ues of liberal democracy, the emergence of a politically plural world signals
a long and very diverse list of problems. In this chapter I have not even
begun to list them seriously, nor was that my intention. What I hoped to
show is that we may expect many of these problems to be of a contingent
nature: there is no logical reason why they cannot be solved, and whether or
not they occur depends mainly on pliable circumstances. The quality of
democracy, for example, may improve or degenerate with the introduction
of international cooperative organizations, depending, among other things,
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on whether these organizations create room for participation, on the kind
of room they create, and on the width of the basic consensus among the
participating individuals. The simultaneous introduction of sub-state poli-
ties can have the same effects given the same side constraints.
However, particularly if we consider the cumulative effect of all types of
fragmentation of the state's powers described here, we have detected two
more fundamental and logically prior problems that need to be solved if
liberal democracy in a politically plural world is to remain viable: incom-
possibility and fragmentation of the reference group. (All this is not to say
that the kind of problems that I called contingent are not crucial for the real
world or for the survival of liberal democracy.)
lncompossibility occurs wherever two systems of rules logically contra-
dict one another and meta-rules assigning priority to one system or rule
over another are lacking. If we can no longer assume that the state is really
sovereign, practically capable of wielding its monopolies on the attribution
of rights and the use of force to support it, then, no matter how sovereign it
claims to be under international law, the state can no longer guarantee the
rights and duties of individuals, the stability of their expectations, the secu-
rity that allows them to cooperate and live a life of their own making -
many of the things we value in liberal democracy for liberal reasons. Unlike
other problems, this one is fundamental: without a hierarchy in rule sys-
tems there is no logical solution to the danger of incompossibility.
The nation state itself is historically contingent; if it changes shape, it
may still in some way retain the form of a polis, a more or less self-sustained
and self-sustainable scheme of cooperation (society) with a unifYing politi-
cal structure exactly mapping society. The emergence of political plurality
implies a fragmentation of the reference group, the polis. What follows is the
mirror-image of incompossibility: the individual's loyalties to different
political entities may clash. In addition, loyalty to democratic institutions
may diminish since representatives in political arena X cannot always influ-
ence the outcome of the fight in arena Y - in other words, representatives do
not or cannot always represent us where and when we want them to.
Although democracy (as a voting and decision-making system) in some
form or other remains possible, fragmentation offers far less protection for
basic liberal values and human rights than we - political theorists and citi-
zens - may find desirable.
As far as liberal political theory is concerned, we can draw two conclu-
sions. For one, problems like incompossibility and reference group frag-
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mentation bring an age-old and almost forgotten issue back onto the
research agenda: sovereignty. The easiest, most obvious solution for incom-
possibility and fragmentation would be to say that a modern world with
'less' state still requires an overarching sphere of sovereignty, now to
be attributed to a different entity. Yet how can this fairly classical solution
be morally justified - and hence gain legitimacy and feasibility - in the
absence of a basic consensus? Or are there, perhaps, alternative ways of
creating a stable hierarchy of rule systems without invoking the notion of
sovereignty? - an issue that could inspire normative political theorists and
rational choice and game theorists alike.
Secondly, with or without a new sovereign, the family of concepts that
we relate today to the concept of the polis - state, nation, nation state, soci-
ety, et cetera - does not take sufficient account of the economic, social and
political fragmentation within and across borders. Our present conceptionS
of the polls does not suffice in theory, and may not suffice in practice, as the
basic composite, the molecule, of the politically plural world of tomorrow.
However, alternative conceptions of the polls are rare and difficult to
(re)construct. One alternative that may be germane to future research is the
mediaeval conception of the polis, but it may also be fruitful to consider
theorists who tried to escape the mediaeval framework, like Jean Bodin. In
his view of sovereignty, the sovereign does not rule a unified polls but creates
one out of a politically plural world where individuals are united by what
he calls the cite (cf. Bodin 1961, Book I, Chapter vi). The cite is civil society,
made up of interdependent yet, in principle, independent cities and vil-
lages, guilds, universities and parishes - any political entity, any body pro-
ducing and distributing freedoms and opportunities that unites people. It
would be interesting to see if we can rethink the emergence of new political
entities in a politically plural world, or even recast liberal theory itself, in
terms of the cite - both with and without a sovereign power 'to bind them
all'.
Liberalism as a school in political theory or philosophy should be distinguished from
liberalism as a political ideology. In the former sense, it presumes among other things
(1) the existence of an irreducible plurality of views on the good life, as a fan of politi-
cal life, as a meta-ethical necessity, or both; (2) moral equality of individuals; (3) moral
priority of the individual's fate over that of more abstract entities; (4) neutrality in
regard to individual plans of life and theories of the good on the part of the state, either
as a political necessity or as a moral virtue; and (5) an at least hypothetical consensus
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among reasonable and impartial individuals as a necessary condition for the justifica-
tion of principles, policies and institutions (cf. Wissenburg 1999).
2 One might want to argue that two can do more than one, that cooperation implies an
expansion of power. In a way, this can but need not be true: cooperation creates a new
actor, consisting of the cooperating parties, one that may be able to 'do more' (however
measured) than its constituent parts on their own. The point, however, is that those con-
stituent parts (a) cannot do these extra things on their own and (b) commit themselves
to terms of cooperation constraining their original freedom of action. Odysseus, when
sailing past the Sirens, did not increase his own power by tying himself to the mast, nor
that of his crew by stuffing their ears; what increased was the power of the collective
aboard the ship. For a discussion of this conception of power as individual freedom of
action, see Van Hees and Wissenburg 1999.
3 There are historical precedents: in pre-Carolingian Germanic Europe for instance, crimi-
nals were tried and punished according to the laws of their land of origin, regardless of
where the crime was committed.
4 At a price, of course: an immeasurable amount of bloodshed. Note that the ultimate
cause of mediaeval incompossibility problems, the conflict over supreme authority
between wordly Imperium and otherwordly Sacerdotium, remains unresolved to this
day_
S I use the word conception to indicate an interpretation of a concept (cf. Rawls 1973 on
the concept and conceptions of justice). Ilence, our interpretation or conception of the
po/is differs from that of the Greeks, the Romans, mediaeval political theorists and so
forth, yet they are all interpretations of the same basic idea, the 'molecule' of politics.
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6International Organizations as Sources
of Political Change
Bob Reinalda
1 Preliminary Remarks
In my analysis of international organizations as sources of political change
I distinguish between three successive perspectives on social and political change.
These perspectives are labelled evolutionary, functional and governance,
respectively. The first and third perspectives focus upon dynamics and
change, the second upon stability and continuity. I am interested in the
position of international organizations (lOs) in a world of nation states
according to these perspectives on change: in what way are international
organizations sources of political change?
It should be noted that the assessment ofIOs has been the object of evo-
lution itself. A shift has occurred from a realist vision centred on an anar-
chic system of nation states preoccupied with security towards a pluralist
vision, which also recognizes competition in the world market, other actors
than nation states as well as domestic politics. The concept of the nation
state should also be treated with care. All too easily the state is seen as an
invariably autonomous and sovereign unity (cf. the Introduction to this
book for the concept and relevance of sovereignty). Nation states, however,
vary according to their stages of state and society building, as can be learned
quickly by comparing modern states on various continents. The exact begin-
ning of the modern or Westphalian nation state (1648) and the proper idea
of ,stateness' (cf. Nettl 1968) add up to the concept of the state as a chang-
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ing and dynamic phenomenon, without altering its position of primacy in
the international system. The interaction between politics and economics
should, moreover, not be seen as a relatively recent one. Support for the
national economy in combination with import restrictions, as defended by
mercantilists even in the seventeenth century, shows that this relationship is
older. The same goes for internationalization and globalization. Relations
between domestic and foreign policies as well as the forces of the world
market have been effective in both the nineteenth and the twentieth centu-
ry. Hirst and Thompson argue that the present period of internationaliza-
tion is by no means unprecedented. They demonstrate that the world eco-
nomy in the period from 1870 to 1914 was in many ways more open than it
has since been (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 31). Finally, I do not see the
relationship between state and international organization as a zero-sum game,
in which one wins what the other loses. The combination that stronger 10s
lead to stronger states is certainly possible.
In Section 2, I discuss the evolutionary perspective and apply it to the
nineteenth-century 10s (the so-called international public unions) to see
how they supported the nation states adapting to economic expansion.
Sections 3 and 4 deal with 10s in the functional perspective with its rigid
distinction between domestic and international politics and its status quo
orientation, in which change is limited and 10s are fairly passive actors. In
Section 5, I turn to the governance perspective, in which this distinction has
become less important and change has been reintroduced. After that I deal
with the ways in which lOs, as part of an interplay between international
and domestic politics, help nation states to recognize external pressures
(Section 6) and to adapt to long-term change (Section 7).
2 Evolutionary Theories on Political Change: Sources of Support
Against the background of the nineteenth-century industrial, political and
other changes, social scientists tried to explain social dynamics by evolution-
ary theories. Major changes in society were to be understood as forms of an
evolution whereby social structures gradually adapt themselves to material
conditions and steady improvements in institutions emerge from failed
attempts. Sometimes social change is seen as having a particular direction
(teleology) but more often as a process of growth. All evolutionary theories
depict social change as a succession of stages, 'each displaying a greater
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degree of social complexity and a more sophisticated division of labour
than its predecessor' (Axford 1997: 147). Morgan discerned various periods
in his Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Sav-
agery, through Barbarism, to Civilisation (1877), in which he emphasizes the
importance of technique and technological factors in the development of
society. Each stage of development shows characteristic changes in social
arrangements and political organization. In his Principles of Sociology (1867)
Spencer recognized an evolution from small-scale and simple structures to
large-scale and differentiated structures. He argued that Darwin's theory -
evolution proceeds by natural selection, securing the survival of the fittest -
confirmed his findings. Hence, according to 'social Darwinism', adaptation
of societies can be understood in terms of the survival of the fittest. In their
Communist Manifesto (1848) Marx and Engels depicted the history of soci-
eties as one of class struggle and contradictions within various modes of
production: slavery, feudalism and capitalism. Severe disruptions in the
form of social revolutions explain the transition from one type of society to
another. Weber believed that the material conditions stressed by Marx and
Engels were necessary but not sufficient factors. His explanation of the gen-
esis of capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904)
added psychological factors. This gave rise to two main schools on political
change. The first school - the societalist one - regards conflicts of interests as
the engine of political change. Societal factors, such as the degree of class
conflict or the clash between interest groups, explain political change and
the choices governments have to make. Apart from Marxism, pluralism -
with its belief in the distribution of political power over several institutions
thus limiting one another's actions - can be regarded as part of this school,
as well as Wallerstein's world system theory, which reduces political factors
to the basic effects of economic forces operating on a world scale (cf. Waller-
stein 1974). The second school- the ideologist one - considers ideologies to
be the engine of political change. Here Weber, Durkheim and Hegel can be
mentioned, as well as Fukuyama, whose universal history is one of funda-
mental conflict between ideologies as the engines of change (cf. Axford
1997: 148). The crux of the evolutionist perspective is the perception of
change as a form of evolution and adapting structures with conflicts of
interests and/or ideologies as the engines of political change.
What about international organizations in the nineteenth century
according to the evolutionary perspective? Can they be dismissed in a few
lines, as is the case in quite a few modern textbooks, or are they to be taken
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more seriously in the context of internationalization? I will defend the sec-
ond position. The sort of states system, as it developed up to the nineteenth
century, characterized by the doctrine of sovereignty and its correlate, the
institutional principle of decentralization, was according to Claude recog-
nized as inadequate. It conceded too much to the pretensions and claims of
sovereigns. In the nineteenth century, the conviction grew that it had be-
come 'necessary and possible to modify the free-wheeling irresponsibility of
sovereign states to a greater extent than had been under traditional interna-
tionallaw, and to remedy the international institutional vacuum by creating
and putting to work some agencies which would serve the community of
states as a whole'. This was accomplished by statesmen who 'sought new
arrangements and devices whereby the sovereign units of the old system
could pursue their interests and manage their affairs in the altered circum-
stances of the age of communication and industrialism' (Claude 1966:
19-20). Instead of only bilateral diplomacy, the nineteenth century gave
rise to the Concert of Europe, multilateral, high-level, political conferences
(starting with the Congress of Vienna in 1815), public international unions
in the non-political field, including organizational inventions such as the
multilateral convention, and the Hague peace conferences in 1899 and
1907 with their rationalistic and legalistic approach toward universality.
Claude: 'the Concert stood for compromise; the Hague stood for regulation;
the public international unions stood for cooperation' (ibidem: 34). Not-
withstanding his recognition of the functional inadequacy of sovereignty by
the creation of public international unions and the fact that these unions
have been the prototypes of modern lOs, Claude regards their role as limit-
ed as a result of an ambiguity in the attitude of modern nation states: 'men
and nations want the benefits of international organization, but they also
want to retain the privileges of sovereignty which are inseparable from
international disorganization' (ibidem: 35).
From the evolutionary perspective of change it may be doubted, how-
ever, whether this rather sparing assessment does justice to the nineteenth-
century IOs. The analysis by Murphy, who argues that public international
unions have fostered industrial change by facilitating transportation and
communication and spreading the ideals of liberal internationalism,
emphasizes the position of the public international unions in the context of
economic internationalization. His evolutionary explanation focuses upon
institutional innovations and the process by which some institutions sur-
vive. This will happen in the event of a sufficiently powerful coalition of
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national governments which have learned that they benefit from the state-
to-state cooperation that these institutions encourage (cf. Murphy 1994:
25). The many issues and the tendency of the nineteenth-century interna-
tional conferences to empower a wide range of professionals as the voice of
the state, gave the conference system the ability to uncover previously unrec-
ognized common interests and to generate useful suggestions for new inter-
national regimes. It attracted so-called public system builders, and permit-
ted numerous experiments. Its success in making the liberal internationalist
vision a reality depended also on many potential sponsors with different
interests and aspirations (among them princes and monarchs), rather than
on a single dominant power with a single set of interests (ibidem: 78). By
1910, regular conferences called by public international unions began to
outnumber those called at the invitation of monarchs or governments.
According to Murphy, this was perhaps the most important institutional
innovation engineered by the public international unions, and 'ironically
most state members did not expect it to have the effect it did'. While states
saw the periodic conferences as a way to oversee the unions' work the
preparations for the conferences gave the unions' functionaries power over
the international agenda as well as the negotiation and implementation
processes (ibidem: 111-12). Some of the unions were abolished before
World War I, while others survived and still have a place in the United
Nations system established after World War 11. The public international
unions helped to create the non-coercive part of the international political
order that Europe needed to enter the Second Industrial Revolution. They
completed the necessary public works for a continental market for indus-
trial goods, and by protecting intellectual property they helped establish a
coherent civil order to settle conflicting interests that would operate in that
market (ibidem: 85). Murphy argues that liberal internationalism and IOs
have played a role in the periodic replacement of leading industries. The
scale of capitalism changed with each new set of leading industries, and IOs
facilitated these changes: 'by helping secure ever larger market areas for
industrial goods, the global agencies helped make it profitable for firms to
invest in new technologies'. Simultaneously, IOs have helped to mitigate
conflicts, to perfect the state system itself and to encapsulate the major chal-
lengers to industrial capitalism (ibidem: 2-4).
The application of the evolutionary perspective to the nineteenth-centu-
ry public international unions helps to rethink the conventional idea that
the predecessors of modern IOs are themselves not very interesting. Mur-
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phy's analysis shows that these early IOs can be regarded as sources of sup-
port for nation states, adapting to changes of the economic and social struc-
ture. The public international unions gain even more salience in the context
of the internationalization as referred to by Hirst and Thompson. They sup-
ported states in their economic expansion and, simultaneously, embody a
de facto internationalization of politics, notwithstanding the sovereignty
claims of the nation states. In the words of Reinsch: 'without legal deroga-
tion to the sovereignty of individual states, an international de facto and
conventional jurisdiction and administrative procedure is thus growing up,
which bids fair to become one of the controlling elements in the future
political relations of the world' (Reinsch 1911: 14).
3 Functional Theories on Political Change: Sources of Stability
Around the 1960s, social scientists produced a second generation of theo-
ries on change. These functional theories presuppose the normality of gradual
change but, unlike evolutionary theories, they do not emphasize change but
order. They are mainly concerned with the conditions under which order is
achieved. They believe that in any given society changes occur frequently
and constantly. These occur in sequential chains and are followed by quiet
periods of reconstruction. These changes take place through entire regions
and virtually the entire world, which means that change and its conse-
quences are everywhere. The proportion of change that is planned and the
result of deliberate innovations in the twentieth century are much higher
than in former times. The impact of technology and social strategies is
greater and greater and their effects are cumulative. According to Moore,
'virtually no feature of life is exempt from the expectation or normality of
change' (Moore 1963: 2). With respect to change, functional theory focused
upon the disturbance of equilibrium. During a period of change caused by
factors such as advances in technology, or migration, or conquest, 'a system
may not be able to sustain its equilibrium, whether culturally, economical-
ly or otherwise'. If change is sufficiently rapid or intense, pressures for politi-
cal elites to respond 'will grow accordingly and may not be met, since the
demand for redress outstrips both the resources available and any govern-
ment's capacity for action' (Axford 1997: 153). The outcomes are a massive
loss of trust in the political system and, consequently, legitimacy deficits,
which force policy-makers to think about measures to regain balance and
order and to prevent yet another loss of trust.
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The political background of functional theories was the Cold War of the
1950s and early 1960s, a situation, that is, in which World War III seemed
imminent. In the Western world, political change obtained a very specific
meaning. Marxism was no longer regarded as an evolutionist guide but a
revolutionary one. Hence, balance and order were seen as bulwarks against
the threat of revolutionary change. Functional theory identified two poten-
tial sources of political change. The first consisted of dissatisfied or deprived
citizens in the domestic sphere, the second of aggressive (in particular com-
munist) or nationalist states in the international sphere. The prevention of
revolutionary change in the domestic sphere could be achieved by policies
aimed at satisfYing the citizenry and regaining its trust in the political sys-
tem, by means of welfare state policies and political socialization projects.
The prevention of aggression or nationalism in a bipolar world was not so
much a matter of the balance of power as of military alliances as well as a
functional approach through specialized agencies of the United Nations.
This functional approach was based on the thesis that the more stable
nations are in economic and social respects, the smaller the chances of
change through war and revolution. The role of 10s is more passive than in
the first perspective. From the viewpoint of the dominant states IOs now are
sources of stability rather than (potential) sources of change. In the func-
tional perspective change is rather limited. Cox and Gill refer to incremental
change as the way the inter-state system works. Because the historically
constituted structures of the international system are taken as given, the
approach is status quo oriented, seeking to improve the operation of IOs in
an incrementalist way and to correct perceived malfunctions of the existing
order (cf. Cox 1997: xvi; Gill 1997: 3).
The same goes for modernization theory in its world-wide dimension.
Starting from the change from an agricultural (traditional) to an industrial
(modern) society, modernization can be described as a process of change
resulting from the application of scientific knowledge to all aspects of social
life. It refers both to the systematic applications of knowledge and its social
effects. By origin a Western European and Northern American product,
modernization theory developed into a world-wide process of change by
diffusion under certain political and economic power relations. As such
modernization developed into a way of assessing whether Third World
states had the potential to become modern and democratic. A distinction
between internal and external dynamics was made, because in Western
Europe modernization referred to an autonomous transformation while in
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the Third World it was inspired by the Western example ('Westernization')
(cf. Breman 1978: 457-58; Axford 1997: 149). In the international func-
tional approach, development aid and cooperation are tools of the devel-
oped states to further order and stability rather than change. The debate on
modernization and development, including the failure of Third World
states to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO), to a very
large extent took place in the context of lOs, in particular in the UN and its
specialized agencies and programmes (cf. Krasner 1985).
4 Interlude. Nation State versus International System,
and Continuity versus Change
A general criticism of explanations of the functionalist type has been that
they are overly concerned with equilibrium and have a built-in tendency to
interpret all change as causing disequilibrium (cf. Axford 1997: 153-54).
Another criticism refers to the fact that functional analyses often regard
modernization as a predominantly national process in which the decisive
factors of change are to be found at the domestic level of the developing
states. However, the character of modernization has, to a large extent, been
determined by its international context (cf. Breman 1978: 459). This point
refers to the relationship between nation state and international systern.
Most functional theorists treated the state as a closed system and took no
account of the international arena within which states operate. A major
intellectual gulf existed between those who studied social behaviour within
states and those who studied relations between states (cf. Little 1994: 12). As
far as international relations theory in general is concerned, a state-centric
model contributed to a static vision of international relations in which
large-scale historical change was absent. That the international system can
be defined in terms of interactions among sovereign states, is however a rel-
atively recent phenomenon. Although Waltz provides a powerful logic to
understand that system, his theory does not give any purchase on the ori-
gins and evolution of the contemporary international system (cf. Hout and
Lieshout's contribution to this volume). According to Little, Waltz's model
is 'ahistorical' (Little 1994: 19). Ruggie argues that it contains only a repro-
ductive logic but no transformative logic (Ruggie 1998: 25). For Waltz, the
reproduction of the international system is an unintended structural conse-
quence of the rational attempts by states to survive, during which the system
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remains unchanged. 'Within a system, a theory explains continuities... a
theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change' (Waltz 1979: 69).
Little argues that the strong presumption of an essentially unchanging
international system is even present with 'long cycle' theories supposed to
challenge Waltz's theory. Modelski, for instance, argues that the survival of
the international system is not an unintended structural consequence of the
anarchic system but the result of actions orchestrated by successive leading
actors or hegemons in the international political system (cf. Modelski
1987). However, an interpretation of the international system's evolution in
terms of cycles of war and peace related to the rise and fall of hegemonic
powers (instead of shifts in power) does not question the structure of the
Westphalian states system. Nor does it help to explain the nature of interna-
tional relations in the preceding feudal period (cf. Little 1994: 18). Among
the successful efforts to break away from the paradigm of the state as a
closed system without links to the international system is Skocpol's com-
parative analysis of revolutions. Skocpol did not restrict her explanation to
intranational conflicts and processes of modernization, but refers systemat-
ically to international structures and world-historical developments. She
demonstrated that the revolutions she investigated occurred because the
ruling elite controlliog the state apparatus found itself caught in 'a pincer
movement, under threat simultaneously from powerful domestic and for-
eign forces' (Skocpol 1979: 14; cf. Little 1994: 14).
With regard to international organizations, the discussion about inter-
national regimes in the 1970s and 1980s reintroduced the idea of change.
This started with the acceptance of a pluralist conception of civil society and
the state, in which public policy is seen as the result of clashes among dif-
ferent groups with conflicting interests. Theories about transnational rela-
tions argued that there could be many different actors, including groups
from civil society (non-governmental actors), that politics was becoming
transnational, and that nation states were being penetrated in a world
which became economically, socially and also politically increasingly inter-
dependent. The new concept of 'international regimes', based on common
standards and decision-making procedures, encouraged discussions on how
regimes were created, what 10s operating them can do to maintain them,
and how, in the long run, regimes are transformed or abandoned. Next to
the realist interpretation of regimes (these serve the ends of the most pow-
erful states), Keohane developed the argument that IOs enable all states to
achieve their ends more efficiently (cf. Keohane 1984). They do this not by
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centralizing authority but by facilitating mutually beneficial agreements
among states. They reduce uncertainty by providing information to the par-
ticipating states, thereby stabilizing mutual expectations, partly through the
development of common standards and the monitoring of compliance with
international agreements. Hence, IQs 'alter state strategies by changing the
costs of alternatives' (Katzenstein er al. 1998: 662). This neoliberal institu-
tional vision encouraged a more dynamic study of international organiza-
tions and regimes and their impact on nation states, followed by studies
into the connections between domestic structures and the international
system.
5 Governance Theories on Political Change:
Steering, Learning and Correction
As a third generation of theories on social and political change, the govern-
ance per.lpective builds on some of the premises of functional theories, in
particular those connected with planning and deliberate innovations as dis-
cussed by Moore. The governance perspective, however, is grounded in the
normalcy of continuous change. It departs from the 'social engineering'
thesis that society is always malleable by governmental policies and institu-
tions ('steered' or 'managed' social change). Expansion as a process of
widening and interlocking social relations has led to a stronger mutual
involvement and a more intensive interplay between various social levels
than ever before. It is supposed that, the more complex a social order, the
stronger its organized capacity to control and steer (cf. Breman 1978: 458).
Governments can manipulate long-term processes and, with these in mind,
they are willing to perform various tasks, such as designing and implement-
ing infrastruetural works, industrial decentralization, zoning schemes,
employment programmes, et cetera. In this context, legislation has obtained
a steering effect. It has become more and more instrumental, in particular in
combination with research into the impact of legislative measures (Laeyen-
decker 1988: 137-38). In addition, the concept of 'policy cycles' comprises
the possibility of evaluation and adjustment of decisions being implement-
ed. Policies can be adjusted, partly as a result of what is known about ongo-
ing processes, partly as a result of changes in a power configuration.
Non-governmental or private actors are also involved in this social engi-
neering. The idea that private groups can initiate social and political change
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is not new. Schumpeter, for instance, carried Kondratieff's economic wave
theory one step further by considering economic forces as the strategic vari-
ables in economic fluctuations. The key to economic growth was in the
hands of technologically innovating and profit-maximizing entrepreneurs
(er. Schumpeter 1912). Neofunctionalism regards business interest groups
as important actors in the process of European integration, lobbying both
'Brussels' and national authorities in favour of more integration. Groups of
citizens can also be relevant, in particular if politico-social movements or
action groups voice their discontent, are prepared to develop alternatives,
engage in politics and gain sufficient support to 'correct' governmental poli-
cies or to take new routes (cf. Laeyendecker 1988: 169-72). Private actors
may influence governments directly, but also, under conditions of corpo-
ratism, through participation in (quasi-) governmental institutions. Trans-
nationally, they may be influential through 10s.
Governance thus refers to the solving of collective problems in a continu-
ously changing public and private realm, stressing processes and institu-
tional procedures and practices. Given the degree of economic internation-
alization and interdependence between nation states, governance, as an
overarching national capacity to manage political, economic and social af-
fairs, cannot be regarded as a closed system like the state in functional theo-
ries. The term global (or regional) governance suggests a certain coherence
in international efforts to manage political, economic and social affairs, in
particular through the web of international organizations and regimes, the
entanglement of states and lOs, and the transnational roles by private
actors. This coherence includes the elements of cooperation, coordination,
steering, learning and correction but not the authority or hierarchy conno-
tations of world government. The term 'world polity' has a similar horizon-
tal suggestion (cr. Ruggie 1998) as 'governance without government' (cr.
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). In the international system of states charac-
terized by the existence of various international actors (sometimes referred
to as the 'mixed actor model', but still dominated by nation states), the
absence of world government, and the mutually beneficial cooperation of
states in international organizations and regimes, the concept of sovereign-
ty has become less and the concept of autonomy more significant.
International Organizations as Sources of Political Change 117
6 Globalization and the Nation State: External Pressure,
Internal Change
In the obliteration of the common domestic-international distinction, as
set in motion by the international regimes discussion, the external pressure
thesis holds that international incentives arising from internationalization,
globalization or regionalization are followed by national policy adapta-
tions. Both 10s and national institutions are engaged in this process of
influence and adaptation. Hout and Sie suppose that internationalization
results in changes in the international policy environment (lOs), the
national institutions and the policy preferences of domestic actors. They
expect an enhanced internationalization to be followed by an enhanced
interdependence, a weakened autonomy with respect to national policy-
making, and an enhanced competition between states with respect to trade
policies (I lout and Sie Dhian Ho 1997: 21).
With regard to the impact of external pressure on the nation state two
positions can be distinguished, of which the second is in line with the
analysis defended in this volume. The first position refers to a changing
state that is losing sovereignty. the second to an enduring state that reacts in
order to protect its national policy autonomy. Rosenau and Scholte sub-
scribe to the first position. Rosenau speaks of the domestic-foreign frontier
as 'a widening field of action, as the space in which domestic and foreign
issues converge, intermesh, or otherwise become indistinguishable within a
seamless web'. He regards the international system as less prominent but
still powerful. 'States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sov-
ereignty has been eroded, but is still vigorously asserted. Governments are
weaker, but they can still throw their weight around' (Rosenau 1997: 4-5).
Scholte, who regards the relationship between globalization and the state in
terms of 'subtle interplays of continuity and change', sketches a similar pic-
ture (cf. also Chapter 3). While state and interstate relations persist at the
core of governance arrangements in the contemporary globalizing world,
the character of the state (its capacities, constituencies, policy-making
process, policy contents, et cetera) is changing (Scholte 1997: 428).
Although the state survives under global capitalism it is a different kind of
state in various respects, and, largely owing to globalizing capital, 'states of
the late twentieth century have on the whole lost sovereignty' (ibidem: 452).
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Koch's critical analysis of the realist inter-state model reveals the second
position. Although this theoretical model is based on full autonomy, it does
not reflect historical reality. Koch argues that in reality nation states have
never fully controlled the economic transactions across their borders. Re-
garding state building and economic internationalization as simultaneous
historical processes, he holds that states have always worked to gain more
national policy autonomy by attempting to control transnational economic
transactions. Hence, internationalization is not really a new topic for nation
states. This also holds for the combination of sovereignty and restricted
autonomy. They can go together vety well (cf. Koch 1997: 33-6). Sovereign-
ty and the already mentioned activities by public international unions in
favour of national industrial change illustrate this point. Lieshout holds
that economic globalization in the late twentieth century has forced govern-
ments to reckon with international developments more than before, while
their means of intervention to solve national problems have decreased.
During the last twenty years a remarkable shift has taken place in the rela-
tionship between international market and national government in favour
of the first. However, governments' active collaboration remains necessary
to solve major problems (cf. Lieshout 1996a: 284-85). Internationally ori-
ented governments, convinced of the desirability of 'more market' in the
long term, may find themselves confronted with the short-term necessity to
remain active domestically, for instance in maintaining minimum social
levels, in order to satisfY their constituencies and win elections. Carrett and
Lange argue that domestic institutions generate powerful pressures for gov-
ernments to persist in policies that are favoured by the constellation of
interests that initially supported their ascent to power. This is true 'even if
the power of these interests has declined, and even if this has deleterious
consequences for macroeconomic performance' (Garrett and Lange 1995:
633). What governments attempt to do in their reactions both to interna-
tionalization and domestic pressures is to strengthen their national
economies by all kinds of protective measures, beggar-thy-neighbour poli-
cies and regional cooperation, which can be seen as a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy by groups of states (cf. Lieshout 1996a: 292). In other words,
although internationalization may be influential in constraining govern-
ments and states, a reassertion of the nation state is also discernible. Gov-
ernments react in order to keep hold of their national policy autonomy, and
by doing so cause an international dynamic. Hence, the external pressure
thesis does not mean a demise of the nation state nor of its sovereignty (cf.
Lieshout 1995: 174-95 and Chapter 4).
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7 International Organizations: Articulating Long-Term Change
International organizations combine two dimensions. The first refers to
nation states and Keohane's alternative policies and mutually beneficial
agreements, the second to the international system and processes of inter-
nationalization. On the one hand, IOs are arenas of decision-making where
representatives of national governments and, to a lesser extent, representa-
tives of other international actors, such as private organizations, the 10 itself
and other IOs (cf. Cox and lacobson 1973: 12), debate and decide about
alternative policies and their costs and benefits. On the other hand, these
IOs are the institutions mediating the longer-term processes of economic
internationalization and globalization. It is in their arenas that processes of
long-term change are articulated and projected, as well as channelled and
institutionalized (cf. Gill 1997: 7). I discuss three actors in this web of mul-
tilateral governance: governments, IOs and private actors.
When representatives of governments and other international actors are
debating alternative policies in the context of international organizations
and regimes, they are aware of both national inputs (in particular with
governmental positions) and international trends (as observed by govern-
ments, IOs or private actors). Governments play two simultaneous and inter-
related power games, one at the domestic and one at the intergovernmental
level. Because international decisions can lead to changes in national legis-
lation and practices, governments are most of the time aware of the range of
potential change when setting the international agenda, comparing alterna-
tive solutions, compromising in decision-making or reacting to evaluations
of implementation. They are also aware of the fact that the international
compromises may compel some or all governments 'to act differently from
the way in which they would otherwise act', to quote Wolfers (1962: 22). At
home, governments have to navigate between those groups that support
internationally discussed change and those that oppose it. They will use the
results of intergovernmental negotiations as a means to exert pressure on
domestic actors unwilling to change. The conclusion is that IOs can only be
regarded as sources of political change if the outcome of the intergovern-
mental power game provides a window of opportunity for change, and if
the forces of the status quo in the related national power game are not strong
enough.
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Resulting from an interaction of organizational dynamics and environ-
mental inputs intergovernmental organizations may play a role of their own
and add to political change in the sense that they formulate and implement
policies that cannot be described as the simple product of interstate bar-
gaining. The endogenous dynamic resulting from the organization's wish to
play a role of its own may produce, under certain conditions, both leader-
ship and instruments enabling the organization to act more or less inde-
pendently from the participating states and to take measures that effectively
intrude into the national domain. The margin of the IO's representatives
wanting to play such a role is, however, restricted, since the majority of
impulses stems from 'the reasoned demands of governments rather than the
subjective needs of bureaucrats' (Haas 1968b [19641: 88). However, if these
representatives have a clear understanding of what is going on, they may use
the opportunity to make 'the organizational influence as extensive as possi-
ble'. The very fact that the organization's representatives do not have the
support of a homogenous and stable body of member states provides them
with the opportunity 'to move and maneuver'. Haas is right in remaining
cautious in this respect: 'few heads of international bureaucracies succeed in
doing so' (ibidem: 118; cf. also Reinalda 1998). Nonetheless, the games that
organizations and member states play are changing. The number of parties
affected by international policy-making has increased considerably during
the last quarter of the twentieth century. International policy-making
should be seen as a game between many actors, inside and outside nation
states, rather than merely a game between nation states. Even though states
are still the dominant actors in lOs, their behaviour is no longer dictated
by their national interests alone. The fact that governments have to take
domestic political considerations into account can serve as a source of influ-
ence for 10s. Organizations' preferences should not only be conceived in
terms of survival, but also of substantive perspectives on certain interna-
tionally relevant policy areas originating in the specific nature of their fields
of action. Among the means to influence actors inside the member states
are the use of technical knowledge and judicial language in order to define
issues and alternative solutions, and the building of coalitions with domes-
tic and transnational actors. The crux of these coalitions' effectiveness seems
10 be a combination both of international and parallel subnational pres-
sures on national governments, analogous to Skocpol's previously men-
tioned pincer movement (cf. Reinalda and Verbeek 1998: 5-6).
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Finally, private actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
play a role in the intergovernmental debates on change. They can influence
intergovernmental debates through international public opinion, lobbying,
a consultative status with an intergovernmental organization which have
granted NGOs formal rights of participation in its activities (more influen-
tial than often supposed) and an official role in the implementation process
of international policies. In various cases, such as human rights, environ-
ment and development, they have demonstrated that they knew how effec-
tively to use the power resources and strategic positions they had available,
in particular with respect to agenda setting, policy formulation and policy
implementation (cf. Reinalda 1997). If 10s can no longer exclude private
organizations that present themselves as agents of change and have to grant
them access (for instance, women's organizations striving for non-discrimi-
nation), their response most of the time is to accommodate them. When-
ever private actors have been recognized by lOs, they have brought expertise
into the intergovernmental decision-making and implementation processes
and have shared responsibilities for their public policies. As such they have
influenced agenda setting and have added to the decisions' qualities and
efficacy and the lOs' legitimacy. Simultaneously, however, 10s have con-
fined the role of these private organizations through their official proce-
dures in order to make them an instrument of intergovernmental problem
solving. Given their dependence on the power relations between nation
states, IOs are conservative with respect to changes in power relations and to
a radical restructuring of economies and societies. Because they set the rules
of the game, they have been able to limit the private organizations' room for
manoeuvre with respect to the scope of their activities and official positions
(cf. Reinalda forthcoming).
It can be concluded that what happens between states has been linked
with what happens within them, and that IOs act as a major transmission
belt of this interplay. Taylor argues that the conditions under which state
sovereignty is maintained have changed. In the way the United Nations sys-
tem functioned traditionally nation states had exclusive domestic jurisdic-
tion and 10s were allowed to enter the state only with their consent. The
manner in which the UN functions in the 1990s, however, presents a more
flexible view of domestic jurisdiction with new forms of UN involvement
within states. Violation of human rights by states has become an almost uni-
versally accepted reason for intervention. Besides, states increasingly tend to
seek the endorsement of the UN before intervening in the affairs of other
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states (with the notable exception of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in
1999). This strengthening of the UN does not mean that the state is under
threat. On the contrary, as I have argued before in this chapter, 10s are not
set up to weaken the state but to strengthen it (cf. also Milward 1992). The
new forms of involvement are concerned with reconstructing the state and
amending states' practices so that states become more successful and the in-
ternational system more stable (cf. Taylor 1997: 280-81). In this context,
Ruggie refers to diffusion of norms of rationalized bureaucratic structures
and, more general, standards of what it means to be a modern state. Diffu-
sion spreads from core states as well as from [Os "'teaching" states in the pe-
riphery that to be modern states means to have these things' (Ruggie 1998:
15). He refers to the work of Finnemore, who has documented successive
waves in the diffusion of norms by 10s among states that differ radically in
their circumstances, but which then express identical preferences for nation-
al policies and institutional arrangements (cf. also Roggeband and Verloo's
contribution to this volume). These include constitutional forms, educa-
tional institutions, welfare policies, human-rights conventions, defence
ministries in states that face no threat, as well as science ministries in states
that have no scientific capacity (cf. Finnemore 1996). Change in the govern-
ance perspective thus leads both to stronger international organizations and
stronger states.
8 Conclusion
[n what way are international organizations sources of political change?
In the evolutionary perspective, [Os are seen as sources of support for nation
states adapting to economic expansion. By fostering transnational industry,
strengthening national bureaucracies and providing mutual benefits for
nation states they facilitate increasing economies of scale. [Os seem to mat-
ter and to be more than instruments of states. With regard to sovereignty,
however, a dividing line exists between the international arena (the benefits
of cooperation, to use Claude's words) and domestic politics (the privileges
of sovereignty). In the functional perspective the role of 10s is more passive.
[Os are seen as sources of stability rather than as sources of change. Function-
al organizations and modernization policies serve as tools of developed
states rather than as incentives to weaker states. Organizations are status quo
oriented and do not go beyond the facilitation of incremental change. It
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took international relations theory a while to reintroduce the concept of
change and, through neoliberal institutionalism, to recognize the signifi-
cance and benefits of IOs for nation states. The introduction of the concept
of international governance as a non-hierarchical form of multilateral coor-
dination changed the understanding of the international system in which
sovereignty plays a less central role and in which other actors come to the
fore. This is not to say that nation states and sovereignty are on their way
out. The globalization debate makes clear that states fight back to maintain
their national policy autonomy. By doing so they also create an internation-
al dynamic. In the governance perspective IOs are the arenas in which the con-
tinuous interplay between national and international policy-making takes
place, and where long-term change is articulated and channelled by various
representatives of governments and, to a lesser extent, by representatives of
JOs and private actors. What happens between states has accordingly been
linked with what happens within states. Although the internationalization
of government through international organizations and regimes has
implied a certain loss of national autonomy, this is accepted by nation
states because IOs are also helping them to recognize external pressures
and long-term change and to adapt to these. This implies a strengthening of
both international organizations and states, more or less in the same way as
in the evolutionary perspective, but without the original dividing line
between the benefits of cooperation and the privileges of sovereignty.
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7The Impact of European Integration
on Domestic Political Change and National
Autonomy
M arlw5 H averland
1 Introduction
The European Union is one of the most powerful sources of domestic politi-
cal change in Europe. Moreover, among all aspects of internationalization,
European economic, political and legal integration is probably the most
visible and most immediate challenge to national autonomy. European
integration may not have resulted in a loss of national sovereignty (cf. Van
Kersbergen 1998: 16-20), but it certainly affected dramatically the range of
national political power and national policy-making. In this chapter I hope
to demonstrate the extent and complexity, as well as the ambiguity of the
impact of European integration on European Union member states.
In the last decade or so, European integration has accelerated in speed,
scope and depth. The Single European Act (1986) and the Treaties of Maas-
tricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1998) were steps towards an ever-closer
union. The European Union member states have increasingly delegated
authority to European Union institutions; the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, capital and labour, external economic relations, agriculture and, most
recently, monetary policy - once the domains of the nation state - nowa-
days belong almost exclusively to the competencies of the European Union.
In other areas, like competition, environmental protection and health and
safety at work, competencies are more equally distributed between the
European Union and the nation state, but tendencies towards further Euro-
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peanization are clearly detectable. Indirectly, European integration even
affects areas in which the European Union is not formally involved. Euro-
pean Court of Justice judgements influencing national social-security sys-
tems provide an example (cf. Leibfried and Pierson 1996).
Increased European integration does not mean, however, that this
process is irreversible or that European Union member states have lost con-
trol over policy formulation and over policy implementation in these inte-
grated areas. National governments are still important players, and, as some
would even say, they are the only ones that really matter (cf. Lieshout
1996b, 1999; Moravcsik 1998). Member state governments effectively use
intergovernmental institutions, such as the European Council, the Councils
of Ministers, and the ubiquitous European committees to advance their
national interests. The locus of decision-making, however, in many areas
has shifted upwards to the European level, and new players such as the
European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court
of Justice have become part of the game (for an introduction and overview
cf. Schmitter 1997; Wallace and Wallace 1996).
Political change can refer to many aspects of the political life, such as
party systems, state structures, public administration or legitimacy. I concen-
trate on political change with regard to the form and substance of policies
and the way in which interest groups are integrated into the policy-making
process. A case study rather then a general overview has been chosen to do
justice to the intricate interrelationship of national and European policy-
making, the various triggers and mechanisms of European integration, and
the complex and sometimes ambiguous impact of European integration on
domestic political change and national autonomy.
The case study deals with the issue of packaging waste. This topic has
been chosen for two interrelated reasons. First, the Europeanization of
packaging waste policy-making has been one of the most controversial regu-
latory issues in recent history. The issue has been at the core of the tension
between two politically important dimensions of European integration, the
free movement of goods and, more recently, a high level of environmental
protection. The second reason for exploring political change in the case of
packaging waste lies in the large cross-national diversity in policy and poli-
tics prior to European integration. The member states of the European
Union had used their exclusive competencies in this area to establish wide-
ly divergent procedures and policies. This diversity indicates their differ-
ences in preferences and also reflects nationally specific policy styles. The
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initial diversity is therefore an interesting starting point to ask why packag-
ing waste has become a subject of European Union policy-making. How did
this European political process proceed? How did the resulting European
policy impact on national policies and politics? Have national policies
changed and did this change result in convergence or divergence? And what
does this change tell us about national autonomy and the way it is affected
by European integration?
Before I present my case study, a clarification with regard to convergence
is in order, which already gives an indication of the complexity and ambi-
guity of the issues involved. Convergence as such is not a proof of less
autonomy of member-state governments. It may well be that convergence is
the result of governments pushing for a European solution in order to cir-
cumvent domestic constraints, and thereby increasing rather than decreas-
ing their autonomy (cf. Moravcsik 1994). Moreover, national political
change in the direction of more similar systems may not be causally related
to the European integration process. Domestic or global forces can cause
political change and the correlation with European factors may be spu-
rious. It is therefore important to trace exactly the processes by which policy
change came about. Moreover, it is also helpful to ask the counterfactual
question: What would have happened without European integration in the
field of study?
1 The Case Study
2.1 INTRODUCTION
I distinguish beIween three dimensions of national political change. I make
this distinction because changes may happen with respect to one or two of
these dimensions without affecting the others or other. Moreover, the driv-
ing and retarding forces of European integration may be different for each
of these dimensions. The dimensions are distilled from earlier attempts to
systematize case studies in comparative public policy analyses (cf. Feick
1991; Van Waarden 1991, 1995). The first dimension refers to the degree of
formalization, or the degree of legal codification. Policies can be highly for-
malized, for instance, as a part of public law, or they can take the form of
rather informal statements, such as a White Paper. The second dimension
refers to the policy objectives or, in other words, the policy substance, which
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is operationalized as the strictness of standards. The third dimension con-
cerns the make-up of interest integration. lt refers to the policy process, and
deals with the relationship between the government and societal, especially
economic, actors. Pluralist relationships are typically characterized by loose,
irregular and unstable contacts, with actors lobbying for narrow interests.
Corporatist relationships denote close, regular and stable contacts between
highly aggregated interests. Societal actors are granted a substantial role in
the process of policy formulation and policy implementation.
Table 7.1 Dimensions of Political Change
------------------------
Dimension
Formalization
Strictness of standards
Mode of interest integration
Range
Public law - private law - not binding statements
Strict - modest
Corporatist - pluralist
In the remainder of this Section I sketch first the existing national diver-
sity prior to Europeanization. I examine three countries in particular: Ger-
many, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries represent
the range of answers possible to the environmental problems associated
with packaging waste. Subsequently, I analyze the process of Europeaniza-
tion of the issue of packaging waste, which resulted in the Directive of Pack-
aging and Packaging Waste (Packaging Waste Directive). The major part of
this Section will, however, be focused on the impact of the European inte-
gration process with respect to packaging waste policies and politics in the
said member states.
2.2 NATIONAL APPROACHES PRIOR TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Up to the early 1990s, member states of the European Union reacted differ-
ently to the common challenge of increased packaging waste. Not hindered
by European packaging waste policies, this diversity reflected the different
national preferences about the best way to deal with packaging waste. It is
important to note that specific features observed in this case also reflect
aspects of more general nationally distinct policy styles (cf. Knill and
Lenschow 1998; Van Waarden 1995).
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The German approach was very formalized. The government adopted
a packaging ordinance 'Verpaclmngsverordnung', which was binding under
public law (Pederal Law Gazette 1991 I, p. 1234). The ordinance obliged
industry and retailers to take back all packaging and to re-use or to recycle it.
Forced by this, internationally speaking most far-reaching obligation, peak
associations of industry negotiated an exemption scheme for the most
problematic waste stream, used sales packaging. For this waste stream,
industry was exempted from its 100 per cent take back and reprocessing
obligations if, within a period of five years, it set up a privately run waste-
management system capable of recycling 72 per cent of all glass, tin plate
and aluminium sales packaging, as well as 64 per cent of all paper, card-
board, plastic and composite sales packaging. This was very demanding
given the fact that sales packaging recycling was estimated for paper at about
38 per cent and for all other materials well below 10 per cent (estimation for
1988, The Economist 3/7/93). This private scheme was called Duales System
Deutschland. In addition, the ordinance ruled that the existing level of re-use
of drink containers, which was 72 per cent, had to be maintained.
The Dutch approach was significantly less formalized. In line with the
general consensus-oriented corporatist approach, which recently has been
labelled the 'Polder-model', government and the Stichting Verpal1l1ing en
Milieu (Foundation of Packaging and the Environment), a cross-sector sin-
gle-issue trade association, agreed to a Covenant (VROM 1991). It was bind-
ing under private law, but only for the signatories and not for the whole
potential target group. The strictness of standards was lower than in Ger-
many: there was a general recycling target of 60 per cent for all packaging
waste to be achieved in nine years, given a level of some 25 per cent in 1988.
Since the target applied to all types of packaging, companies could offset
difficult-to-recycle sales packaging by the easier-to-recycle transport and
industry packaging. The agreement that industry had to reduce - by the year
2000 at the latest - the quantity of packaging newly introduced into the
market to below the quantity for the reference year 1986 was, however,
unique in Europe. This was a reduction of about 20 per cent.
The United Kingdom had the least formalized approach. The Govern-
ment policy was stated in a White Paper (cf. lIer Majesty's Government
1990). It favoured voluntary measures by the industry. A very broad and,
from an international viewpoint, modest recycling target for household
waste, 25 per cent by the year 2000, was set. This target was, moreover, not
legally binding. In addition, the Government asked local authorities to
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increase their packaging waste collection and recycling efforts and provided
a small recycling credit scheme to stimulate this. In addition, government
requested industry to reduce unnecessary packaging and packaging waste.
Industry developed three initiatives: two general codes of practice and one
business plan. These initiatives were, however, very vague and too limited to
achieve substantial reductions in packaging and packaging waste (cf. Haver-
land 1999: 140-44).
Table 7.2 National Approaches Prior to Europeanization
Dimension countr)!
Gennon}'
Packaging
Ordinance 1991
"111C Netherlands
Packaging
Covenant 1991
United Kingdom
White Paper 1990 &
Codes of Practice 1992
---------------- ---
Formalization
Strictness of standards
Modes of interest
integration
High
High
Corporatist
Medium
High/Medium
Corporatist
Low
Low
Pluralist
2.3 THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE PACKAGING WASTE ISSUE
The German, Dutch and British approaches of the early 1990s illustrate
nicely the degree of diversity to which national practice can lead when
countries try to formulate solutions to the same challenges, in this case the
environmental effects of packaging waste. Yet, in an increasingly interde-
pendent world, national diversity is prone 10 have negative cross-border
effects. Regulations in a field that is so closely related to the free movement
of goods, potentially threaten the proper functioning of the European
Union's internal market. Since the German sales packaging recycling system
had to be financed by trade and industry, it was known that, in order to sup-
port the scheme, most of the German retailers favoured products by compa-
nies participating in the scheme at the expense of others. Foreign competi-
tors argued that the 'green dot' established a technical barrier to trade, for
they had to comply with an additional measure before being able to sell
their products in Germany. Next, as there existed a shortage of domestic
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recycling capacities, collected used packaging from Germany penetrated the
recycling markets of other European Union member states. Since the Duales
System Deutschland subsidized this material, it could be offered at lower
prices at foreign recycling facilities than the waste collected in the home
country. As a consequence, the embryonic packaging-collection infrastruc-
ture in a number of member states, in particular in the United Kingdom,
was threatened. The third consequence was associated with the German rule
that the existing level of re-use of drink containers had to be maintained,
the so-called refillable quota. The refillable quota was threatened by a trend
towards more one-way packaging. There was evidence that some retailers
preferred refillable drink containers on their shelves to counter this devel-
opment. It was argued that the refillable quota indirectly discriminated
against foreign companies because it was more costly for them to trade
products in refillable containers given the long-distance logistics required.
European Union member states held no formal decision-making power
to prevent these consequences of the German policy. They had either to
bear their cross or to push for a European solution, that is to say to strive for
collective authority to compensate for their individual loss of autonomy. A
number of member states, like the United Kingdom, chose the second
option. They expressed their concern to the Commission. Since European
Court of Justice decisions had not hindered the earlier national regulations
in this field, such as the Danish ban on cans, the Commission chose not to
challenge the German system before the European Court of Justice. Instead,
it proposed in 1992 a directive to harmonize national regulations while at
the same time ensuring a high level of environmental protection 1 After
more than two years of heavy lobbying and profound political conflict, the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament finally agreed on the text
of the directive.
The first official proposal of the Commission, as well as the initial posi-
tion of the European Parliament, aimed at a harmonization of national
policies on a high level of environmental protection 2 They were supported
by the 'green' member states of the European Union, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Denmark. The majority of the member states, however, wanted to
ensure the free movement of goods and the harmonization of policies on a
low level of environmental protection. Confronted with this opposition, as
well as heavy lobbying from trade and industry, the European Commission
stepped back from its initial ambitious 'green' proposal, and framed the
Directive in a way that would please the majority in the Council of Minis-
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Table 7.3 Convergence or Persistent Diversity: An Overview
Dimension Country
Cenllllny I'llI.' Netlwrlmllls Unilfd Kingdom
from OrdinalKf from Covenant From \I\/hite Paper
(1991) to (199\) to Packaging (1990) and Codf's
Amended Regulation( \997) of Practice to
Ordinance ( 1(98) and Covenant 11 Packaging Rcgul<l-
(1997) tion (1997)
Convergellce or
per.~istelJt diversity
Formalization Still high
(public law)
hom medium to
high (public law)
horn low to high convergence
(public law) lOwards strong
formalization
Suictness of
standards
Slightly weaker Slightly weaker Slightly stricter still diversity,
more narrow range
Mode of interest More actors but tl,lore actors but Pluralist still diversity
integration still corporatist still corporalisl
ters. The European Parliament also shifted its position. In the second read-
ing of the Directive it was less concerned with the environment and accept-
ed all major elements of the Council's position. Many members of the Euro-
pean Parliament voted along national lines, rather than along party lines. In
short: the majority of member states was able to lower the standards and
thereby decrease substantially the necessity for domestic political change
and restrictions in their autonomy The Directive stated that packaging ful-
filling the essential (environmental) requirements defined in the Directive
could be placed on the market. The directive also introduced minimum and
maximum targets for recovery (50-65 per cent) and recycling (25-45 per
cent).' At the same time, the Council majority accepted exemptions for the
'green' member states. Under certain conditions they were allowed to main-
tain measures or introduce even stricter ones. For example, if member states
could prove, among other things, that they had sufficient recycling facilities,
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then they were allowed to exceed the European Union's maximum recycling
targets. Exemptions of this kind prevented a far-reaching harmonization of
national policies4
2.4 THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE ON
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHANGE AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY
The member states were the most powerful actors in the European policy-
formulation process with respect to the Packaging Waste Directive. This
does not mean, however. that the European directive did not lead to domes-
tic political change, or that national autonomy remained unrestricted. This
Section examines the logic of the European decision-making process and
the resulting domestic political change. In doing so, I hope to show the
complex and sometimes ambiguous impact of European integration on
national policy-making.
2.4.1 Convergence towards Formalized Policies
The most significant convergence process, and the one that is causally most
closely related to the European Union, occurred in the form of policies: the
convergence towards the German legalistic approach. Both the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom followed the example of Germany and introduced
regulations binding under statutory public law. The voluntary agreement
between parts of the Dutch industry and the Ministry of the Environment
was replaced by a so-called ministerial regulation. In the United Kingdom, a
statutory instrument imposing producer-responsibility for packaging waste
on the industry replaced earlier half-hearted commitments.
The restriction of the national autonomy with respect to the degree of
legal codification was not clearly spelled out in the Directive itself. but
resulted from the general European LJ nion legal framework, as interpreted
by the European Court of lustice. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom
had to meet the legal requirements concerning the transposition into
national law of the European Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste.
Even though member states are free to choose their own legal means and
the form in which they wish to implement a directive, the European Court
of lustice has formulated in its case law a number of basic legal require-
ments. Member states have to ensure clarity, legal security, and legal protec-
tion of third parties when implementing directives (cf. jans 1994: 133).
These obligations leave member states with virtually no viable alternative to
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implementation than by means of a legalistic command and control ap-
proach. Next, the Court emphasized repeatedly that directives have to come
to full effect. This implies certain obligations for member states in making
directives enforceable. Moreover, member states are also held liable if the
desired result is not achieved, or the directive is implemented too late or in
an improper manner. The member state concerned cannot evade its respon-
sibility by putting the blame on private actors or sub-national governmental
institutions. Under these circumstances member states are very reluctant to
choose implementation instruments other than statutory command and
control measures (cf. Steyger 1993).
Although convergence occurred in the direction of a command and con-
trol-based policy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were able to
maintain some autonomy in the specific coordination mechanisms. On top
of the legal framework, the Netherlands continued its covenant approach
(communicative steering), while the United Kingdom introduced a system
of tradeable recycling obligations (market steering).
In order to answer the question of whether adaptation to the Directive
was the decisive factor for the convergence towards formalization, one has
first to answer the question of what would have happened without the
Directive. There is no reason to believe that Germany would have stepped
back from its legalistic approach. The legalistic approach fitted its overall
regulatory culture and was also the result of a learning process. The govern-
ment drew lessons from the failure of voluntary agreements and successes
of statutory measures in regard to drink packaging in the 1970s and 19S0s
(cf. Haverland 1999: 94).
In the British case it is quite unlikely that regulation would have been
introduced in the absence of the European directive. Environmental issues
decreased in salience in the mid-1990s, and the British government was
against regulation and intervention in market processes. In areas other than
packaging, such as paper waste from newspapers, the government was satis-
fied with voluntary commitments by the industry (Department of the Envi-
ronment 1996: 96). The strong degree of formalization induced by the
Packaging Directive clearly ran against the preferences of the British govern-
ment. It was only accepted because the British government weighted the
potentially positive trade effects of the new directive higher than its negative
implications for the traditionally informal British policy style.'
Counterfactual reasoning is probably the most difficult for the Dutch
case. There are some factors that point to a stronger formalization of pack-
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aging waste policies even in the absence of a European Union directive. Par-
ties to the Covenant increasingly complained about free-riders, that is to say
the many companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones, who did
not participate in the Covenant scheme and did not engage in packaging
reduction and packaging waste recycling. Moreover, it was very likely that
the packaging prevention target of the 1991 Covenant would not be met. In
consequence, a modification of the covenant would have been necessary.
One way to do this would have been through further formalization, by
making the Covenant generally binding. This would have broadened the
base and facilitated the achievement of the target. It is more likely, however,
that the government would have renegotiated the Covenant because it
would have been politically too costly to make it also binding for the more
reluctant companies. Moreover, the government's will to do so would have
been weak, because environmental issues decreased in importance on the
political and societal agenda.
The complexity and ambiguity of the European impact on national
autonomy comes clearly to the fore in the Dutch case. The Directive restrict-
ed the government's room for manoeuvre by precluding non-legalistic
options of implementation. Moreover, political change towards a more
legalistic approach would not have occurred without the European direc-
tive. This does not mean, however, that the change in the form of policies
ran against the interests of the Dutch government. The legalistic bias built
into European Union policies, created the opportunity for the government
to deal more effectively with the problem of the free-riders. In this sense the
European directive increased the autonomy of government vis-a-vis Dutch
industry.
2.4.2 Persistent Diversity of Pac/wging Waste Standards
In contrast to the degree of formalization, there is only modest change and
convergence in regard to the national targets of packaging waste policies.
Germany still has quantified quotas for refillables and ambitious recycling
targets for sales packaging, although most target levels have been lowered
slightly. The Netherlands still has a packaging prevention target. The recy-
cling target has even been slightly increased from 60 to 65 per cent. On bal-
ance, the standards are, however, a little less strict, as the new packaging pre-
vention target is corrected for economic growth. Hence, the amount of
packaging may increase to a certain extent in the case of a fast-growing eco-
nomy. With these targets the German and Dutch governments took advan-
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tage of exemptions provided by the Directive to go substantially beyond the
maximum recycling targets of the Directive. The United Kingdom, on the
other hand, fixed the target at 26 per cent, which is the almost absolute
minimum of 25 per cent allowed for by the Directive. This target is, how-
ever, more concrete than the general and rather symbolic recycling target for
municipal waste stated in the 1990 Government White Paper. Hence, while
the British government increased its standards modestly, the German and
the Dutch government slightly reduced their ambitions, but the policy
changes that occurred did not significantly reduce the differences in stan-
dards. Diversity continued to persist.
Given the unintended trade effects caused by the diversity of packaging
recycling standards and given the objective of the European Packaging
Directive to harmonize national regulations, this persistent diversity is sur-
prising. Why did the Packaging Directive only set a range of targets and why
did it provide for the possibility to go even beyond these targets? The reason
was that the majority of the member states was more concerned with the
free-trade element in the directive than with the environmental dimension;
but why did the majority accept environmental standards above the lowest
common denominator and even allowed for exemptions for 'green' mem-
ber states?6
That the 'green' minority was not simply overruled can be explained by
the institutional logic of European Union policy-making. The member
states participate in many parallel decision-making processes. It is, there-
fore, merely sound politics for them to take into account the consequences
of adopting a certain strategy in one decision-making process for their posi-
tion in other decision-making processes. Member states depend on each
other to reach decisions and to conduct European policies. The institution-
al structure of the European Union therefore necessitates a cooperative pol-
icy style that is guided by principles of fairness and reciprocity (cf. Hayes-
Renschow and Wallace 1995; Kerremans 1996: 233). For this reason, in the
Council of Ministers, concessions are made to minorities even under the
majority-voting rule.
This does not explain, however, the strong interest of 'green' member
states in high standards. One could argue that Germany and the Nether-
lands would have used the European negotiations to lower significantly
their domestic standards. This seems plausible at first sight because envi-
ronmental issues declined in importance while questions ofeconomic com-
petitiveness gained in prominence. Moreover, in the German case, the recy-
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cling system ran into serious implementation problems, partly due to its
high standards, and the German refillable quota was time after time criti-
cized for its adverse trade effects. However, the German and the Dutch gov-
ernment stuck to their high standards during the formulation process of the
Directive, as well as during its implementation stage. The 'green' member
states wanted to Europeanize the standards they had set for their own
national companies. This was done to prevent economic disadvantages for
them and even to give them a competitive advantage compared with com-
panies which had to catch up with the high standards (cf. Heritier er al.
1996). In the German case, policy inertia was also important. New interests
emerged, which benefited from the policies adopted, especially the private
packaging waste collection and recycling scheme established to meet the
targets of the 1991 ordinance, and the waste-management companies that
have an economic interest in high recycling standards. The maintenance of
the strict refillable standard was supported by a coalition of protectionists
and environmentalists, which gained crucial influence via the Bundesrat, the
chamber of the federal states, that had to agree to the implementation of the
Packaging Directive. The Bundesrat provided an effective veto point against a
substantial weakening of the refillable quota.
Hence, Germany and the Netherlands maintained their autonomy to set
high environmental standards. In one instance European integration has
even strengthened the autonomy of the governments of their member
states. The implementation of the European directive in the Netherlands
provided the Dutch government with an elegant opportunity to lower the
packaging prevention target of the 1991 Covenant that turned out to be
unfeasible. Since this change was embedded in the renegotiations of the
whole packaging waste policy necessary in view of the European Directive,
this failure of the 1991 Covenant went more or less unnoticed.
The high standards in Germany and the Netherlands contrast with the
low ones in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Regulation entails
standards that are slightly above the minimum standards set in the Direc-
tive. Still, these standards are relatively ambitious for this country. The tar-
gets were the direct consequence of the European Packaging Directive.
Given the rather low recycling level in this country, the poor salience of
environmental issues on the political agenda, and the pro-industry stance
of government, it is very unlikely that anything like this would have been
adopted in the absence of the European Union Packaging Directive. What is
more, it is doubtful that the United Kingdom will achieve the target (cf.
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ENDS-Report June 1998: 15). Hence, the European directive forced the
British government to impose - from its point ofview - relatively ambitious
standards on its industry.
2.4.3 Mode of Interest Integration:
towards European Union-Induced Pluralism?
The legalistic bias of European policies and the attempt to harmonize
national standards can have direct effects on national policy autonomy. Yet,
European integration can also have an effect on domestic relations between
government and industry. It can indirectly restrict the autonomy of govern-
ments to shape the integration of economic and social actors into national
political processes. Comparing the modes of interest integration prior to
and after Europeanization one still finds diversity in the degree of inten-
sity of interactions between government and industry, the type of actors
involved and the function of societal actors in decision-making. This is not
to say, however, that there was no impact of European integration on the
modes of interest integration in the member states.
There was a strong impact in the case of the United Kingdom. This was
for two reasons. First, the government saw the need to increase substantial-
ly the recycling efforts of the industry. Second, and equally important, the
nature of the packaging waste problem demanded a degree of intra- and
intersectoral coordination which was at odds with the traditional mode of
interest integration in the United Kingdom. The traditional British mode of
interest integration had always been between individual firms and govern-
ment officials. To establish an effective and efficient packaging waste re-
cycling system, however, packaging raw material producers, packaging man-
ufacturers, packers and fillers, and the distribution and retail sector (the
so-called packaging chain) had to work closely together, and to be viable,
the system needed the consensus of all these. Given the weakness of British
trade associations, as compared to its German and Dutch counterparts, even
seetoral interest aggregation became a problem, as well as cross-sectoral
aggregation of interests. This had not been a problem until the early 1990s,
since before that time the United Kingdom employed a minimalist
approach to the problem of packaging waste. Anticipating the European
Packaging Directive, however, the government increased its effort to come to
industry-led solutions. The resulting policy process was cumbersome, and
characterized by a pluralist pattern of interest integration. A number of ad
hoc groups made up of individual firms were established. These groups
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either had too large a number of pal1icipants to be able to make decisions,
or did not represent all the interests concerned, or even suffered from both
defects (cf. Ilaverland 1999: 207-16). In order to meet the targets set out in
the Directive, the British government was forced to engage in a politically
costly process, as it burdened the overall relations between government and
industry in the United Kingdom.
The European Packaging Directive also threatened the well-balanced
system of corporatist interest integration established in the Netherlands.
The legal requirement that provisions of directives have to be enforceable
and must come to full effect means, in principle, that regulations must be
generally binding for all packers and fillers and impol1ers of packaged
goods. The voluntary agreement, however, had been signed only by the
parts of industry represented by the Foundation of Packaging and the Envi-
ronment. The need for a generally binding rule implied a broadening of the
interests affected compared to the 1991 Covenant. Given a relation to the
target group based on consensus the policy network had to become wider.
More interests had to be considered for the development of the measures
needed to implement the European Directive. Industry organized itself in
the so-called packaging platform, where representatives of the peak associa-
tions of Dutch industry pal1icipated along with members of the Foundation
of Packaging and the Environment. As a result of the widening of the net-
work, the policy process became more complicated and contentious. The
Dutch system was, however, flexible enough to absorb the European Union-
induced pressure. Unlike their British counterpal1s, the Dutch associations
were able to accommodate intra-industry conflicts. A small number of re-
presentatives from the trade associations negotiated with the government.
Government and industry could build on existing corporatist institutional
arrangements.
The European impact on the German mode of interest integration was
the most limited one. In contrast to the Dutch and British governments, the
German government did not need to integrate societal interests for the co-
production of new policies. However, it was increasingly exposed to a plu-
rality of interests because domestic business became aware of the great
influence that the 1991 Packaging Ordinance had on the entire German
industry. In addition, the German government also had to deal with foreign
companies complaining about the trade effects of the German packaging
ordinance. European economic integration has increased the number of
participants in the German packaging waste policy process. However, it
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would be going too far to say that pluralist patterns have replaced corpo-
ratist ones. In contrast to the United Kingdom, and in line with the Nether-
lands, the German government maintained its preference for stable and
institutionalized contacts with trade associations rather than loose and
unstable interactions with individual companies (cf. Haverland 1999).
3 National Political Change and Autonomy in the European
Union
The case study aimed to show the complex and sometimes ambiguous
effects of European integration on national policy-making and autonomy.
The member states of the European Union have achieved a high level of
economic integration. At the same time, this increases the likelihood of
unintended cross-border effects of interventionist policies. These effects
provide an incentive for member states, which experience the negative
effects of these policies, to push for more European integration. By shifting
formal decision-making powers to the European Union, member states
hope to compensate for their loss of national autonomy caused by interde-
pendent markets. In the decision-making process at the European level,
member states strive for unanimous solutions. Since, very often, a bad solu-
tion is preferable to no solution, member states have to make concessions
and accept initially unwanted domestic political change and restrictions in
their autonomy. The United Kingdom, for instance, motivated by its over-
riding preference to ensure the free movement of goods, accepted substan-
tial changes in the form and substance of its national environmental poli-
cies. The Dutch case illustrates nicely that national political change, even
when it is caused by European integration, does not always run against the
preferences of member-state governments. The implementation of the Euro-
pean directive provided an elegant opportunity for the Dutch government
to deal with the problem of free-riding and to tone down the earlier pack-
aging reduction target, which turned out to be unattainable.
The story of the Packaging Waste Directive as told so far demonstrates a
substantial but not radical impact of the Directive on domestic political
change and national autonomy. Further qualifications are in order, how-
ever, to put the case into a broader perspective. These qualifications point to
a greater decrease in national autonomy than the case of packaging waste
suggests so far.
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In the coming years, the European Court of Justice can decide to restrict
the autonomy of the 'green' member states substantially. This is because the
conditions under which member states can maintain or introduce more far-
reaching packaging waste prevention measures or go beyond the maximum
recycling quota are couched in rather vague terms. The vague wording of
directives has often setved as a strategic device, to maintain member-state
flexibility and autonomy. It may soon turn out to be the opposite. A pro-
ducer or importer, believing himself to be adversely affected by far-reaching
intetventionary measures, such as the German refillable quota, may request
the European Court of Justice to decide whether the country in question has
gone beyond the exemptions granted by the Directive. The final judgement
about where to strike a balance between environmental protection and free
trade will then rest with the European Court of lustice rather than the mem-
ber states (cf. Gehring 1997: 351-52).
Moreover, though the case of packaging waste reads essentially as a case
of an intergovernmental bargain, one should not underestimate the role of
the European Commission and the European Parliament in other decision-
making processes. Examples such as the 1989 Small Car Directive or, more
recently, the Landfill Directive show that these actors can, under certain
conditions, significantly influence the policy-making process and the con-
tent of the policy output (cf. Arp 1992; Pagh 1999). One should also bear in
mind that even in the case of the Packaging Directive attempts by a number
of Members of the European Parliament to substantially modify the Coun-
cil's position only failed by a few votes. In the case of a successful amend-
ment, it would have been very difficult for the Council to maintain its posi-
tion, given its internal divisions.
furthermore, apart from the high degree of politicization involved in
this piece of legislation, quite similar stories of policy changes and losses in
national autonomy could have been told for hundreds, if not thousands, of
pieces of European legislation. The acquis communitaire amounts to some
80,000 pages and is superior to national law. It entails thousands of regula-
tions and directives that have been incorporated into national law. Al-
though member states sometimes reduce adaptation pressure by imple-
menting directives late or improperly, most of the regulations and directives
are implemented and enforced. Moreover, the pressure to implement and
enforce European directives has been strengthened by European Court of
Justice case law over the years (cf. Prechal 1995). As elaborated in Section
2.2.1, the European Court of lustice has ruled that directives have to come
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to full effect and that member states are held liable if the desired result is
not achieved. Moreover, many legislative acts confer rights to individuals.
These individuals can rely on these rights before national courts (the so-
called Direct Effect). The European Court of Justice held that in these cases
member states could be held liable if individuals suffer damages because of
inaccurate implementation.
In assessing the question of whether the loss in national autonomy is
desirable or not, one should bear in mind that the acquis communitaire is not
simply imposed on the government of a member state by an external body.
It is the result of a decision-making process in which each member state
takes part. One should also be aware of the fact that, as this chapter illus-
trates, searching for consensus and protecting essential minority interests
are the dominant rules of the game in the Council. It is also true, though,
that in the course of the European integration process national autonomy
has been restricted in an ever-broader range of areas. European Union
member states are bound by a supra-national legal order. The European
Union has no police force to ensure compliance, it is true, but non-compli-
ance is often very costly politically speaking, and it can prevent potentially
beneficial integration projects in other areas.
In addition to the 'push' factors of a European solution to the trade problems of some of
the member stales, there was also a 'pull' factor involved. The Commission's General
Directorate of the Environment waIlled a European solution to revitalize its own pack-
aging waste policy and to increase its competencies {for detailed chronological analyses
of the European packaging waste policy process, ef. Cehring 1997, Colub 1()96 and
Hawrland ]999: ]66-203).
2 The initial Commission proposal contained the collection and recycling quota of the
Dutch 1991 Covenant. This is no coincidence. The author of the text was a civil servant
of the Dutch environment n1inistry, delegated to the Commission.
3 The term recycling is confined to the recycling of packaging material. Recovery is a
broader term that denotes material recycling as well as the incineration of packaging
material with t'nergy recovery.
4 Provisions for 'laggard countries' further contributed to the weakening of the t'l1viron-
mental dimension and the lack of harmonization. Grt'ece, Portugal and Ireland were
granted less-demanding targets.
5 It is, however, doubtful whether the British negotiators in Brussels were fully aware of
the political costs involved in the implementation of the Directive in the United King-
dom.
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G As a matter of fact, Germany and the Netherlands had already met the Directive's
maximum recycling targets for the year 2000 in 1993 (Commissie Verpakkingen 1994,
Duales System Deutschland 1994).
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8The Irrelevance of Globalization:
the State and the Energy Sector in Russia's
Transformation
Anton Weenink and Aad Carrelje
1 State Decline in Russia
Few states seem to have lost effective control to the degree that Russia did
over the past decade. During the Gorbachev reforms, and in particular after
the Law on State Enterprises of 1987, it had already become clear that the
Soviet state was losing its grip on society. The collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 aggravated this development, particularly for Russia as the largest
successor state. With the Communist Party outlawed, the new Russian gov-
ernment lacked the institutional framework that had given at least a sem-
blance of cohesion to the Soviet system. The federal government and the
President soon became enmeshed in a conflict with the legislature. A 'war of
laws' broke out between the branches within the federal administration,
and between the federal centre and the 89 provinces (cf. Shlapentokh et al.
1997: 204). Numerous, often contradictory laws were adopted and applied
arbitrarily, thus undermining the institutional framework and the legitima-
cy of the Russian state, and inviting rent-seeking behaviour from those
aware of the loopholes (cf. Newcity 1997: 52).
The Russian state is in serious financial trouble, while state power has
been undermined by organized crime, involving state officials as well as cit-
izens, and by widespread corruption at all levels of the administration,
often in association with the so-called financial industrial groups that have
emerged in the course of the reform project. Russia now ranks among the
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top three corrupt nations in the world. 'Government officials conduct busi-
ness in an atmosphere in which state service is routinely used - and indeed
expected - to advance personal material interests, often in the name of
"reformist" economic goals or revenue raising. What would be denounced
in Western societies as a conflict of interest appears to the elite as a natural
and agreeable state of affairs' (Jensen 1998: 11; cf. CSIS 1997: 47).
The loss of state control in Russia seems to be at odds with the general
thesis of this book. namely that states appear to be rather successful in
adapting to changing circumstances and that it is far too early to claim the
demise of the nation state. Instead it would seem that Russia provides the
perfect example of Ohmae's thesis that 'nation states have already lost their
role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today's
borderless world' (Ohmae 1995: 11). With respect to Russia, Shlapentokh et
al. (1997: 16) accordingly argue that 'it does indeed seem to be a dialectical
case that the globalization of social life, a phenomenon that should be
considered as spreading 'universalism', or the growth of similar patterns
of behavior across the world, at the same time promotes 'particularism',
undermining nation states and encouraging regions to develop their auton-
omy from the center'. Should, therefore, Russia's decline be considered an
example of a state fallen victim to globalization and as a refutation of this
book's general thesis? As we will show, it should not.
Our account of the role of the energy sector in Russia's transformation
suggests a world radically different from that depicted by globalization
theory in two respects. First, we demonstrate that the causal nexus of glob-
alization theory - globalization undermines state power - is debatable at
best. In our view, internal developments heralded the demise of state con-
trol in Russia, and thereby induced a more open Russian economy. Second,
in institutionally weak states, our approach suggests, the rent-seeking by
powerful interest groups has effectively inhibited a true liberalization of the
economy, which in the view of globalization theory is hardly avoidable
even for strong states. Therefore, the apparent collapse of Russian state
power cannot be considered a confirmation of globalization theory, or a
refutation of the thesis of the 'adaptive state'.
The crisis of the Russian state first and foremost was caused by specific
internal political and economic developments and not primarily by the
Russian state's inability to adapt to autonomous market forces. The loss of
control has been part of the vicious circle that connects the Russian state's
declining legitimacy with its lack of financial resources and vulnerability to
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corruption. As we will show, the Russian government had no other option
but to seek support from powerful groups in society, particularly the energy
sector.
In order to substantiate our argument, we discuss the political and eco-
nomic consequences of the structural dependence of the Russian economy
on the country's energy industry. To a large extent, the fact that the state has
not been able to control this sector accounts for the faltering of the process
of economic and political liberalization. We show that this influence is
much more structural than suggested by the, in itself illustrative, example of
the career of Viktor Chernomyrdin. Chernomyrdin, the former president of
the nationwide natural-gas conglomerate Gazprom, in 1992 joined the
government and became prime minister; in the summer of 1999 he returned
to Gazprom. The extravagant preferential treatment Gazprom obtained du-
ring Chernomyrdin's reign induced the World Bank to call the firm a state
within the state (cf. World Bank 1996: 119).
We realize, of course, that there are many other factors that help explain
the demise of the Russian state, the most important being the policies
pursued by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments. We will no!, however,
enter the normative debate that has been waged over these policies between
the neo-classical economists who favour radical reform through shock
therapy and the neo-institutionalist defenders of a gradualist approach. l
instead, our analysis deals with the way in which Russia's inherited eco-
nomic structure - and particularly the role of the energy sector therein -
imposes constraints upon the Russian government and its policy-making. in
this respect we adopt an instutionalist perspective and draw attention to the
path-dependent character of Russia's transition from communism.'
in Section 2 we address the structural characteristics of Russia's eco-
nomy that were caused by seventy years of isolation from the world market
and explain why the energy sector is so crucial for an understanding of what
has been going on in Russia. Subsequently, in Section 3, we discuss how
perestroilw, within the existing economic structure, gave rise to an excessive
political and economic leverage of the energy sector in the course of the
transition. In Section 4 we explore the impact of the rent-seeking behaviour
of the energy sector and the administration and its implication. finally, in
Section 5, we assess the implications of our account for the globalization
argument.
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2 Why the Energy Sector is Crucial:
the Distorted Russian Economy
The role of the energy sector in Russia's reform process is intimately related
to the causes of the Soviet Union's economic decline. Up to the end of the
1950s, the Soviet economy achieved impressive growth rates, yet over the
subsequent decades its development stagnated and, from 1990 onwards,
economic activity actually declined. The single most important cause for the
gradual deceleration of the development of the centrally planned Soviet
economy was that its institutional make-up did not allow private entrepre-
neurs to perform the innovative function they have in modern market-
based societies. As Schumpeter has stressed, entry to and exit from markets
by experimenting entrepreneurs are vital for economic growth. This process
of creative destruction whereby innovative firms replace stagnating ones is a
driving force of a continuous evolution of technology, products and pro-
duction methods in 'capitalist' societies (cf. Schumpeter 1992ed.). The
Soviet economy was, however, closed to innovative entrepreneurs, foreign
as well as native, and as such denied itself the fruits of the process of creative
destruction (cf. Murrell 1990). This had serious consequences for economic
growth.
Technological development stagnated right from the start of the Soviet
experiment. Therefore the economy could only grow extensively, that is, by
exploiting its large untapped natural resources, in particular oil and gas. Sig-
nificant shares of the proven world reserves for oil (6.5 per cent), natural gas
(39.2 per cent) and coal (23.4 per cent) are located in the Former Soviet
(FSU) republics and particularly in Russia (BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 1997). As Western observers began to realize by the late 1960s, the
formerly high growth rates were the result of this extensive strategy: 'more
than half and perhaps upward of three-quarters of Soviet growth has been
achieved by the essentially mechanical and ruthless process of forcing out of
the economy ever greater supplies of productive resources' (Powell 1968:
23). An extensive growth strategy, however, leads to diminishing returns to
scale, and cannot be upheld indefinitely. Indeed, increasing amounts of
energy were required to produce the equipment that was needed to develop
new oil and gas fields, further and further away from the industrial centres
in the West, fields which were located in ecologically vulnerable and climat-
ically hostile environments (cf. Wolfson 1994; Ebel 1994). Intensive growth,
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in contrast, demands that markets are open to private entrepreneurs. With
low barriers to entry, even large, quasi-monopolistic and oligopolistic firms
face serious consequences if they neglect the imperative to modernize. They
are forced, if not by competitors, then by the threat of new, small firms
entering the market, to experiment with new techniques. In the case of the
Soviet Union freedom of entry and experimentation would have meant
abandoning central planning and freeing markets from political control, an
option that was absolutely not acceptable to the ruling communist leader-
ship. As a consequence Soviet enterprises were well-nigh totally shielded
from competition and the economy did not intensifY.
Extensive growth could only be maintained by subsidizing the manu-
facturing sector through administratively imposed low prices for raw mate-
rials and energy. So, energy prices were held down. Within the context of the
relative isolation from the world market, this could lead to the bizarre phe-
nomenon of a manufacturing industry that reduced the value of its raw
materials, energy and labour inputs, instead of adding it. The more complex
the production processes, the larger the losses in value. This may be illus-
trated by the estimation that in 1992 the market value of the raw materials
and energy produced was twice that of Russia's GNP! Consequently, it was
suggested that the Russian economy would have been better off 'if every
Russian worker, except those in the country's mining, oil and transport
industries (who would be needed to ship raw materials abroad) simply
stopped working' (The Economist 25/10(92).
The prosperity of the Soviet Union and its satellites was fully dependent
on an abundant supply of natural resources (cf. Kramer 1990). This funda-
mental weakness is also illustrated by the fact that resource-poor socialist
countries relied heavily on artificially low-priced Soviet supplies of raw
materials: 'One of the most significant aspects of the [industrial] revolution
!in eastern Europe] was that the foundations for a modern industrial system
were laid on a highly restricted raw materials base ... with one or two excep-
tions (Poland, Romania), the CMEA Six were heavily dependent on Soviet
supplies of raw materials'. Between 1960 and 1980 these 'implicit trade sub-
sidies' amounted to $87 billion (cf. Marrese and Vanous 1983: xv, ),.'viii).
In short, the legacy of the Soviet economic strategy was that of a value-
destroying economy, in which all non-primary industry was subsidized by
the primary sector. Within the primary sector, the energy sector was the
most important source of subsidies. Economically speaking, this was not a
very healthy situation; it depended on the willingness and the ability of the
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state to prevent producers from selling to the highest bidder. If left to their
own devices one would expect producers in the primary sector to demand
market prices from national customers; where no realistic price is offered,
they would sell their resources on the world market. This circumstance
shows why socialist economies can only be run on command lines and in
isolation from the world market. Destroying the hierarchical lines that form
the fabric of a socialist economy is a risky business indeed. This became all
too obvious when Gorbachev started his perestroilw.
3 Reform in a Distorted Economy
The crux of perestroilw was the Law on State Enterprises of 1987 (cf. Goldman
1991; Nove 1992ed). By giving state enterprises a large degree of autonomy
in financial matters and by creating opportunities for workers' control over
management, this Law destroyed the command lines that had kept the
Soviet economy going in the previous decades. The Law also effectively put
an end to central economic planning, by replacing the traditional system of
imposed production targets with a discretionary system in which the state
gave the firms specific orders, while allowing enterprises to trade up to 30
per cent of their cash income. In addition, the Law terminated centralized
foreign trade, by allowing firms to select their foreign trade partners them-
selves. These fundamental alterations to the system of economic coordina-
tion caused an immediate disruption of the traditional supply channels and
provoked inflationary wage demands from the workers. As a consequence
production started to decline.
Afurther crucial effect of the 1987 Law is that the decentralization of the
productive system undermined the state's ability to collect taxes. As McKin-
non points out, until then all taxation had been 'implicit', because all trans-
fer payments were handled by the state banks. Except for wage payments,
enterprises held hardly any cash balances. By monetizing payments and by
shifting the control over productive assets, or firms, from the central state
level to the (still state-owned) enterprise, without first establishing the
proper institutional framework for tax collection, the state effectively gave
away its tax base (cf. McKinnon 1991: 110-15).
The dismantlement of the Ministry of Foreign Trade's monopoly on
trade with external partners further reduced state control. The partial liber-
alization of foreign trade opened up an important source of privileged
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wealth. It enabled enterprises and well-connected traders to purchase oil
and metals at home, at very low state-controlled prices, and to resell these
goods abroad at hard-currency world-market prices.' As this kind of trade,
already accounting for nearly 60 per cent of Russia's exports in 1992, was
subject to quotas and licenses allocated by the state, it quickly turned into a
source of corruption and bribery (cf. Aslund 1997: 89). At the same time,
though, it laid the financial foundation for the later very powerful so-called
Financial Industrial Groups.
Proponents of shock therapy, like Aslund, argue that in combination
with a full-fledged liberalization of prices, the dislocations and abuses
described above would never have been possible. Yet, in 1987 such a price
liberalization was unthinkable. Moreover, after the state had given away part
of its control, the rent-seeking interest groups in the energy sector came to
generate more than half of GDP in the $80 billion economy of 1992.
Hence, by the time the transition began in earnest, the state was hardly in a
position to call for radical price reforms. The gradual loss of control that
had started under Gorbachev had made the central government hostage to
the energy sector.
It is significant that the reformists' government proposal to liberalize
internal prices, in the Spring of 1992, provided the energy sector with the
opportunity to move on from the administrative perimeter to the political
centre. A proposed radical liberalization in energy prices induced country-
wide protest, from consumers as well as the energy industries. In May 1992,
President YeItsin, confronted with heavy pressure from the industry, was
forced to dismiss his reformist Minister for Fuel and Energy, Lopukhin, and
replaced him with the 'more experienced' director of Russia's giant monop-
olistic natural-gas company Gazprom, Viktor Chernomyrdin (cf. YeItsin
1994: 207). By December 1992, Chernomyrdin even replaced Gaidar as
Prime Minister and remained in power until March 1998. Meanwhile, the
direct involvement of the energy sector in Russia's political arena, its influ-
ence in the federal and local administration and the impact of the sector in
the economy and the state budget enabled it to continue its rent-seeking
behaviour, while blocking institutional and legal reforms. In order to sub-
stantiate this, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of the role of the
energy sector in the Russian economy.
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4 The Energy Sector
Despite the fact that there was a general decline in energy production and
consumption from the end of the 1980s, the energy sector gradually gained
an enormous weight in the economy. This is illustrated by the fact that,
while overall industrial production declined by around 46 per cent between
1992 and 1995, the output of the natural-gas and the electricity sector fell
by only 7 and 24 per cent, respectively. Consumption of oil in Russia
declined from 250 Mtoe in 1987, to only 128 Mtoe in 1997, while the pro-
duction of oil was halved from nearly 600 to only 302 Mtoe. This contrac-
tion in output was largely caused by supply constraints, such as reservoir
depletion, poor technical management and lacking investments for new
exploration activities, enhanced recovery methods and maintenance. In
addition to its impact in Russian industrial production, by the end of 1996,
the energy sector contributed 70 per cent of the Russian federal tax revenues
(cf. Slay and Capelik 1998), while around 50 per cent of the total hard-cur-
rency export revenues were generated by sales of crude oil, refined oil prod-
ucts and natural gas. The importance of Gazprom's foreign sales is illus-
trated by the fact that half of its gross revenues on sales ($30 billion in total
over 1996) came from export sales, whereas only a fifth of the total amount
of gas sold was exported (cf. Gray 1998b). The energy sector thus had an
enormous impact on the state budget and in macro-economic relations.
Simply because of its relative size and its macro-economic impact the sector
became of crucial strategic and political importance in economic policy-
making and the process of transition (cf. Makarov and Remizov 1997).
In addition to this, the energy sector acquired increasing significance in
issues of micro-economic organization and political relations post-1990.
Essential elements in the unfolding of a web of interrelated economic and
political connections and interdependencies are: firstly, the fact that the
price liberalization of 1992 caused substantial payment arrears with impor-
tant economic and political implications; secondly, the manner in which
the process of privatization was undertaken; and thirdly, the workings of the
tax system.
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4.1 PRICE LIBERALIZATION IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF PAYMENT
ARREARS
Following the initial, limited liberalization in energy prices, in January
1992, energy prices rose enormously, and energy-intensive industries in par-
ticular, but also households, were confronted with rapidly rising energy-
supply costs. Nevertheless, the potentially beneficial effects of the price lib-
eralization were offset by mounting payment arrears. Payment arrears to
energy suppliers rose, which in turn saw their own ability to pay their sup-
pliers and staff weakened. By April 1997, overall payment arrears had
reached a level of 52 per cent of Russian GDP. A third of these arrears was
owed to the energy sector, which had a share of 13 per cent of total GDP (cf.
Bagratian and Gilrgen 1997).
Another consequence was that the means of payment changed. In 1996,
between 74 and 91 per cent of the amounts due to the electricity companies
in the several Russian republics were paid properly, but only between 9 to
22 per cent of these payments was in currency. The remainder was in
promissory notes, treasury bills, barter and even shares in debtor firms. The
gas supplier Gazprom received payment on between 49 and 100 per cent,
depending on the republic, of its invoices. Only 7 per cent of its total Russ-
ian revenues, however, was in currency. The state aggravated the problem by
not paying its own energy bills, resulting in a debt amounting to 1.2 per
cent of GDP. The increasing inability and unwillingness to pay for energy
purchases had important economic and political consequences for the par-
ties involved, i.e. the state, consumers, and the energy industry.
The state provided 'payment relief', through subsidized rates and
exemptions from penalties on payment arrears for certain privileged con-
sumers. This provided the authorities with a new instrument of cross-subsi-
dization and redistribution of services and goods, as an alternative to the
abandoned system of state planning. Obviously, these prerogatives had
political implications. On the one hand, it made the state vulnerable to
pressures from specific groups and regions, including the energy sector
itself, while on the other hand, it provided the state with the means to 'buy'
political support (cf. Slay and Capelik 1998). This pricing 'policy' allowed
the energy industry and associated state entities to discriminate between
'friendly' and 'unfriendly' enterprises and sectors (cf. Bagratian and Gilrgen
1997).
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The energy industry accepted these arrears because it had little choice, as
it could not sell its gas and electricity elsewhere, neither in the FSU, nor
abroad 4 Moreover, the non-cash payments in barter and other values,
including equity in the consuming companies, provided the energy industry
with a source of income that could be kept 'outside' the books and thus
offered an effective means of tax evasion (cf. Bagratian and Giirgen 1997:
13). This also gave energy-sector firms influence in other sectors. Finally, the
government sanctioned these practices, and thus, as was stated by Slay and
Capelik (1998): 'In exchange for providing society with non-interrupted
services of electricity and natural gas and the government with political sup-
port and financial resources, firms like Gazprom and UES were largely per-
mitted to run their own show'.
Both the payment arrears as such, and the alternative forms of payment
to the energy sector affected the Russian state's tax revenues and, thus,
reduced the state's policy-making capacity. One should keep in mind, how-
ever, that the implicit 'regulation' of prices, by allowing payment arrears or
the alternative means of payment to specific consumers, sectors and
regions, provided the several layers of the administrative system with alter-
native instruments of economic and social policy (cf. Makarov and Remizov
1997). Because of the price differentials between high-priced industrial sup-
plies and low-priced supplies to households and state-funded institutions, a
cross-subsidization of the latter politically important groups of consumers
took place. This occurred, though, at the expense of industrial activity (cf.
Slay 1997).
4.2 PRIVATIZING THE ENERGY SECTOR
Traditionally, the entities operating in the energy sector were associations,
operating under the respective ministries, i.e. the 'Fuels and Energy Ministry'
for the electricity sector, the 'Natural Gas Ministry' and the several ministries
for oil production refining and marketing. The reorganization of the Rus-
sian energy sector started in November 1992 when a presidential decree
established 10 vertically integrated oil companies (comprising production,
transport, refining, distribution and retail assets) along geographic lines
with an effective monopoly on the sales in their region. The national
Gazprom monopoly was left intact because, as was stated by the chairman
of the State Committee on Antimonopoly Policy, it 'is a unique structure
which earns one third of Russia's foreign exchange' (cf. Slay and Capelik
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1998). In the electricity sector the Unified Electrical Power System (UES)
was established.
From 1992 onwards, in several steps, the several oil companies were
partly privatized. Initially the government had hoped to auction off shares
in the energy industries to the highest bidder, but this was not exactly what
ultimately happened. In the course of 1995 the government ran into severe
financial difficulties, which threatened to destabilize the economy. A group
of private banks - in fact, front offices of energy-sector industries - stepped
in and proposed the so-called loans-for-shares scheme (Blasi et al. 1997: 74
-5). The banks would provide the government with loans in return for
shares in 29 energy companies as collateral. Whenever the government was
unable to meet its debts, the banks were entitled to sell the shares at self-
organized auctions. The revenues would then be split by the government
and the banks. This loans-for-shares agreement lacked any transparency,
however, and resulted in due course in a sell-out of shares to firms that were
owned by the same banks that had participated in the deal.
In particular the eight firms that had previously constituted the national
oil company Rosneftegas were sold at ridiculously low prices. For example,
Oneximbank acquired 51 per cent of shares in Sidanko, at a price of 2 dollar
cents per barrel of oil reserves owned by the firm, while in normal circum-
stances a price of $4 to $5 would have been appropriate. While organizing
the auction for Yukos, the Menatep Bank itself announced that it would be
the highest bidder for the oil company. When other banks protested, the
government silenced them by threatening them with the Tax Police. A
Menatep affiliate, Laguna, ultimately bought 33 per cent in Yukos for the
price of $150 million. Additionally it provided a 'loan' to the state of anoth-
er $159 million, in exchange for control over yet another 45 per cent. 40 per
cent ofSurgutneftegas was sold to its own pension fund. Shares in the largest
Russian oil company, Lukoil, were sold by Bank Imperial, a bank owned by
Gazprom bank and Gazprom itself obtained 5 per cent of Lukoil (cf. Khar-
tunov 1998a,b). The outcome of the loans-for-shares program was a signifi-
cant privatization of Russian industry. Between 1992 and 1996, however, the
contribution of the privatizations to the state budget was less than $1.5 bil-
lion, while the real value of these assets was estimated at around $50-60
billion.' Another important result was that it led to the birth of Russia's oli-
garchs, the leaders of big cartellistic 'Financial-Industrial Groups'. Of the
eight-biggest FIGs, six have interests in the energy sector (The Economist
4/4/98). These new oligarchs showed their gratitude in a politically most sat-
]'he IrrelelllltlCe of Clohalilillion 155
isfYing way. After a meeting in Davos, they joined forces in an ultimately suc-
cessful effort to finance Yeltsin's re-election campaign in 1996.
4.3 TAX REVENUES FROM THE ENERGY SECTOR
The sell-out of state assets in large parts of the energy industry, of course, did
little structurally to relieve the government's financial difficulties. To com-
plement the meagre tax receipts, the government was forced to rely on for-
eign lending and on issuing short-term state bonds at exceptionally high
interest rates. The revenues were spent on regular budget expenditure, subsi-
dizing enterprises and sometimes disappearing into the pockets of bureau-
crats and politicians (cf. lensen 1998).
The privatization of the energy sector did not, however, re-establish state
control, in the sense that it enabled the state to collect taxes from a now
depoliticized energy sector. For a number of structural and institutional rea-
sons, the Russian state failed to establish an adequate system of taxation for
its potentially most lucrative economic sector. A crucial factor is that the
Russian system of oil and gas taxation, as an inheritance from the Soviet sys-
tem, is based largely on fixed production-based levies, which mainly taxes
the amounts of oil and gas taken out of the well, instead of the oil products
sold to consumers. Such fixed production levies are unrelated to the profits
generated on the sales of the manufactured products. Consequently, if prof-
its are only meagre because of low consumer prices, non-payment or high
production costs, fixed levies tend to discourage exploration and pro-
duction activities. A fall in production, in turn, reduces the aggregate tax
receipts.
Low fiscal revenues from the oil and gas sector are also caused by infra-
structural constraints obstructing an efficient transport and handling of
crude oil and manufactured products, and by the fact that most of the prof-
its are generated in the largely untaxed transport, oil refining and distribu-
tion segments of the supply chain (cf. Gray 1998a: 15). Through a mixture
of political power, economic leverage and monopolistic practices, these
down-stream sectors (including Gazprom and the national-gas pipeline
company Transneft) have seized a disproportional share of the total value
added in the oil and gas production chain. As end-use prices at home or in
export markets are relatively fixed, it is eventually the up-stream oil and gas
production segment that is plagued by low revenues. As stated, lack of prof-
itability discourages production and accordingly lowers the statutory
amount of tax extracted from these producers.
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The Russian state, having lost control over the energy sector and in con-
stant need of revenues, saw no other option but to raise taxes. Moreover, in
the Russian republics, taxes are frequently imposed in an uncoordinated,
arbitrary manner by the several federal, regional and local governments. In
addition, there seems to be a large degree of discrimination against (for-
eign) joint ventures, because Russian privatized companies - managed by
the insiders ~ are often granted tax exemptions, or allowed to run up con-
siderable payment arrears whereas outsiders are not (cf. Gray 1998a: 14).
High and arbitrary taxation, however, has probably been the single most
imponant cause of tax evasion and capital flight. As such, its effects are
counter-productive. With capital fleeing the country at a rate of $1-2 billion
a month, according to a conservative estimate, little hope for the future
remains (cf. Ellman and Scharrenborg 1998: 583). Russia needs investment
badly, but particularly since August 1998 investors have been leaving the
country.
A short-lived change of policy intended to regain state control over vital
petroleum and gas industries was abandoned in May 1998, when President
Yeltsin lifted a ban on funher privatization. The financial crisis of August
1998, however, minimized the chance of finding interested buyers. Rouble
funds have become unavailable, while foreign investors are frightened by
the governments' moratorium on foreign-debt repayment and the general
worsening of the investment climate (cf. Khanunov 1998b: 18). The rouble
devaluation further enhanced the imponance of the exponing energy
industries. but it also inspired the government to establish a mandatory
exchange of currency earnings for roubles. Newly introduced taxes and con-
trols will prove counterproductive in the attempts to attract foreign and
domestic investors. On the contrary, capital flight, which had already
reached dramatic proportions before the financial crisis broke out, has risen
to new highs.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis of the decline of Russian state power and the role of the energy
sector draws attention to a paradoxical phenomenon, described by others as
the mineral curse (cf. Mikesell1997; Kurpershoek 1998). It seems a paradox
indeed that a state like Russia, with such vast mineral resources at its dis-
posal, has not been able to reform its economy succesfully. At first sight,
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abundance in energy resources could be considered an advantageous pre-
condition for any state in the process of political transformation. The
exploitation of these resources could provide the transitional government
with the pecuniary leeway to invest in the productive system and to finance
a minimum level of social security. Aflourishing energy sector would reduce
unemployment. Enerb'Y exports would generate an inflow of foreign curren-
cy enabling society to import. Energy pricing, including direct taxation,
could be used as an instrument of economic, regional and social policy.
These revenues and stabilizing instruments would diminish the chance of
social unrest. Consequently, common sense would suggest that the transfor-
mation would proceed in a relatively orderly and succesful manner, as com-
pared to states without such resources.
This scenario, as we have shown, is much too simple, though. The clue
to this apparent contradiction lies in the words 'at its disposal', which refer
to the crucial role of the political and economic institutions in the transi-
tion. The idea that a transitional state may be able to 'use' the energy sector
and its revenues to smoothen the process of political and economic trans-
formation assumes that such a state has the power to control the energy sec-
tor and the firms therein.
When the transitional government has only a weak control over the
economy and the administrative system, though, the opportunities for 'rent-
seeking' increase enormously for those actors involved in the key-industries
and related parts of the administration, as we have shown. During Gor-
bachev's perestroika the Soviet state lost effective control over its enterprises.
Parallel to the increasingly apparent failure of the planning system and the
loss of power of the central government, the logic of economics gradually
appeared and those sectors that sustained Russia's 'economic life' saw their
economic weight increase enormously. In the context of Russia's value-de-
stroying manufacturing industries, the energy sector became the new power
base with which any reform policy had to reckon.
Lacking an adequate institutional framework, and given the changes in
economic relations, the 'transitional' state had a hard time resisting the eco-
nomic and political pressures of its raw-materials producers and accordingly
the democratic politicians and institutions were taken hostage. The federal
government was unable to control the provinces and even the federal bu-
reaucracy - in particular the former branch ministries in the energy sector. At
the same time, however, the government became financially dependent
upon the energy producing regions and firms. After the loans-for-shares
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agreement, which did help the re-election of Yeltsin in 1996, the financial
difficulties of the state, of course, had still not been solved. Ever since the
government has tried to regain control over the state revenues by imposing a
wide variety of taxes, which were subsequently difficult to collect, in part be-
cause power political considerations time and again interfere with budgetary
considerations.
The financial crisis that broke out in August 1998 heralded another sell-
out of remaining state assets in the energy industry. With foreign investors
unwilling to invest and to take further risks, Russia's new oligarchs will fur-
ther extend their control over the economy (cf. Karthukov 1998a: 267). This
lowers the prospect for a re-establishment of the state's control to an abso-
lute minimum.
From the above it can be inferred that the relatively large weight of the
energy sector in the economy makes it rather difficult for Russia to proceed
on the path to a modern society. Governments without access to readily
available natural resources may show much more inclination to substantial
economic and political reform. Indeed, it is the only way out of the political
and economic slump, if only because Western credit suppliers require effec-
tive reforms in the absence of other securities, such as their participation in
energy resources exploitation. This suggests that, before entering into the
discussion of whether and how states are able to adjust themselves to inter-
nationalization and globalization, we first have to address the issue of inter-
nal legitimization and institutionalization.
Our analysis has underlined the problems for countries like Russia (but
also for the OPEC member states and other raw-materials producers) to
establish adequate democratic political institutions and to coordinate their
economies. Interest groups associated with the exploitation of these raw
materials have both the motivation and the means to stay in power or, at
best, if they wish to, to share the power with a 'friendly' administration and
a government of their choice (cf. Khartukov 1998a: 266). This situation sug-
gests the continuation of the well-known vicious circle. The lack of adequate
stable institutions, controlled by an effective state, impedes a development
of alternative sources of economic and political power. Indeed, the weak-
ness of the state is a disincentive for investment by national and interna-
tional entrepreneurs. Without new investment and with weak competion,
there is little hope that Russian firms will become competitive in the world
market.
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Consequently, the degree of integration by Russia into the international
economy will remain limited. The low-income economy hardly offers a
market for expensive imported products and will remain dependent on
low-quality home-made, often bartered, goods. As a producer, Russia will
remain a supplier of energy and raw materials to the world market. As long
as world energy prices allow the backward Russian industry to cover its pro-
duction costs and to invest in the development of oil and gas reserves, the
impact of internationalization and globalization on the economy will be
almost nil (cf. Khartukov 1998b: 22). Note that labour remains a negligible
cost factor in the oil and gas sector. The revenues will continue to be seized
by a small elite and spent on luxury, the sustenance of (semi-private) repres-
sive organizations, and on sustaining the corrupt administrative system. The
state, in such circumstances, will be rather immune to the consequences of
internationalization.
for a defence of the shock therapy see Aslund (1995) and (Sachs 1994ed.). (.'or the grad-
ualist approach see: Murrell (1995), McKinnon (1991) and Goldman (1991, 1994).
2 Our emphasis on path dependency is, of course, more in line with the gradualist approach
than with shock therapy.
3 In the spring of 1992, the price of oil in Russia was only one per cent of the world-mar-
ket price. In January 1995, tht' Russian oil price was still a third of the world price.
4 Export of Russian gas is constrained because, unlike in the oil sector, there is no interna-
tional market for gas. Cas trade takes place through pipelines with a fixed destination
and is organized by means of long-term supply contracts with specific \Vestern Euro-
pean importers. These importers - which until recently controlled regional, mutually
recognized supply monopolies - have based their purchases of Russian gas on their own
requirements in order to control supply - and thus lower - prices. As the European mar-
ket grows steadily but slowly, while Russian gas has to compete with Norwegian and
Algerian gas, only limited extra amounts of gas can be sold to Europe.
5 Several varying estimates of these discrepancies exist (cr EIA 19~)7; Gray 1998a,b). All
estimates agree, however, on the enormous gap between the market value of the assets
and the budgetary receipls.
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9European Tripartism:
Convergence in Topics, Persistent Divergence
in Decision Making
Hans Slomp
1 Introduction
Does globalization enforce a development towards one European model of
labour relations, or do national variations persist? In this comparison of
peak-level contacts and, in particular, recent tripartite social pacts, the thesis
of convergence versus divergence is the main topic. However, the focus is on
convergence and divergence in international patterns of industrial relations
rather than national models. The question here is not so much one of diverg-
ing developments in countries that used to have similar systems of labour
relations, and common trends in countries with different types of labour
relations, but one of convergence or divergence between groups of nations
with similar traditions of industrial relations.
The discussion focuses on convergence and divergence in tripartism,
and in particular in the role of the state in tripartite negotiations and agree-
ments. The chapter starts with a short theoretical discussion of the impact of
globalization on labour relations, followed by a systematic survey of recent
developments in tripartism and state activities in the three international
types of labour relations that will be distinguished.
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2 The Challenge: Globalization, Flexibility and Decentralization
'Nations now seem to have lost control of a large part of their economy to
the global "bulldozer" that is intent on building a new world order on the
ruins of the once powerful national economies' (Drache 1996: 31). This
statement aptly summarizes the alleged impact of globalization upon
national autonomy in social and economic policy-making, whether made
by national governments, or by employers, associations and trade unions.
The impact of globalization is twofold. First, the production process
and the input of labour have to be adapted to conditions of global compe-
tition. Increasing capital mobility enables companies to move quickly from
one location to another, both within and among nations. Sectors in which
local, regional. or national markets used to predominate are losing the pro-
tection offered by national and sector 'frontiers'. Globalization marks the
'crisis of the nationally constituted territorial rules and regulations'
(O'Tuathail et al 1998: 3). All enterprises are now subject to global compe-
tition. National actors have become global players. However, it is not only
national borders that are disappearing. Companies that have already oper-
ated on the world market and did not need national protection are also
affected by globalization. They have to adapt their production to rapid
changes in world-market conditions. Methods used to facilitate overnight
adaptations are lean production, which allows instant response to shifts in
demand, subcontracting, which shifts some of the burden of increasing flex-
ibility to the subcontractors, and increasing flexibility in the input oflabour,
by means of extended operating hours, for instance. It is no longer enter-
prise size and power (domination of the market), but the speed with which
changes are introduced, that decides company success (cf. Sverke 1997).
From shot-putters, focusing on weight, enterprises have become long-dis-
tance runners, obsessed with speed and losing weight.
The second change is a consequence of this increasing mobility and
flexibility in production and labour input in response to globalization.
Labour flexibility within the firm requires a shift of decision-making on
labour conditions from levels outside the enterprise to within the enterprise
or even at shop-floor level. State rules and sector agreements that regulate
labour conditions impede flexibility in labour input; they were introduced
for that very purpose by the trade unions and national governments.
Although employers have almost permanently complained about the con-
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straint these measures pose to flexibility and national competIlIveness,
globalization and the need for instant flexibility now seem to lend increas-
ing weight to their arguments. Many forms of labour protection by means of
national and sector rules, such as a maximum of daily or weekly working
hours, a ban on night work or on Sunday work, are now regarded as obso-
lete and as impediments to the twenty-four hour economy. Labour protec-
tion has become an 'institutional rigidity' that has to be dismantled. 'Supra-
enterprise' rules are to be replaced by negotiations between management
and the enterprise workforce to guarantee flexible adaptation of labour con-
ditions to the requirements of the world market. This change implies an
'organized decentralization' of collective bargaining from national and sec-
tor level to that of the enterprise. Decentralization might also be 'unorga-
nized', however, when the unions are totally shunted off. and collective bar-
gaining is supplanted by unilateral employer decision-making with respect
to labour conditions (cf. Traxler 1996).
Generally, employers are regarded as the main agents of change in
labour relations by bringing about flexibility in labour input and enforcing
decentralization of decision-making on labour conditions. They try to
reduce the impact of sector and national rules or even to circumvent such
rules. 110wever, in doing so, employers act under the strong pressure of
globalization and the need to achieve more flexibility in production and the
allocation of labour (cf. Thelen 1998). The trade unions are considered to
be the main victims of the employers' drive towards enterprise-level con-
tacts and the company efforrs to do away with any 'third party interference'
in their company. The trade unions had already suffered membership losses
since the oil crises of the 1970s, due to the decline of traditional industries,
and the shift from manual to clerical work. Decentralization affects trade
union efforts of national or sector solidarity in the form of wage uniformity,
one of the overriding trade union concerns during the twentieth century.
This loss of traditional goals results in even greater membership losses (cf.
Western 1997).
The role of the state in industrial relations is probably at stake most of
all in the process of national adaptation to the new world order. Drache's
opening lines of this section in particular point to the loss of state power
over the national economies (although he himself refutes that thesis).
Globalization also removes 'the basis of political authority, legitimacy and
accountability away from national governments, towards the increasingly
transnational and global markets' (Gill 1997: 13). Deregulation has
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become the rule, albeit sometimes accompanied by a temporal)' growth in
the body of rules in order to implement deregulation. Not only labour leg·
islation is increasingly regarded as an impediment to flexibility, this also
applies to more indirect forms of state involvement in industrial relations,
such as declaring bargaining results generally binding for a sector as a
whole, including non·members of the bargaining organizations. Since there
is hardly any latitude left for national rules on labour conditions, the role of
the state in tripartite national negotiations has also come to an end. If
national governments retain any role at all in shaping national economic
and social conditions, which some observers doubt, it is a vel)' limited one
(cf. Locke er al. 1995). In Western Europe, globalization has reduced the
state's role in yet another way, by its pressure in the direction of privatiza·
tion. (The European Union's role in this and in other developments is not
discussed here.) This form of deregulation has reduced the opportunities to
use the public sector as a means to introduce new ventures in industrial
relations or to serve as a model of wage restraint.
The loss of function of the nation state, the decline of trade union influ·
ence, the growing power of 'capital' due to globalization, flexibility and
decentralization, have prompted pessimistic visions with respect to the
effects of convergence in industrial relations. National differences disappear
in the course of a downward trend, a 'race to the bottom' in labour condi·
tions. One of the most prominent protagonists of this pessimism is Streeck,
referring to the fate of the Gerrnan soziale Marktwirtschaft (cf. Streeck
1996a). Labour standards will be lowered, labour conditions will deterio·
rate, and the old de· industrializing nations of Europe will gradually have to
adapt to the standards and the conditions of the newly industrializing
nations in the Pacific. In this gloomy picture, the world market has (finally)
broken its chains, forged by the nation states and the trade unions.
3 The Response: Globalization, Training and Tripartism
The pessimism that prevailed in the previous Section is not shared by all. It
has prompted a lot of research and essays on the strength of the Western
European economies and the continued influence of trade unions and
national governments in shaping national market conditions. National gov·
ernments do not forge chains, they create preconditions for successful mar·
kets, and to some extent this also applies to trade unions.
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Against the downward trend in European labour conditions, the opti-
mists put forward a crucial advantage of the European labour force when
compared to that in most of East Asia: its level of training. As an alternative
to a low pay strategy, as practised in the USA and Great Britain, some point
to the emphasis on vocational training in continental Europe. Training
leads to more worker interest and a more innovative and creative attitude
towards work, and it stimulates higher productivity, as a precondition of
high wages and a strategy of European survival. While receiving hardly any
attention until the 1990s, vocational training has become a prominent
theme in industrial-relations literature over the last five years. This is also
one of the fields in which national governments and trade unions actively
shape national market conditions. By raising the level of employee skills,
state and union efforts in vocational training contribute to labour flexibility
and to high labour standards.
Without denying the trend towards decentralization and trade union
decline, some concentrate on the persistence of tripartism (cf. Berger and
Compston forthcoming). In a number of Western European nations, tripar-
tite pacts have been concluded, with the general goal of increasing labour
flexibility and reducing unemployment by means of stimulating investment
in jobs, and preferably part-time jobs. These tripartite agreements, and
failed attempts in that direction, show that flexibility and globalization not
only lead to decentralization but also to an expansion of efforts to construct
national frameworks for the decentralizing industrial relations. The tripar-
tite agreements are attributed to the trade unions' willingness to comply
with greater flexibility in working time, in exchange for greater employer
commitment to create new jobs. The government's role differs between the
nations involved, but its main aim is to reduce unemployment by promot-
ing flexibility. In order to reach that goal the government has either put
pressure upon the social partners to engage in central level talks, has initiat-
ed the talks, or has only acted as a mediator.
Lately, the thesis of decentralization in general has been questioned. It
seemed to rely too heavily upon evidence from countries in which bargain-
ing was already highly decentralized and the role of the state was limited, as
in the United States and Great Britain. Deregulation is not even a Europe-
wide phenomenon, as is borne out in international comparisons (cf.
Wallerstein et al. 1997). While relatively decentralized systems have decen-
tralized still further, tripartism and state involvement are still prevalent in
countries with a tradition of tripartite agreements. This difference points to
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a trend of divergence rather than convergence in labour relations (cf. Thelen
1998).
4 Tripartism: Convergence or Divergence?
Here [ attempt to shed some light on the issue of national autonomy in the
field of industrial relations, by looking at recent efforts at tripartism, with a
special focus on the role of the nation state.
The first question [ address is whether the tripartite pacts that have been
concluded in the course of the 1990s are mere 'agents of deregulation', or
expressions of autonomous national policy-making. This question deals
with the contents of tripartite agreements. Are they aimed at wage restraint
or more flexibility in labour input as forms of adaptations to world market
conditions? Or is their main purpose to reallocate work as a means to
reduce unemployment without paying much attention to the effects of this
step upon labour flexibility? [n that case, the measures are taken irrespective
of globalization or even contrary to the requirements of globalization. The
tripartite agreements then point to autonomous national tripartite action in
shaping national labour conditions.
The second question deals with the nature of decision-making within
the limits of national autonomy. It is about the autonomy of the state in its
contacts with employers and trade unions. This question deals with the
form of the tripartite agreements. Are national governments able and will-
ing to carry through reforms within the framework of tripartite agreements,
even when facing employer and/or trade union opposition? [n the event
that the national government is willing to impose its own measures if agree-
ment cannot be reached, the subject of the measures remains a political
issue, with the possibility of political conflict, including (employer) non-
compliance and political strikes. In that case the issues concerned are not
'depoliticized', and full responsibility remains with the national govern-
ment. Such state initiatives point to ample room for autonomous state
action.
The answers to these two questions tell us something about national tri-
partite autonomy vis-li-vis globalization, and the autonomy of the national
government vis-a-vis employers and trade unions. (Of course, different kinds
of autonomy are involved here.) They provide the basis for an answer to the
third and most basic question, on the degree of convergence in labour rela-
166 Ham Slomp
tions. Do the changes, if any, in national autonomy and in the autonomy of
the state in its contacts with employers and trade unions result in conver-
gence of national industrial-relations systems in Western Europe?
4.1 THE THREE EUROPEAN PATTERNS OF LABOUR RELATIONS
The three European patterns of industrial relations distinguished here are
the British, the Gerrnanic European, and the Latin European ones. In the
British model, the enterprise is the main meeting point between ernployers
and trade unions; sector bargaining is not very widespread and national ne-
gotiations are absent. In this model, decentralized and informal bargaining
and conflict prevail. The core of the Germanic pattern consists of collective
bargaining at sector level. Germany excepted, national-level talks are also a
normal feature of labour relations and they provide frameworks for the sec-
tor agreements. Enterprise-level bargaining is limited by the sector agree-
ments. Compared with the other models, conflict is relatively rare in the
German pattern. The Latin type combines collective bargaining and conflict
at various levels, intermingled with political conflict about labour condi-
tions. Frequent deadlocks in the contacts between employers' associations
and trade unions are 'solved' by seeking state support, which transforms
labour conditions into political issues. Tripartism and national government
involvement have differed strongly along the lines of the three patterns (cf.
Slomp 1996).
In the British Isles, tripartism used to be a marginal phenomenon, if
practised at all, and state intervention in industrial relations (other than in
internal trade union affairs) has been rare. The high degree of division and
differentiation within the trade union movement and the decentralization
of labour relations have reinforced the rather strict demarcation line
between labour relations on the one hand and politics on the other. This
long tradition of separation was interrupted in Great Britain by Thatcher's
attack upon the trade unions, but has since been restored. Such a strict
demarcation line does not constitute a suitable precondition for nation-
wide tripartite talks.
In Germanic Europe, the preconditions for tripartism exist in the form
of centralized organizations. Social democratic trade unions prevail, in
which power is concentrated at national or sector level. All smaller German-
ic nations have their traditions of tripartism. In Scandinavia and the Alpine
Countries, the national government fulfils a minor role, in the Low Coun-
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tries the government occupies a prominent if not a dominant place. The lit-
erature on corporatism, concertation and tripartism has almost completely
focused on the smaller Germanic nations, with Austria as the brightest jewel
in the crown. In all these nations, consensus-seeking is at the heart of the
national-level contacts. In Germany, efforts of tripartism were scarce until
the 1990s. The only example was the short-lived Konzertierte Aktion of the
1960s. This difference between Germany and the smaller Germanic nations
is due to the weakness of the national peak organizations in Germany, and
to the general rejection of any kind of direct government interference in
labour relations in that country.
In Latin Europe, including France, the existence of communist trade
unions and the hostile attitude of employers towards any form of trade
unionism has not been conducive to collective bargaining, let alone negoti-
ations at national level. Moreover, trade unions and employers appreciate
spontaneous action more than in Germanic Europe, and this does not allow
for strict guidelines for sector-level union bargaining or for enterprise bar-
gaining. In all Latin European nations, tripartite meetings have been held,
but not on a regular basis. The national government is more involved in
labour relations as a target of trade union action than as a partner in tripar-
tism. Trade unions and employers alike attempt to get government support
for their position in labour relations, if need be by means of political strikes
or other action. The national governments themselves do not count on con-
sensus, but try to carry through state measures in spite of employer or trade
union opposition during tripartite meetings.
4.2 TRIPARTISM IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1990S
4.2.1 The British Isles
In Great Britain the absence of tripartism continued under the Conservative
governments of the last two decades. In 1992, even the last form of tripartite
talks, albeit highly specialized, within the framework of the tripartite
National Economic Development Council, was abolished. The Labour gov-
ernment has yet to undo this policy.
In contrast, Ireland has followed a different course. Despite the fact that
labour relations showed a number of similarities to those in Great Britain,
such as the high degree of differentiation within the trade union movement
and shop-floor bargaining, a number of tripartite agreements or 'under-
standings' had already been concluded during the 1970s. The contacts were
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renewed in 1987 and have intensified. Wage restraint has been the major
subject covered in the four national agreements that have been concluded
since then. The latest agreement, 'Partnership 2000', concluded in 1997, has
introduced something new in Western Europe, the extension of tripartism to
'Quatropartism', with four parties involved. In addition to the national gov-
ernment, employers and trade unions, a number of social organizations
have also taken part, including the movement of the unemployed, the 'Na-
tional Women's Council', and organizations engaged in social work. Their
participation should help to prevent social exclusion of the unemployed and
intensifY national cooperation in a society of 'partnership'. A Monitoring
Committee checks the observation of the agreements (cf. Thomas forthcom-
ing). The degree and nature of government involvement, aimed at wage
restraint, can be characterized as active and consensus-oriented.
4.2.2 Germanic Europe
In Germany, both the Christian democratic Chancellor Kohl and his social
democratic successor Schr6der have attempted to establish a Bilndnis filr
Arbeit (Alliance for Work). Both efforts have failed. In the smaller Germanic
nations, developments vary but in general tripartism continues.
The impression that tripartism is in decline has probably become popu-
lar due to the wide interest in Swedish labour relations. In the late 1980s,
the Swedish employers' confederation gave up central-level negotiations in
order to put an end to the alleged inflexibility of the Swedish economy (and
to the trade unions' power). Since that time the talks have not been re-
sumed. Despite short-lived bipartite talks, with occasional government par-
ticipation, on industrial relations reform, the Swedish government has
refrained from efforts to revive tripartism.
In the other Scandinavian countries, national-level talks have fared bet-
ter. In Norway, the national government participated in central-level negoti-
ations in 1993 and 1994, but the outcome was a bipartite pact, as is usual in
that country. In 1999, the three partners issued a common report on wage
moderation, as one of the steps in preparing a new two-year central agree-
ment. (Only a small cadre organization stayed aloof.) Government involve-
ment was limited but consensus-oriented, aimed at adaptation to interna-
tional conditions through wage restraint. (cf. EIRR 1999: 303). In Finland,
employers' associations and trade union confederations concluded a series
of bipartite pacts, the latest one in 1997. In fact, these bipartite pacts had a
tripartite character, since they involved government concessions in the tax
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system to compensate for wage restraint. The negotiations did not take long
and all organizations were content with the agreement. The government's
role may be characterized as active and consensus-seeking, aimed at wage
restraint. In Denmark, tripartism has focused on employment policies. A
new 'Tripartite Forum' and new tripartite committees were set up in 1998,
intended to promote a more active labour market policy. Governments have
voiced critical comments on the slowness of tripartite decision-making but
they have not given up tripartism. Wage moderation has not been a major
topic of the talks. The government was mainly concerned with increasing
labour flexibility. Its role may be characterized as active and consensus-
seeking.
The Low Countries have also gone their own separate ways. While the
Netherlands has become the international model of tripartism and concer-
tation, the Belgians have been less successful in organizing central talks. The
main ingredients of the Dutch 'Polder Model' are wage restraint and increas-
ing labour market flexibility in the form of part-time jobs (cf. Visser and
Hemerijck 1997). During the first half of the 1990s the relationship
between the social partners and the national government was rather con-
tentious, in particular concerning cuts in work disability benefits. In the sec-
ond half of the decade, there was hardly any difference in priorities among
the social partners themselves and between them and the government. The
social partners helped to solve disagreements within the government, and
the government facilitated collective bargaining by promising measures to
compensate for trade union or employer concessions. One of the highlights
of this system of concertation was the bipartite agreement 'Flexibility and
Security' in 1996, which became the basis of labour legislation that extend-
ed job security for part-timers, while shortening the long dismissal proce-
dure for full-timers (cf. Slomp forthcoming). Flexibility, then, was the main
purpose. The govenment's role was consensus-oriented.
In Belgium, the social partners have, without much success, tried to
revive the tradition of central 'interprofessional' pacts that were concluded
during the 1960s. The main bone of contention has been the compensation
that the employers and the national government offered in exchange for
moderation in trade unions' wage demands. In 1996, the parties were close
to an agreement but the socialist trade union confederation (the second
largest after the Catholic one) refused to sign it. The government then once
again imposed wage restraint. At last a new intersectoral agreement was
concluded at the end of 1998 under the threat of further state intervention.
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It contained flexible margins for sector and enterprise collective bargaining,
and also provided for the creation of large state funds to subsidize new jobs.
Due to the state's obligations involved in the agreement, the government's
role was active, and more consensual than before, but certainly less consen-
sual than in Scandinavia orthe Netherlands (cf. EIRR 1999: 301).
The Alpine countries have been most stable as regards social partnership
and tripartism. The Austrian Sozialpartner concluded an agreement in 1992
concerning the continuation of social partnership and compromise. They
have lived up to the spirit of the agreement, although both the employers
and the trade unions have become a little less compromising. That change
in their relations has allowed the government to assume a more active role
in deciding on the agenda of tripartism. An example of this growing state
initiative is the 1997 law on working time, which was negotiated between
the confederations, but under strong government pressure (cf. Kittel and
Talos 1998). The purpose was more flexibility in working time. Despite the
pressure it put on the unions, the government role was still a relatively con-
sensual one. Swiss developments are harder to evaluate, since Swiss concer-
tation has always been highly informal. The style of governance in the field
of labour conditions continues to be highly consensus-oriented.
4.2.3 Latin Europe
In France, the national government has organized a number of tripartite
conferences during the 1990s. At the end of 1995, the Caullist government
tried to terminate a series of strikes and other protest actions by means of
tripartite meetings but the conference remained without result. In 1997, the
socialist government convened another conference, this time to deal with
the 35-hour working week. Despite the fact that the employers furiously
opposed any shortening of the working week, the government published its
draft legislation shortly after the conference was closed. The bill had proba-
bly already been prepared before the conference, but it was not used as the
basis for discussion. The French government went its own way, without
adapting its proposals to the outcome of the tripartite talks. Since then, the
law has come into force but it has remained a bone of contention. Employ-
ers have demanded a postponement of the deadline contained in the law.
Interestingly, they were joined by the major trade union confederation, the
socialist CFDT, which argued in favour of more room for sector and enter-
prise bargaining. Autonomous state action continues to be characteristic of
French labour relations, with the government not much concerned about
consensus.
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In Spain, the economic reforms that were carried through by the social-
ist government during the 1980s also provoked a number of nationwide
strikes and a decrease in tripartite contacts. The employers were only inter-
ested in tripartism if it would end the extensive dismissal protection, which
was a remnant of the Franco regime. This employer interest was met by two
agreements (1994 and 1997). Other tripartite agreements, concluded with
the new conservative government in 1997, dealt with employment and col-
lective bargaining. The agreements offered a combination of labour flexibil-
ity and employment security. Several of the subjects were later covered by
social legislation. In 1998, the relations between the government and the
trade unions deteriorated, when the government refused to include a reduc-
tion in working time in its employment policies. However, at the end of that
year a new pact was signed after protracted negotiations. The pact stopped
short of tripartism, since the employers' confederation left the bargaining
table halfway through the negotiations and refused to sign. This shows that
the government, aiming at a better allocation of work rather than adapta-
tion to international conditions, was more interested in trade union acqui-
escence than in consensus. In contrast to the previous decades, the 1990s
were a decade of tripartite pacts in Portugal. Two agreements, in 1990 and
1996, reduced the working week. The pacts were not completely tripartite,
however, because the largest trade union confederation, dominated by com-
munists, refused to sign, despite the fact that it had participated in the ne-
gotiations. The absence of one trade union confederation reveals that the
Portuguese government was just as determined to reach consensus as its
Spanish counterpart.
Italy has the longest tradition of tripartism in Latin Europe. The deep
crisis in the political system, which completely reshaped the Italian political
landscape in the early 1990s, offered the trade unions ample opportunity to
influence the shaping of social and economic policies. A tripartite agree-
ment in 1992 sealed the fate of the famous scala mobile, the automatic
indexation of wages, which had been an important issue in many a political
strike. A second agreement. in 1993, changed the system of collective bar-
gaining. Henceforth wage negotiations would be a tripartite responsibility
and would take place within the limits that would be set by the government.
This change was also a major government victory, deemed necessary in
order to secure Italy's admission to the EMU. A new pact was signed in
1998, which dealt with the reduction of working hours. During the negotia-
tions, which were interrupted by a government breakdown, the new govern-
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ment gave up its effort to discuss a change in the collective bargaining sys-
tem, under pressure form the major trade union confederation (cf. EJRR
1999: 302). The developments are an indication of the government's initiat-
ing and consensual role, seeking adaptation to international conditions by
means of wage restraint and working-time reduction.
In Greece, a tradition of bipartite national agreements has been estab-
lished during the 1990s, with four two-year agreements. The government
has also announced plans to introduce part-time work throughout the pub-
lic sector and to change the national system of collective bargaining, in spite
of trade union announcements of political strikes against these proposals
(EIRR 1998: 291). The government takes the initiative but it is not con-
cerned with consensus in its search for more working-time flexibility.
4.3 TRIPARTlSM AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT:
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?
As this survey shows, Ireland is the most conspicuous newcomer to the club
of tripartite nations. Tripartism in that country has now been in existence
for more than ten years, after a few shortlived experiments during the 1970s.
It is no longer the British Isles that form an exception; Great Britain now
stands alone. The Irish case is all the more interesting since the structure of
its trade unionism and employers' association, which mirrors the British
one, would seem to forbid active central-level activities. In spite of the
absence of these institutional preconditions, the country has become an
innovator in tripartism. Except for Sweden, all countries with a tradition of
corporatism continued tripartite contacts during the second half of the
1990s. Until 1998, Belgium seemed to become a second exception, despite
the many attempts in that country to restore tripartism. In Germany, the
1990s have seen the most strenuous efforts to implant tripartism since the
1960s but so far without success. In Latin Europe, there seems to be a true
tripartism fever, which leaves no country unaffected. As in previous decades,
Italy is the champion of tripartism. Even Portugal has joined the movement
towards tripartism and concertation. formerly, the communist-dominated
trade union confederation was able to sabotage any kind of tripartite agree-
ment by calling protest strikes. Now its protest is confined to a refusal to
sign. France also paid lip service to the principle of tripartism, with more tri-
partite conferences than in any previous decade.
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Turning to the question concerning the contents of tripartism (wage
restraint and working-time flexibility versus reallocation of work), rnost of
the agreements deal with working-time flexibility and/or with wage rnoder-
ation, as strategies of adaptation to the world market. Working-time flexi-
bility prevails in Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Greece;
wage moderation in Ireland, Norway, finland, Belgium and Italy. Only in
two countries, France and Portugal, has the main aim been to introduce
general working-time reduction (referring to full-time working) in order to
reduce unemployment. Even taking into account these two countries, there
is no clear difference in the topics of tripartism between Germanic and Latin
Europe. The subjects that tripartism deals with do not point to great nation-
al autonomy. Coping with globalization seems to be the overriding con-
cern. While wage moderation is a traditional subject of tripartite agreements
in Europe (sometimes hiding some kind of statutory wage control), work-
ing-time flexibility is a new one. With the exception of France and Portugal,
all of Western Europe has adopted a well-tried method or experiments with
a new course to face the consequences of globalization.
With respect to the question concerning the nature of government
involvement in tripartism as a criterion of state autonomy, the three models
of industrial relations show more variation. In the smaller Germanic
nations, government involvement is still compromise-oriented. Govern-
ments do not 'force a breakthrough' in tripartite consultation by means of
threats. They only help to find a compromise by offering state compensa-
tion in return for employer or trade union concessions. In these countries,
the government's main function in tripartism is to widen the range of
'exchange' subjects. If their involvement does not lead to any result, no
agreement is forced upon the social partners. Governments are not willing
to jeopardize their position vis-tl-vis both parties by siding with one or the
other. Agreement counts more than result, or maybe even better: the main
result should be agreement. Belgium is an exception in the sense that, in the
event of disagreement, the national government has often imposed 'pack-
age deals' that did not meet with strong employer or trade union resistance.
Even Germany follows the rule of state 'neutrality', since the government
has refrained from imposing a bilateral Bundnis fur Arbei!.
In Latin Europe, tripartism has become popular, but not in the same
form as in Germanic Europe. Only in Italy have tripartite pacts been con-
cluded in a surprisingly fast sequence, which were applauded by all partici-
pants. In the other countries, governments have ignored opposition from
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either trade unions or employers. France is an extreme example in this
respect, with a government that had its proposals ready before the tripartite
conference, but did not discuss them during the meeting. Except for Italy,
tripartism in all Latin countries leaves the impression of serving as a pretext
for governments to implement state measures. Results count, not agree-
ment. In the nature of state involvement, then, the difference between the
two continental models persists notwithstanding globalization, with Ire-
land now joining the continental Germanic nations.
This difference between the two continental models does not refute the
more active role of the national government in both the Germanic and the
Latin model. In almost all cases the employers have, at most, expressed
lukewarm support for tripartism. They have frequently spoken out in favour
of decentralization but have been reluctant to give up sector bargaining and
central talks. The unions are willing to accept both wage moderation and
flexibility in labour conditions, but they demand compensation in the form
of reduction in working hours and more security for part-time workers. It is
the national government that is most interested in tripartism. Governments
are aware of the pressure of globalization and most anxious to maintain the
national economy's competitiveness by means of more flexibility. Almost
everywhere, it is the government that exercises strong initiative in tripartism
and, to some extent, decides on the agenda. During the tripartite meetings it
is also the national government that most impatiently awaits prompt
results. Growing state initiative and lack of patience point in the direction of
more state pressure to introduce reforms in labour conditions and labour
relations, as indicated by government impatience in Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Greece, Italy and Spain. However, only in Latin Europe does the gov-
ernment not even wait for the outcome of tripartite talks and introduces
flexibility or wage moderation, anyway.
5 Conclusion: Persisting Divergence in European Tripartism
Globalization and the need for more labour flexibility have not resulted in
less government activity in the field of labour conditions. On the contrary,
they have motivated national governments to display more initiative in call-
ing for tripartite agreements. The growing popularity of tripartism is an
indication of convergence in European labour relations. Tripartism has per-
sisted in countries in which it existed, and expanded to countries without a
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tradition of such national-level contacts. Only a few countries stay aloof
notably Great Britain and Germany. The conclusion that European labour
relations are converging is reinforced by the great similarities in the topics
of the tripartite talks: wage moderation and working-time flexibility. These
common themes seem to reaffirm the fact that the spread of tripartism, and
the convergence of labour relations on this specific point, is due to global-
ization.
I lowever, the spread of tripartism and the common topics addressed do
not permit a general conclusion of convergence of different European types
of labour relations as a consequence of globalization. In the nature of gov-
ernment involvement in tripartism and, accordingly, also in the nature of
tripartism, the variations between the Germanic and the Latin models are as
great as ever. Government intentions behind tripartite meetings differ, and
so do the results. In Latin Europe, national governments take autonomous
action in order to prepare the national economies for international compe-
tition, in Germanic Europe their action is confined to encouraging employ-
er/trade union compromise. The consensus-orientation of the Germanic
governments has not been affected by the urgency to introduce more labour
flexibility, and neither has the way in which Latin governments proceed
with tripartism. Although tripartism may look similar throughout Western
Europe, it continues to hide two different forms of decision-making: gov-
ernment-initiated and consensus-oriented in Germanic Europe, govern-
ment-imposed and result-oriented in Latin Europe. Globalization has, as
yet, not bridged that gap.
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Global Sisterhood and Political Change:
the Unhappy 'Marriage' of Women's
Movements and Nation States
Canny Roggeband and Mieke VeTloo
1 Introduction
Global sisterhood is perhaps not the most common example to highlight
the consequences of globalization, yet - as this chapter will show - it pro-
vides an interesting analysis of the relationship between the national and
the global level, and consequently for an answer to the question of the
importance of the nation state in a context of ongoing globalization. Glob-
al sisterhood, as a major concept in the history of the women's movement
that accentuates the common ground on which the global women's move-
ment is founded, has had very material consequences. The similarities
between women's movements across countries, not only at the level of their
problem definitions, but also in their strategic choices are striking. The con-
cept facilitated international diffusion. This can be seen as the cause of strik-
ing similarities between women's movements in countries that are very dif-
ferent indeed. In view of the existing political science literature on social
movements, this common ground and these similarities are hard to under-
stand. It seems that reality is at odds here with theories that link the rise
and fall of social movements sometimes exclusively to characteristics and
actions of nation slates.
The basic assumption of the central role of the state for social move-
ments poses a fundamental problem in a context of global diffusion of
problem definitions and strategies. The question that we will emphasize in
177
this chapter is: how did global sisterhood affect the role of the state as a
dominant counterpart for the movement? Our answer will be based on the-
oretical considerations and on empirical findings. Theoretically, we concen-
trate on establishing the circumstances under which social movements can
be affected by national political contexts. Empirically, we analyze two social
movements which show significant similarities whilst developing in very
different political contexts: the Dutch and the Spanish women's movements
against sexual violence.
2 The State and Social Movements
Most authors on social movements stress the connection between the state
and social movements. In fact, many authors have related the development
of national social movements to the rise of the modern state (cf. Tilly 1984;
Tarrow 1994; Marks and McAdam 1993). By introducing the concept of
governing at the mandate of the people, the modern democratic state has
legitimated the rise of a public civic culture. As Tarrow says: 'by producing
policies intended for large populations, and standardising the procedures
for citizens to use in their relations with authorities, states provided targets
for mobilization and cognitive frameworks in which challenging groups
could compare the situations to more favoured constituencies and find
allies' (Tarrow 1994: 66).
Even if one tries to define a social movement, the state often takes up a
central position, as in Tilly's definition of social movements as a sustained
series of interactions between a challenging group and the state (cf. Tilly
1984). The connection is complex though, as the state has multiple roles to
play with respect to social movements. The nation state is seen 'simultane-
ously as a target, sponsor and antagonist for social movements as well as the
organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory' (Craig Jenkins
and Klandermans 1995: 3).
In political science literature, the relationship between nation states and
social movements does not hold centre stage. Studies on politics tend to
accentuate the representational system, while studies on social movements
concentrate on the movements themselves, rather than their interaction
with the state. There is, however, one major exception. Since the 1980s, the
Political Process Approach (PPA) has emphasized the relevance of the state
for social movements, linking 'the mobilization of social movements close-
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Iy to conventional politics in the parliamentary and extraparliamentary are-
nas of a given country' (Kriesi et al. 1995: xii; cf. also Craig lenkins and
Klandermans 1995). According to the PPA there exists a 'marriage' between
social movements and the state.
Following Eisinger (1973), Kriesi et al. present a model for the political
context of mobilization of social movements, the so-called political oppor-
tunities structure. According to the PPA, four characteristics of the (nation-
al) political context determine the chances of facilitation, repression or
reform with respect to the rise and fall of social movements. First, there is
the existing configuration of political cleavages. In countries where there are
'old' cleavages, newly arising social movements will run the risk of getting
split up between these cleavages. The women's movement in Belgium, for
instance, automatically divided along the old language lines. This consider-
ably weakened the movement. The chances of success for social movements
will be higher if there are no strong established cleavages. Second, the for-
mal institutional structures (the parliamentary arena, the administrative
arena, and the direct democracy arena) are important. The characteristics of
these arenas define the degree of openness of a state and its strength. If the
state is weak and/or has multiple possibilities for access, there are more
chances of facilitation. The third element consists of the prevailing informal
strategies towards challengers of the state (characterized by exclusion of
integration). If the state has a tradition of inclusive strategies, opportunities
for movements are more favourable. Finally, there are the differences in
power between the political parties and the resulting chances of alliances
with those parties. For social movements, the position of the Left is consid-
ered to be most important. If the Left is in opposition and strong, possibili-
ties of alliances and facilitation are judged to be most favourable. If the par-
ties at the Left are in power there is a chance of reform that may abolish the
need for a social movement. If Left parties are part of a coalition govern-
ment it is possible that they will not be able to facilitate social movements.
So far the PPA has been used in a large number of comparative studies,
which focus almost exclusively on the explanation of differences in social
movements in countries with stable and established democracies. Accord-
ing to Kriesi et al. (1995: 248), the theoretical framework of the PPA is not
already antiquated in the light of the process of globalization, but will only
need some extension: it should suffice to include 'supranational political
opportunities' in addition to the existing national opportunities. As we
argue in this chapter, the potential shift of political opportunities to a high-
er level is but one of the problems facing the PPA.
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3 The Impact of Nation States on Social Movements:
Theoretical Considerations
Are social movements indeed 'married' to the nation state, and if so, to what
extent? firstly, social movements can only be 'married' to a nation state to
the extent that they define the issues that they address as national issues
and/or if they choose organizational structures that follow national lines.
Social movements can have other options, depending on their goals. In real·
ity, some movements partly define the issues they address as national issues,
while others emphasize the importance of the market or of primary rela·
tionships. Secondly, social movements can be 'married' to the nation state
to the extent that they define the issues they address as issues that ask for
political change by means of national political actors. The range of issues
and strategies of social movements can involve a wider scope. The changes
they try to accomplish need not only concern the traditional issues regulat·
ed by nation states. Therefore, social movements often aim at a mix of polit-
ical, cultural, social and economic change. The PPA fails to acknowledge the
importance of movements aiming at cultural change, and cannot develop a
theoretical analysis of the impact of the political opportunity structure on
social movements of this type. Thirdly, the extent to which social move-
ments are 'married' to a national political context is related to their perspec-
tive of the state. Primitive analyses of the state were in the habit of noting
that there were problems out there in society, and that the role of the state
was to develop policies to solve these problems. However, the state cannot
be seen as - or only as - a neutral institution to solve societal problems. It
also has to be seen as part of the problem (cf. Outshoorn 1987). If a move-
ment defines the state as part of the problem, then the state can be a target
or an antagonist, but never an easy ally or a sponsor of the movement. In
general, social movements can only be 'married' to the nation state if they
envision the state as a part of the solution, and not as part of the problem.
Finally, the importance of the national political context is dependent on the
power of the nation state compared to lower or higher levels of political reg-
ulation. The more the state transfers its competencies to a supranational or
regional level, the more this level can replace the state in its role as a coun-
terpart for social movements.
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4 The Impact of Nation States on Women's Movements:
an Empirical Perspective!
The Dutch and the Spanish states are very different indeed. A comparison
between the political systems of the Netherlands and Spain reveals a large
divergence in those characteristics of the states that, at least according to the
PPA, determine the mobilization potential of social movements. The
Netherlands has a long and stable democratic tradition, whereas Spain has
had democratic rule only since 1975, when the authoritarian Franco regime
collapsed. The Franco dictatorship denied citizens elementary freedoms,
such as the freedom to meet and form associations. This explains the
absence in Spain of a civic society tradition and the emergence of social
movements before 1975. In contrast, the Netherlands has a strong tradition
of civic society with a large number of civic organizations and interest
groups.
Spain and the Netherlands also differ on the element of cleavages. In the
Netherlands the traditional class and religious cleavages had been pacified
by a system of 'pillarization', which created space for new social movements
to mobilize. In Spain, the traditional regional cleavage re-emerged when the
highly centralized Franco-regime broke down. Regionalism became a para-
mount political issue in contemporary Spain, limiting the space for other
'new' political demands by social movements. The conditions for the emer-
gence of new social movements and their demands were thus very different
between the two countries, leaving far less space for new political demands
in Spain than in the Netherlands.
If we compare other characteristics of the (national) political context
mentioned in the rrA, we find more important differences. The formal
institutional structure of the Netherlands permits many possibilities for
access for social movements, because of its open electoral system, relatively
heterogeneous coalitions and a strong functional decentralization, where
interest groups are incorporated in the policy-making process. In Spain,
however, the access of social movements has remained limited because of
the closed character of the public administration, even if the high degree of
decentralization results in more points of access. Even the 'Institute for
Women's Affairs' (Instituto de la Mujer), created by the government in
response to feminist demands, remains a very closed institute (Valiente
1995). The position of the parliament is constitutionally weak and its
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weakness was further exacerbated between 1982 and 1993 by the lack of a
strong or effective opposition. Between 1982 and 1989 the socialist party
ruled by an absolute majority.
The prevailing informal strategies of the authorities towards new social
movements in both countries reflect the differences in their respective politi-
cal history. The Netherlands sought to resolve religious conflicts in the past
by applying integrative strategies, resulting in a 'pillarized structure' or
'consociational democracy' (cf Lijphart 1969). The new social movements
that emerged in the 1960s also met with favourable informal strategies of in-
tegration and facilitation (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995: 112; Duyvendak et al. 1992:
52). In Spain, in contrast, political authorities have essentially continued the
tradition of exclusion established during the dictatorship, by adopting a sta-
tist and non-cooperative policy style with low levels of political and social
participation of civil organizations (Colomer 1996: 196).
The last difference between the two countries, relevant according to the
PPA, concerns the position of the Left. In Spain, the Socialist Party (PSOE),
which gained an absolute majority in 1982, could afford to neglect the
demands of social movements, wbile other Left parties (Communists,
Greens, etc.) faced major internal crises. Both factors resulted in what Hey-
wood (1995: 184) calls 'the crisis of representation' for new social move-
ments. This situation of exclusion has changed somewhat since the early
1990s. With the loss of the PSOE's strong position in the 1993 elections,
parliament was able to start regaining some of the initiative it had lost dur-
ing the preceding fifteen years. In the Netherlands, the political landscape
has been more diverse, providing social movements with better opportuni-
ties for finding allies. The Dutch social democrats (PvdA) have been recep-
tive to new social movements since the early 1970s. A PvdA-dominated gov-
ernment created favourable opportunities for social movements. When the
PvdA was forced back in opposition into 1977, the link between the party
and new social movements became even stronger. During the first half of
the 1980s the strategy of the PvdA with respect to new social movements
was one of strong facilitation, which continued during the short participa-
tion in government from September 1981 to May 1982. During the second
half of the 1980s, the PvdA's links with new social movements were weak-
ened or sometimes even severed as a result of a new party strategy designed
to regain acceptability as a coalition partner.
Summarizing our findings, the political opportunities for the Dutch
women's movement against sexual violence were generally more favourable
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than for their Spanish counterparts. Because of these differences one would,
according to the PPA, expect to find important differences between the
Dutch and Spanish women's movements. Research on two branches of the
women's movement against sexual violence, however, reveals striking simi-
larities.
5 The Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence in the
Netherlands and Spain
5. t DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch women's movement against domestic violence emerged in 1974,
as a clear example of the international transfer of movement strategies. A
group of women working at a Youth Advice Centre was dissatisfied with the
way traditional services treated women's problems. Soon the group decided
10 focus on violence against women: at that time a very central issue in the
United States' women's movement. After reading a newspaper article about
Ihe recently opened Chiswick shelter for battered women in London, the
theme of wife beating emerged. In the spring of 1974, the Dutch women
visited the London initiative, and a few months later they opened a similar
shelter-service in Amsterdam under the expressive name: 'Don't touch my
body' (Blijf van mijn lijj).
The shelter was set up without any direct government facilitation. They
'squatted' in an old orphanage and furnished it with flea-market furniture.
The project was run by volunteers. Later, the group found out that residents
of the refuge were entitled to social security benefits, making it possible to
ask them for a financial contribution. Apart from providing shelter, the
group wanted to capture the public's interest with respecI to the issue of
wife beating. Wife beating was considered a non-existent problem in the
eyes of the traditional political institutions and the public. Within a few
days the shelter was filled with women and children escaping from beatings
or other forms of abuse by husbands or boyfriends. This made clear that the
problem was a real one and was widespread. Very soon, 'Don't touch my
body' became a name that everybody had heard of. The Amsterdam shelter
served as a model for an expanding movement. In 1982, 18 shelters existed
in the Netherlands and three years laler, in 1985, the movement reached a
peak with 23 shelters operating under the name and according to the prin-
ciples of 'Don't touch my body'.
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Autonomy has been an important theme in the movement for battered
women, at the individual as well as the institutional level. The state was
seen as an important threat to this autonomy. Therefore, the movement
adopted a separatist, independent strategy. The groups defined wife beating
as a structural and political problem, involving social and political change.
Shelters were seen as an escape from violence, providing women with a
remedy largely independent of a patriarchal state. However, at the end of
the 1970s various shelters lacked the appropriate resources due to the high
number of women seeking help, and decided to apply for state subsidies.
This caused great internal conflicts, as many activists feared that state fund-
ing would endanger their feminist principles. llowever, for many shelters
the choice was between closing down or applying for a subsidy. With the
help of Leftist parties the shelter-services successfully negotiated a specific
regulation, leaving the feminist principles of the shelters (self-help, volun-
tary staff and a collectivist organization model) intact.
In 1985, this agreement was threatened by a proposal of the govern-
ment to decentralize the financial responsibility for the shelters. The shel-
ters protested against this decision, because they feared 'political arbitrari-
ness' of local and regional authorities, which might lead to the closure of
some shelters. In the movement's ideology violence against women should
be considered an issue of national importance, and therefore the responsi-
bility of the central government. It took a while before the national author-
ities agreed. In November 1985, a massive national action was organized
and two weeks later the socialists, christian democrats and new left parties
proposed a motion to postpone decentralization. As a result of political
pressure the government decided to reconsider its plans.
However, this decision hardly felt like a victory, as the decentralization
plans had not been completely withdrawn. Moreover, most groups strug-
gled with internal problems: many activists and volunteers had left the
organization out of discontent with the growing grip of the state on the
shelters. At the same time, it became more and more difficult to attract vol-
unteers. Therefore, in most of the shelters it was decided to professionalize.
By the end of the 1980s most shelters had been transformed into profes-
sional organizations trying to hold on to their feminist principles of self-
help and a collectivist style of organization. The result was a rather hybrid
type of organization, more and more dependent on state funding. In
December 1993, the (christian democratic and socialist) government again
announced the decentralization of the shelters. This time protests were
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weak. In January 1994, the financial responsibility for the shelters was
transferred 10 the regional authorities, forcing some shelters to merge with
other (non-feminist) services for battered women.
5.2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SPAIN
Even if the Spanish movement against domestic violence started to mobi-
lize almost a decade later than their Dutch counterparts, they chose the
same model. In the 1980s Crup I'Alba in Barcelona, a group of professional
women (among them social workers, psychologists and lawyers), like their
Dutch counterparts, planned to open a refuge modelled upon the pioneer
shelter in Chiswick. In 1982 they applied for a subsidy to start a shelter for
battered women. However, the local government in Barcelona granted only
a small subsidy to set up a pilot-project. According to the local authorities
the need for such a service and the size of the problem had first to be exam-
ined. The group used the local funding to create an information and assis-
tance service for battered women instead of a shelter. Despite the promises
of the local authorities of Barcelona, the group had to wait four more years
before they were finally able to realize their original shelter-project. In the
intervening years, initiatives for shelter-services by other groups in various
parts of the country were supported.
The first Spanish shelter for battered women was opened in Madrid in
1984. It was initiated by various groups, including the 'Commission for the
Investigation of Wife-Beating', a group operating at national level that
mainly aimed at raising public awareness and placing the issue on the politi-
cal agenda. Soon after, more shelters were opened, and at the beginning of
1990, 37 shelters existed.
In contrast with the Dutch case, the shelters were created with funding
from regional and local governments. This meant an early contact with the
(decentralized) state limiting the available options for the movement. Like
their Dutch counterparts, Spanish feminists feared cooptation, but it was
simply impossible to create a shelter without government aid. The opposi-
tion against state funding was not only weak for pragmatic reasons, it also
reflected a change in the global feminist vision of the state in the 1980s.
Whereas in the 1970s radical feminism envisioned the state as an important
part of the problem (cf. Hanmer 1978), in the 1980s activists gradually
turned to the state for solutions. Deficiencies in the criminal justice system
and a lack of police response caused large problems for victims and resulted
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in a demand for institutional, political change. The Spanish women's move-
ment saw wife beating as a structural and political problem and therefore a
state responsibility.
The shelters were organized non-hierarchically, with a collectivist style
of working and decision-making. In most cases the shelters did not provide
therapeutic assistance; self-help was their basic principle. For the paid Span-
ish workers, the economic independence of women was an important fem-
inist goal. State subsidies and professional workers created a movement
with fewer accents on activism. In the middle of the 1980s the issue of wife
beating entered the political agenda, due to the lobbying efforts of the
women's movement, in particular the 'Commission for the Investigation of
Wife-Beating', which had close ties with the ruling Socialist Party. The Sen-
ate commissioned a special group to study the phenomenon. lt consulted
relevant literature and international policy documents on violence against
women, collected data on the incidence of wife beating in Spain and held
interviews with professionals. In its final report, published in 1989, the
group recommended measures to prevent battering, and adopted one of the
central demands of the women's movement, the inclusion of wife beating
in the Penal Code. After an intensive campaign by the women's movement,
the Penal Code was changed in November 1989. The new Code included
battering as a crime, although the juridical description of the crime re-
mained rather vague.
From the early 1990s the Spanish (socialist) governments became more
actively involved in the creation of shelter-services by providing subsidies.
As a result, the number of shelters increased enormously. The financial
responsibility for the refuges is in the hands of the regional and local
authorities, which has led to large differences in available resources between
the shelter-services in different autonomous regions. These regional differ-
ences block cooperation between the regions. Several initiatives have been
taken to overcome this. In 1987, a network and a 'Refuge Coordinator' were
established, funded by a small subsidy from the 'Women's Institute'. One
important aim of the cooperation network was to stimulate exchange and
cooperation between the shelters and to develop common criteria and a
model for the shelters. In addition, the network aimed to be a political pres-
sure group. The main demand was to formulate central regulations and cri-
teria for the shelters, in order to diminish the alarming regional differences
in resources between the shelters. However, the government did not
respond. In addition, the battered women's movement showed its concern
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about the 'symbolism' of most government actions over the last five years,
the lack of personal and material resources and the lack of a vision on how
to provide assistance to the victims of ill treatment. Up until the end of the
1990s, the movement did not succeed in convincing the government of the
need to formulate a national policy to combat violence against women.
5.3 THE DUTCH AND SPANISH MOVEMENTS ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COMPARED
When we compare both movements, we see similarities as well as differ-
ences. The most striking similarities are the definition of the problem and
the choice of the basic strategy (shelters). The similarities in the definition
of the problem and the choice of strategy can easily be understood as the
result of a process of globalization, of international diffusion of informa-
tion between women's movements. At the same time, the role of political
opportunities at national level also is clearly visible. In fact, for almost all
differences that have been found, the state is the explaining factor.
First of all, the timing of both movements is different, Spain being
almost a decade later than the Netherlands. Here, the national political con-
text is the most logical explanation. In Spain, democracy had to develop
before social movements could. Another difference is found in the relation-
ship between the women's movement and the state. In the Netherlands, the
state was seen as part of the problem for a long time, which caused strong
frictions between the movement and the authorities. In Spain, the state was
seen as part of the solution, resulting in an early engagement with the state.
This difference can be explained, partly at least, by the difference in timing.
Feminist interpretations of the role of the state changed over time. Earlier
global analyses presented patriarchy as a total institution, of which the state
was a part, ensuring women's oppression both in the private and public
sphere. Accordingly, the state was seen as part of the problem. By the early
1980s, analyses had become more subtle, and it was agreed that the state
could also he an ally in the fight against patriarchy. Next to this, it is also
clear that in Spain, in 1984, there were hardly any alternatives for an
alliance with the state, as there was not yet a civil society of any importance,
whereas the women's movement in the Netherlands could afford to be
more radical, because of its greater access to possible allies and resources
outside the state. During the 1980s the Dutch movement became increas-
ingly involved with the state, which gradually resulted in a more assimilated
Clobal Si.'iferhood and Political Change 187
and moderate movement. However, the feminist component of the services
still remains, specifically in the definition of the problem.
A last set of differences concerns the various levels of political regula-
tion. In the Netherlands, the national level is dominant and most visible in
attempts by the government to force cooperation between local organiza-
tions. Later on, the state decentralized its responsibilities. In Spain the
national and regional levels have a distinct role. With respect to attempts to
change the legal code the national level is dominant, but as far as the facili-
tation of the movement is concerned, the regional level is all important.
5.4 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
The roots of the Dutch movement against sexual harassment are American,
yet, in its further development, the Dutch state has played an important
role. The issue of sexual harassment was raised in 1980 in a particular ini-
tiative by two feminists who decided to copy an American survey on sexual
harassment, 10 provoke a discussion on the issue in the Netherlands. As in
the US, the survey was placed in a popular women's magazine and attracted
a lot of attention and reactions. The initiators then contacted the women's
department of the largest trade union, rNV, to ask for cooperation. The
trade union women reacted positively, as the issue of sexual harassment had
already been discussed at various times during their team meetings. This
cooperation was the start of a working group on 'unwanted sexual intima-
cies in the workplace' (the Dutch equivalent of sexual harassment). The
main aim of the group was to make the problem visible, to prevent sexual
harassment and to offer support to the victims. They defined sexual harass-
ment as one of the dimensions of the unequal power relations between
men and women. The group started to look for political access right from
the start, and demanded a legal framework to prevent and combat sexual
harassment. lledy d'Ancona, a former feminist activist, who became state
secretary for women's affairs in 1981, supported this claim. She incorporat-
ed the 'new' issue in her plans for an integral policy to combat sexual vio-
lence against women. The working group's recommendations for this policy
were adopted in the policy document already commissioned by d'Ancona's
predecessor. One of these recommendations was to start a national 'com-
plaints office'. In 1984 the working group received state funding to create
this office. The complaints office, which chose the activist name 'Hands Off'
(Handen Thuis), started as a service for victims but after a few years devel-
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oped into a consultancy office for labour organizations. Tbe complaints
office was a highly innovative project, which gave the Netherlands the status
of a pioneer within the European lInion. The Dutch government also com-
missioned an extensive study on sexual harassment (Projectgroep Vrouwe-
narbeid, 1986). The authors of this study made a comprehensive analysis of
the mechanisms of sexual harassment, which resulted in a more thoughtful
vision on the relation between gender/power-relations and the incidence of
sexual harassment.
In 1984, d'Ancona was appointed rapporteur for the European Union on
sexual harassment. In addition, the Dutch government started to put on
pressure at Ell-level to make sexual harassment an Ell-policy issue, and to
conduct an investigation into the issue of sexual harassment. This study, by
Michael Rubinstein, revealed that policies to combat sexual harassment
were largely absent in the Ell-member states, and recommended regula-
tions to prevent sexual harassment. The Commission, in response, pro-
duced a Code of Practice, with more symbolic than legal value (Collins
1996: 27). Despite the Dutch government's pressure for policies at Ell-level,
at national level no steps were taken to formulate specific regulations to pre-
vent sexual harassment. In 1991, the state subsidy of 'Hands Off was even
cancelled as the Dutch government saw possibilities for a commercial ser-
vice that indeed proved to be able to operate successfully. In 1994, the
Dutch government finally came up with a specific law to prevent sexual
harassment. In this law sexual harassment is defined as a problem of labour
conditions. According to the law, employers have the duty to protect their
workers against sexual harassment. The law has had some effect, as more
than 50 per cent of the collective labour agreements in 1998 contained a
paragraph on sexual harassment.
5.5 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SPAIN
The roots of the Spanish movement are American too, but here the diffusion
route was longer. The impetus came from discussions within the Interna-
tional Federation of Trade lInions, which edited a guide on sexual harass-
ment in 1986. This guide, translated into various languages including Span-
ish, helped the Spanish women's movement to put pressure on their trade
unions to put the issue of sexual harassment on the agenda. In 1987, women
within the trade union lICD initiated a survey on the incidence of sexual ha-
rassment in the workplace. They mainly aimed at consciousness-raising both
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within and outside the union, putting the emphasis on problem visibility,
prevention and legal action. This resulted in several internal circulars and in-
formation brochures for union members and the wider public.
The Spanish women's movement defined sexual harassment as a dimen-
sion of the unequal power-relations between men and women, basing
themselves upon the trade union guide and feminist literature from the US.
Inspired by the American feminist theorist Catherine MacKinnon, they
made a clear distinction between sexual blackmail and sexual harassment,
and decided to put a stronger emphasis on the struggle against sexual black-
mail (by superiors) than on sexual harassment (by colleagues). They also
feared that the second issue would not be taken seriously in a cultural con-
text where friendly touching and giving compliments about one's looks is
considered as having a positive cultural value. Moreover, they judged the
American discussions and regulations as exaggerated and puritan, likely to
be ridiculed in the Spanish context.
Spain was remarkably fast in introducing specific regulation against sex-
ual harassment. This can be explained by two factors. First, the connection
of the issue of sexual harassment with labour-relations made it easier to
define it as a political issue, as the ruling PSOE put strong emphasis on eco-
nomic policies and framed equal rights policy mainly in terms of the redis-
tribution of work. Second, an important impetus for this initiative came
from the EU-Ievel. The study by Rubinstein (1987) revealed that Spain was
one of the few Ell-members without any policy to combat sexual harass-
ment. A reform of the 'Workers Statute' in 1989 offered an easy possibility
to introduce specific regulation on sexual harassment. A new paragraph was
introduced to ensure respect for a person's intimacy and dignity, including
protection against verbal or physical insults of a sexual nature. This legal
measure was defended by the ruling Socialist Party by indicating initiatives
to combat sexual harassment in other economically and politically 'more
developed' countries (cf. Valiente 1995: 217). However, the new regulation
had more symbolic than legal value, for no sanctions are introduced against
employers who do not properly protect their employees against sexual
harassment. Finally, in 1995, with the reform of the Penal Code, sexual
harassment perpetrated by superiors was introduced as a criminal offence.
The trade unions have remained a target for the Spanish women's move-
ment. To some extent trade union women have been able to press for the
introduction of the issue of sexual harassment in the negotiations on col-
lective labour agreements. The results, however, have been meagre. In 1997
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only 30 per cent of all collective labour agreements made any reference to
the problem of sexual harassment. Also, the trade unions did not develop
any specific services for complaints by victims or advice to labour organiza-
tions. In reaction to this, a special organization was initiated in 1998 to treat
complaints on sexual harassment and to provide psychological and legal
assistance to the victims of sexual harassment.
5.6 THE DUTCH AND SPANISH MOVEMENTS ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT COMPARED
Comparing both movements, again some similarities are striking. First of
all, the basic problem of definition is the same, due to the use of the same
(American) references. This similarity is the result of a diffusion process in
which Dutch problem definitions and strategies also played a role. With
respect to feminist issues, the Netherlands had a strong influence on the
European Union, while the latter had a strong influence on Spain. In the
Netherlands, the state secretary for emancipation affairs had taken the first
steps to develop a policy on sexual violence against women, and she trans-
ferred the experiences of the Netherlands to the European Union when she
was chosen as rapporteur to the European Parliament. She was strongly
backed by the Dutch government, which relished the opportunity to be
seen as a pioneer in matters of equality policies. Spain proved to be sensitive
to European Union pressure in these matters, because the country did not
want to be considered as backward. Moreover, the Spanish move towards
the European Union made it possible for the movement to present Euro-
pean documents as a model for Spain. The European Union acted as an
alliance partner by asking the Spanish government to comply with Euro-
pean agreements in this matter. [n this case, both diffusion processes and
the international political context were more important than the national
political opportunity structure.
Nevertheless, the state has been an important actor in both countries.
The issue of sexual harassment was rapidly adopted as a policy issue. The
fact that the issue of sexual harassment was defined as a labour issue made
it easier to connect it to 'traditional' politics and redefine it as a political
issue. However, the strategies chosen varied. Whereas the Dutch state adopt-
ed the integrative strategy of subsidizing a women's movement initiative,
the Spanish state opted for (symbolic) regulation of sexual harassment in
the 'Workers Statute'. These rapid successes caused demobilization and
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deradicalization. As a result, in both countries these branches of the move-
ment remained rather weak.
In both countries, the women's movement made use of the trade unions
to gain easier access to the political system. In the Netherlands the discus-
sion on sexual harassment was started by an autonomous group, which
formed an alliance with the trade unions at an early stage. In Spain there
was no independent group, as the whole issue had been brought forward by
the trade unions. Support from the Left was also manifest. The PSOE put
strong emphasis on economic policies and the 'Europeanization' of Spain,
and this facilitated the introduction of sexual harassment on the political
agenda.
In the course of time, a difference arose with regard to the definition of
the very problem. In Spain, Spanish 'culture' was the base for a choice to
make a distinction between two types of sexual harassment, resulting in dif-
ferentiated claims and demands on the state, whereas in the Netherlands no
such distinction was made.
6 Conclusions
The women's movement against sexual violence framed its issue as a global
one. Therefore it is interesting to see where the nation state entered the pic-
ture. The striking similarities between the movement in both Spain and the
Netherlands can be traced to international diffusion processes. The concept
of global sisterhood - the idea that women face the same problems every-
where and therefore should fight women's oppression together - served as a
powerful tool for the diffusion of ideas and development of strategies.
Although in both countries the women's movement started with an
international impetus and saw itself as part of a global project, after a cer-
tain time in both countries the movement became more and more 'contex-
tualized' and more involved with the nation state. Strategic choices and
organizational structures of the women's movement against sexual violence
were partly made to fit the national political opportunity structure, but the
movement continued to be strongly influenced by feminist ideology. How-
ever, the manner in which the activists framed the issues continued to influ-
ence their stance towards the state and the strategies they adopted in rela-
tion to it. Despite state pressures for conformity, feminist groups tried to
remain as close as possible to their original ideological commitments.
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In the Netherlands, the combination of a global problem definition, a
negative perspective on the state and the availability of independent
resources resulted in a movement that was, at first, very autonomous. Strate-
gic choices at that time were hardly influenced by the state. The rise of the
movement against domestic violence in the Netherlands, for instance, was
largely independent of direct opportunities provided by the state. The
movement against domestic violence chose to pursue their double goal of
assisting victims and changing public opinion without any direct appeal to
the state. The movement was facilitated by non-state actors and made use of
resources indirectly provided by the welfare state (social security benefits).
Elements of political culture were also important: the Dutch policy of toler-
ance towards 'squatting' facilitated the use of squatting as a strategy for shel-
ters. Quite soon, however, the movement became more and more involved
with the state for two main reasons. First, as the demand for services was
growing and resources became scarce, the movement decided to turn to the
state for additional resources. Second, feminist perspectives of the state
became more subtle, and legal transformation became a third goal. This
resulted in a process of growing state dependency and state influence.
Spain entered the stage at a time when global feminist perspectives of
the state no longer blocked alliances with the state. As independent
resources were almost non-existent, this resulted in an early dependency on
the state, especially at regional level. This also explains the later emergence
of a Spanish movement: resources for social movements were not available
until the victory of the PSOE in 1982. In Spain, national political opportu-
nities seem to have been decisive for the timing of the emergence of the
women's movement. The state was the important facilitator for the move-
ment against domestic violence, but trade unions and the EU were the most
important allies for the movement against sexual harassment. Diffusion still
played an important role when EU-policies were used as a lever for changes
at national level. The global definition of the problem was, however, miti-
gated by cultural differences in Spain, when the Spanish movement against
sexual harassment decided to put stronger emphasis on sexual blackmail
than on other forms of harassment.
A major victory for both movements has been the recognition of sexual
violence as a political and social problem. The vision of sexual violence as a
political, and not a private problem, has become the dominant and widely
accepted perspective. Public opinion has changed, and the call on the state
to accept its responsibility for protecting its citizens against sexual violence
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has been successful. The shelters, as a strategy for assisting the victims of
domestic violence, have now become regular state-subsidized services. The
existence and level of state funding for the movement's programmes are evi-
dence of concessions won, but the requirements of the state in return limit
this success. The state has been challenged, but in taking up the challenge
and responding to it, the state has not been weakened. On the contrary, the
state has strengthened its position by enlarging the scope of its responsibil-
ity towards the private sphere.
The story of this political success, however, transcends the dynamics of
the nation state. Although, as far as the adaptation of legal codes and proce-
dures is concerned, the classic elements of the political opportunity struc-
ture are clearly dominant - the element that seems to be most important
here is the support from the Left - the contextual differences were not limit-
ed to the four elements distinguished by the PPA. The concept of political
opportunity structure should be extended, at national level, to incorporate
institutionalized interest groups such as trade unions, and by the level and
quality of welfare-state provisions. As far as the supranational level is con-
cerned, the PPA should include international organizations such as the
United Nations and the European Union, as these turned out to play an
important role in facilitating social movements.
The result of this study shows that, even in the case of global diffusion
of problem definitions and movement strategies, the nation state did not
lose its potential as an important counterpart for social movements. More-
over, our findings lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the women's
movement, by challenging the state to make sexual violence against women
a political problem, actually strengthened the state by enlarging its respon-
sibility to protect its citizens, even in the sphere of primary relationships.
A comparison between feminist movements in Spain and the Netherlands should allow
for an investigation of the connection between social movements and the state, because
of the existence of important similarities between these movements in Spain and the
Netherlands in combination with important differences in the structure of political
opportunities as defined by the PPA.
194 Canny Roggeband and Miehe Ver/oo
11
Conclusion: Developing the Research Agenda
Kees van Kersbergen, Robert H. Lieshour and Grahame Lock
We have already glimpsed, in the various contributions to this volume, a
selected sample of the questions that must be dealt with in any serious con-
sideration of the theme of internationalization or globalization in its rela-
tion to the topic of change in the form and function of the nation state. Our
own hypothetical point of departure was that 'the nation state is a historical
phenomenon that is enduring yet variable'. This hypothesis is still in the
process of being investigated and tested.
The authors represented in the volume are generally critical of the 'glob-
alization thesis', in particular insofar as this thesis presupposes or implies
the future irrelevance of the nation state as a unit of governance. The claim,
for example, that the construction of the European Union is in effect sub-
verting the sovereignty of its member states is subjected to a number of crit-
ical counter-arguments. But this debate will, of course, not be settled by the
publication of this book: much more work remains to be done, both theo-
retical or analytical and empirical.
The conclusions to be drawn from an investigation of recent develop-
ments in the international system are, of course, always dependent on the
theory applied in the analysis. Hout and Lieshout, for instance, present a
study that takes account of this need to develop an adequate theoretical
framework for making sense of recent changes. But what framework is
required to make sense of future changes? Will the same approach suffice or
do the changes in political reality demand a reorientation in theoretical
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approach? The authors issue a warning in this connection: although it is
impossible to guarantee that developments in the field will follow a partic-
ular line, it would be unwise to suppose that the future will differ struc-
turally from the order which we know. After all, the Westphalian state sys-
tem, which has long dominated international politics, does not at present
face a serious challenge, in the sense that there are still no obvious alterna-
tives; that is to say, no institutional entities as 'effective and efficient' as the
state1
Van Kersbergen, too, is concerned with the impact of internationalization
and European integration on the nation state and particularly, again, on the
latter's alleged loss of sovereignty. For him, the nation state remains a cen-
tral player in the international power game, including and indeed especially
in situations where the degree of cooperation at an international level is
increasing. Also at the national level the state remains a powerful actor. In
short, the 'powerless state' is a myth. Future research might begin to look
into the question of what the origins and functions of this myth are, and
whether changing political circumstances at the national, European and
global level will necessitate its ideological reworking.
What is at stake in these fields of research is not just the reliability of any
attempt to predict the fate of the nation state in an internationalizing or
globalizing world, but the question of the theoretical instruments to be
used in any such project. Lock in his contribution claims that the revolu-
tions of 1989-91 - which resulted firstly in the overthrow of the communist
regimes established in central and eastern Europe after the Second World
War and secondly in the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union itself
- spelled the end of the period of political modernity; that is to say, of the
applicability of the central categories of specifically modern politics. From
now on, it will no longer be possible to speak of political change in terms of
the old vocabulary, that is to say, of the vocabulary which in essence has
been in use since the French Revolution.
Wissenburg's essay on the prospect of a politics - in casu a liberal-demo-
cratic politics - without the state may be viewed as one attempt to explore
one of the conceptual shapes that the national and/or international politics
of the twenty-first century might take and to pose the question of how we
are to evaluate what would be an unprecedented situation. His approach,
however, can be broadened to include other possible regime forms and
their many variants, and thus many divergent scenarios.
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It has been obvious for a long time that nation states are not the only
substantial actors in the international field. Reinalda discusses other institu-
tional players with a key role in this domain, citing their function as an
important source of political change. The future research agenda for any stu-
dent of the process of internationalization will involve a study of the possi-
ble development of such non-state organizations, in their relation to the
nation state, as well as of their changing role in what, to many, looks like an
increasingly and irreversibly complex and interdependent politico-econom-
ic world.
Thought experiments alone are insufficient for carrying out analyses of
the future of the nation state. Detailed empirical studies are required, for
example, ofspecific cases in which the nation state runs up against obstacles
to its autonomous functioning. The European Union presents an interesting
example here, one in which such obstacles are only a function of a freely
willed delegation of policy-making powers, whereby - even if in particular
cases European policy seems to contradict the interest of a given nation state
- the overall functioning of the Union provides benefits which apparently
more than compensate for these specific frustrations.
Since the beginnings of the modern labour movement, the latter has
stood, as one of its founding principles, for a certain internationalism. In
the early days of European unification, the latter was interpreted by some
national labour movements as an instance of the 'wrong' kind of interna-
tionalism: one which benefited capital, to the detriment of the working
classes. This standpoint inspired much opposition to the European Com-
munity, as it was then known, for example in the United Kingdom. Thus,
paradoxically, some labour movements came to stress precisely their
national orientation2 It now looks as if, not just with the passage of time
but with the thoroughgoing transformation of the labour movement itself
(both of the trade unions and of the social-democratic and socialist parties),
this hostility has largely disappeared, to be replaced in some cases by a hope
that a united Europe can, in fact, play the role of a tool for the realization of
- much modified - social-democratic values.
Haverland analyzed the impact of the European integration process on
the political autonomy of the nation states by means of a case study of the
issue of waste packaging. In this connection he also makes use of the coun-
terfactual approach, asking what would have happened in the field in ques-
tion if the European integration process had not taken place. This is a basic
feature of the historical method and can, as Haverland shows, be usefully ap-
Conclusion 197
plied by political scientists, too. Another notion introduced by the author,
which will surely be of application in future research, is that of 'political
cost': the question is, as he puts it, not just whether the nation state will re-
tain its formal autonomy, but how politically costly it can be for such a state
to challenge particular integration policies.
To return for a moment to the labour movement, Slomp's investigation
concerns the fate of tripartism (linking trades unions, employers and gov-
ernments) in a number of European nation states. It is tempting to interpret
the growing popularity of tripartism as a sign of globalization-induced con-
vergence, but this temptation should be resisted because national traditions
in labour relations persist. Besides, this convergence has not led to a dimin-
ished role of the government. On the contrary, European governments now
play a more active role than ever before.
Something similar seems to hold in respect of the so-called new social
movements - in this case the women's movements against domestic vio-
lence and sexual harassment - as Roggeband and Verloo note. Here, too, it
seems clear from a detailed study of developments in recent years that the
national context - what is called the 'national political opportunity struc-
ture' - remains of central importance in determining the success or failure
of such movements. 'Global sisterhood' may be a source of inspiration, but
only with the help of the state can it be translated into concrete action.
These authors, too, point in their contribution to questions which must
concern future researchers aiming to discover how to cash out the real sig-
nificance of the much-touted internationalization of political processes.
The reader will have noted that this volume is concerned not only with
the phenomenon of the nation states presently belonging to the European
Union, but with other states too, and with the world-system as a whole. A
chapter is devoted to Russia and the forms of political change characterizing
that country in the first decade following the fall of the communist regime.
The authors, Weenink and Correlje, concentrate, for obvious reasons, on the
role of the energy sector in sponsoring and sometimes determining the
direction of political change, in a country in which most other economic
sectors have been reduced to relative destitution and insignificance. The
question here, around which much future study will revolve, is that of the
very cohesion of the Russian state and the relation of the state apparatus to
other, internal and external forces.
As the introduction to this volume makes clear, the Nijmegen research
group has felt itself obliged, consequent on the research results already
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obtained, to swim to a certain extent 'against the current'. But what of the
future research agenda? In part, of course, this agenda will be determined by
developing events, which are impossible to predict in their detail and often
even in their general line. One of the tasks of political science is, in any case,
to develop a new vocabulary which will make it possible to come to terms
with political changes of new kinds. But where is this new vocabulary to be
found? Perhaps, as so often in the sciences, in the product of conflictual dis-
cussions between existing, rival systems of thought. In this respect European
political scientists, though admittedly relatively underfunded, may have an
advantage over their American colleagues, who live and work in a relatively
monotonic political culture of their own, as compared with the unstable
but culturally rich gamut of political systems still characteristic of the Euro-
pean continent.
There are also thinkers who, in their attempt to make sense of the new,
propose to return to and draw illumination from the example of the old. Let
us quote in this connection one example, an article by Denis Duclos. His
piece represents just one example, and a particularly pronounced one, of a
fairly widespread tendency in normative commentary on globalization.
Duclos argues in a study of the 'cosmocracy', which he calls a 'new planetary
class', that the best way to grasp the sense of the developing political situa-
tion in the world is to compare it structurally to the situation in the last
period of the Roman Empire (see Duclos 1997). He writes that 'a metamor-
phosis of liberalism into authoritarianism has been on the agenda since
1989. A structure of oppression and hierarchy has been emerging, analo-
gous to that of the ancient empires. We are moving to a form of regime
whose aim is, as it was long ago, to establish its hegemony by way of the
exaltation of the fantasies of the powerful, by means of the oppression of
free citizens and the suppression of the indigent peoples'. In the name of
reason, he adds, the elites are steering society towards the 'triple reef of suf-
fering, narcissism and madness'. These, he notes, are features of elite rule
readily to be found in late antiquity.
Duclos' analysis is evidently one which contains strong evaluative ele-
ments. In this book it is argued that the dawning century will be character-
ized, at least initially, by the lack of real institutional alternatives to the
domination of 'Westernism'. This in no way implies the irrelevance of the
nation state as a figure of political organization and action. This is true not
just at the international level but also at the domestic level: for instance, the
diminution of the influence of the labour movement in most Western
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states, at least in Western Europe, means - as Duclos puts it - that as soon as
late capitalism felt itself free of any serious opposition, it began to carry out
a redistribution of riches in its favour. We know that, in the ancient world,
the obligation on the economic elites to support the city by their liturgies
died out around the end of the third century. Something analogous, Duclos
claims, is true of the post-1989 Western world. 'Privatization' and a new
'value-system', which stresses, among other things, the obligation of the
poor to make a 'contribution' to society and thus to earn their own living,
means that the post-Second World War political settlement, and especially
one of its principal components, the welfare state, is in the process of
decomposition or rather of deliberate deconstruction.
Duclos' claims - whatever their intrinsic interest - are of relevance inso-
far as they represent a tendency about which the Nijmegen research group is
particularly sceptical. His article illustrates, moreover, the difficulty, in the
present state of reflection, of producing a research agenda which, if it is
more than a fairly banal extrapolation of present trends, is not an apocalyp-
tic denunciation of a relatively ill-defined danger. Globalization itself, as we
know, is indeed a normatively charged concept.
Scholte (1997) writes that the argument to the effect that the logic of
contemporary economic development is making the state redundant is
hardly new. He cites in this connection the work of Naisbits (1994), Ohmae
(1995) and Reich (1991), comparing it with early twentieth century fore-
casts proposed by Marxists on the one hand and liberal internationalists on
the other, as well as with the 1970s functionalist theories of international
integration. He notes that there is much resistance to the globalization the-
sis, for instance from writers like Hirst and Thompson (1996), as well as
Krasner (1993) and Mann (1993). It is interesting that his classification of
pro- and anti-globalization theories cannot avoid assigning a prominent
place to normatively critical accounts of the phenomenon of globalization.
These claim for example that under the regime of globalizing capitalism, a
supplementing or supplanting of the old territorial nation-state system is
taking place, to the profit of governance agencies that operate 'without ade-
quate democratic control'. In other words, the debate on internationaliza-
tion, globalization and the nation state is, in essence, a politically con-
tentious one. But this is perhaps an inevitable state of affairs.
Any research agenda concerning the themes of this debate will have to
claritY the relation between internationalization and globalization. These
two concepts, though closely linked, have rather different theoretical back-
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grounds and senses. Internationalization denotes a tendency for cross-bor-
der interactions - in the economic, but also in the political, legal, cultural
and other spheres - to proliferate. These interactions concern trade, invest-
ment, finance et cetera, but also labour mobility and, more generally, com-
munication links of the most varied kinds. Hout and Lieshout note that the
'international system' is fundamentally a states system; thus we might
roughly distinguish between internationalization theories, which can admit
the assigning of the principal explanatory role to the state, and globaliza-
tion theories, which resist this approach.
There is nothing new about internationalization as a process, though it
may be argued that it is unprecedented in its quantitative extension, but
internationalization, as we have just noted, does not necessarily imply glob-
alization. For instance, the free movement of labour within the European
Union constitutes a form of internationalization, but the borders of the
European Union remain in principle - with some well-known exceptions -
closed to immigration from the rest of the world, and especially from the
Third World. The European Union itself is an international but not a global
institution. Moreover, even within this Union and within that group of
states which have ratified the Schengen Agreement, national frontiers retain
many of their classical characteristics. Each member state of the European
Union has, for instance, its own national legal system, its own law books, its
own courts and claims sole jurisdiction over its own territory.
In one sense of the term 'globalization' it is precisely the phenomenon of
supraterritoriality that is claimed to define the novel aspects of the emerging
world system. Whether or not one sympathizes with such claims, the ques-
tion of territory and borders remains a fascinating topic in its own right.
Barry Smith, for instance, comments that 'when national borders in the
modern sense first began to be established in early modern Europe, non-
contiguous and perforated nations were commonplace' (Smith 1997b). The
currently dominant conception of the nation, however, is one in which its
borders must by preference 'guarantee contiguity and simple connectedness'
as well as reflecting features such as cultural and linguistic unity and topog-
raphy. It is sometimes claimed that nations have 'natural' borders: that a na-
tion is a 'natural whole'. In this connection, too, an interesting comparison
with the Roman Empire can be made. In this case, however, it is a matter not
of a similarity but of a difference, for the Roman Empire was characterized
not so much by 'border lines' as by 'border lands' - the limes. Indeed, the
peoples that attacked Rome, the centre of the Empire, were often inhabitants
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of such border lands: that is to say, at one and the same time members of the
Empire and yet strangers to its dominant culture. Today it is these border
lands that have been 'de-territorialized', the minority cultures having now
moved in some cases to the slum suburbs of the cities, in other cases to the
very centres of the Western rnetropolises.
The interpretation of a border or frontier as a line is arguably modern. 3
In this modern conception borders are a matter of 'geometry' and more
specifically of Napoleonic geometry. 'Hand in hand with the French cadas-
tral ideal of fixed linear external frontiers', writes Smith, 'is the idea of com-
pactness and convexity, an idea according to which the natural shape of a
nation is a continuous, broadly spherical (in the French case hexagonal)
bubble' (Smith 1997a: 397). One question, therefore, is whether the pro-
cesses of internationalization or globalization are now generating a differ-
ent concept of the border or frontier. It is not obvious that this is the case.
What seems to be happening (but future research will need to look into this
matter more carefully) is not so much that the concept of border or frontier
is being redefined, as that in certain - but only in certain - respects, nation-
al borders are becoming irrelevant. It is, for example, often noted that, with
the rise of the internet, of satellite television and the like, communication
across borders becomes child's play. Yet this claim, even if correct, is in a
sense misleading: for communications received and sent are still subject to
national law, even if it is often difficult in practice to control them. If the
nation state and global society are to be understood as rivals, as some com-
mentators suppose, then we ought to be looking for particular kinds of evi-
dence of the consequences of such processes (for example, proof that power
is shifting away from the former to the latter). If, on the other hand, we
understand that the nation-state system is already not just an international
phenomenon but the principal pillar of the global society, we shall be look-
ing for very different things, in particular for information on changes in the
ways in which the nation states interact with and support a global system of
which they are, in fact, part4
It is indeed true, to take another example, that it is relatively easy and
has become easier for capital to globalize its production and marketing
operations. Thus, for instance, it is possible for a multinational or transna-
tional corporation so to organize its operations in these domains of its
activiry that it 'makes profits' only in those states in which taxation is low,
but the very fact that it needs to engage in such tax-avoidance schemes is
witness to the continuing authority of the nation state and its tax laws.
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Moreover, even if there now exists something like 'transborder' production,
this by no means implies that the labour supply functions in the same
transnational mode. As certain commentators have pointed out, frontier
controls - whether national or European Union controls - not only contin-
ue to operate in respect to the regulation of labour mobility but are in some
cases becoming stricter, much stricter than the controls on the movement of
capital. These developments are sometimes interpreted as one source of an
increasing power of capital in its relation to labour: another claim of nor-
mative significance and a matter of some relevance for future research.
A matter which remains to be investigated is that of the consequences of
internationalization and/or globalization for democracy and its institu-
tions. Wissenburg examines in his contribution some aspects of this ques-
tion. Again, there are optimistic and pessimistic speculations as to the likely
outcome of present trends. Crudely, the pessimistic argument claims that
democratic institutions function principally at the level of a well-defined
cultural sphere like the nation state (or below it, that of the regions and
cities). Thus, if the influence of such nation states really is diminishing, to
the benefit of other, often global decision-making institutional levels, citi-
zen input into the decision-making process will become ever more limited:
the 'big' decisions are taken at a 'higher' level, whether these decisions
involve economic, financial, political, technological, ecological or other
matters.
Global society, one might say, looks from a certain point of view like a
civil society which is able to operate largely outside of the control of the
nation state or any equivalent of it. From this point of view, global society is
the realization of the nightmare about which Hegel wrote in his Philosophy
of Right. In the absence of a 'state in the proper sense', he argues, society
would be nothing more than a 'soulless community', in which every 'sub-
stantial link' between the members is lacking - to put the point in Hegel's
own terminology. Such a sociery would lack any Sittlichkeit, that is, any eth-
icallife proper to itself.
Some thinkers consider that it is indeed high time that such 'national
ethical life' was eliminated as a factor in social existence. Paul Treanor, who
is no friend of the European Union presently in course of construction,
writes that, in principle, 'Europe can be a state of a new type, without iden-
tity or culture, and specifically non-national'; it can 'reject the nationalist
idea of using territory for the transmission of culture'. This, he adds, is a
quite different vision from the liberal democratic notion of a 'European
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constitutional citizenship'. Liberal constitutionalism, like classic national-
ism, requires a certain loyalty from its citizens - this indeed was, if in
another political context, precisely Hegel's pointS - whereas the kind of
Europe that Treanor anticipates is 'without identity or culture' and can
therefore 'simply dispense with the loyalty of its inhabitants. They are not
citizens. They need not feel any emotional attachment to the state, any com-
mitment' (Treanor 1997a).
It is, however, not clear what such a development would mean for the
inhabitant of this kind of Europe. Addressing such a potential inhabitant,
Treanor tells him: 'You will lose almost all the social structures which give
meaning to your lives'. In the process, he adds, national borders will disap-
pear. But, he concludes, since on the one hand 'almost evetyone has reason
to oppose any transition from the present order', and given on the other
hand that this order 'cannot continue for ever', the consequences are, he
predicts, likely to be dramatic and probably violent.
Treanor's wide-ranging speculations, like Scholte's more sober analysis
and Duclos' normative evaluations, are diverse examples of attempts to
write a research agenda for the study of an internationalizing and globaliz-
ing world and the future role of the nation state within it. This is a fascinat-
ing task and one which will actively concern the Nijmegen research group,
further pursuing the lines of investigation presented in this volume. As
Alexander Zinoviev remarks in a recent article, we are now living through
the beginnings of a new epoch in world social and political histoty. This, he
adds, is an enthralling object of study for social scientists: for 'never was the
situation in the world as complicated and interesting as it is today'
(Zinoviev 1999c: 65). We can only agree.
cr. Treanor 1997b, par. 5.3: 'There is at present one clear example of a competing world
order: theocratic religious universalism. IButl a complete alternative world order is
unlikely to control any territory within the world order it rejects ... As long as there are
nations, there will be no caliphate ... Structurally, nationalism excludes other entities
from state status. Nationalism is a blocking world order: it excludes other worlds'. We
need, of course, here to distinguish claims about the nation state and its future from
claims about the state form: theoretically, states of a type different from the nation state
are possible, and indeed have been realized in the past: for example in the case of certain
dynastic states in which any national principle of unity was, if not absent, a subordinate
element.
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2 This was not, in fact, a new development. The history of the labour movement in Europe
is a contradictory histOly of resistance to and yet integration into the structures of the
nation state. The positions taken by the various socialist parties at the outbreak of the
First World War - support for the national war efforts, in contradiction with many inter-
nationalist and pacifist declarations - is a well-known and dramatic illustration of the
ambivalence in question.
3 Smith here cites Whittaker, who writes: 'the very idea of a frontier as a line on a map is
modern' - and French (Whittaker 1994).
4 er. Treanor 1997b, par. 4.1: '[AnI opposition recurrent in theory on nations is that
between the national and the globaL The nation-state and national culture are being
eroded by global communication - it is often said ... [But] nation-states are still here...
There is no erosion of the national by the global ... Nationalism is 100% global: a world
order cannot logically be further globalized'.
5 In paragraph 267 of his Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1967 [1821]), where he stresses the
importance of the political sentiment or patriotism of the individual subject, which can
only develop and come to fruition in a community - the state - united by culture, tradi-
tion, religion and moral values.
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